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ABSTRACT
This dissertation se t out to review the array  of O ireachtas Select and  Jo in t 
Com m ittees created a t the  s ta r t of the  27 th  Dail in  1993 and reestab lished  
following th e  change of governm ent in 1995 and  to  explore their im pact on the  
functions of parliam ent.
To begin w ith, secondary literature relating to tasks associated w ith  parliam ents 
is discussed draw ing on Irish experiences and  practices w here possible.
The m any debates on O ireachtas reform  over th e  p ast tw enty  years are 
exam ined, prim arily w ith  a view to learning the views of parliam entarians 
regarding the specific use of com m ittees.
A range of factors w hich it is felt have a critical im pact on the  operations of 
parliam entary com m ittees and  their m em bers in a num ber of countries are 
p resented  for consideration.
An overview of the O ireachtas com m ittees in ex istence in 1996 illustrating such  
features as the  role of wom en, paym ents to  chairpersons and  ex ten t of 
m em bership by deputies and  senators is offered.
Two case studies relating to th e  operations of th e  Select Com m ittee on 
Legislation and  Security  and  the Jo in t Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs exam ine the 
detailed activities of both  these com m ittees for the period 1993 - 1996, 
highlighting th e  degree of involvem ent by m em bers, workload, observations of 
participants and  m ain  players over tim e, difficulties encountered  and  a  nu m b er of 
observations are presented  regarding their operations.
The study  concludes th a t th e  com m ittees offered parliam entarians, governm ent 
and in terest groups a unique opportunity  to unleash , enkindle and  fuse ta len ts  
and knowledge from  sources hitherto  largely rem oved and uninvolved in detailed 
public policy form ation. The potential benefits available from their em ploym ent, 
however, w ere severely ham pered  by th e  sheer overabundance of com m ittees 
w ith consequent s tra in  on all the stakeholders/p layers involved, the  persistence of 
governm ent dom ination in  parliam entary  output, the continuing em phasis on 
constituency work by m em bers w hich tended  to place those w ho w ished to 
pursue an energetic, active role in com m ittee operations, possibly a t the  expense 
of less well-publicised constituency activity  a t an  electoral disadvantage, the 
failure by the authorities to provide appropriate resources for effective and  
dynam ic ou tpu t from  the com m ittees and  the  lack of appropriate m edia 
recognition com bining to dilute their effectiveness.
The am endm ents to the  com m ittee system , announced for the  28 th  Dail are 
noted, observing th a t m any  of the changes flow from the experiences gained from 
their use in the  2 7 th  Dail w hich in itself justified  their creation and  
experim entation.
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Introduction
The new role for the Oireachtas as a result of the creation in 1993 of a network of 
select and joint committees was hailed as an advancement in parliamentary 
reform in Ireland insofar as it was seen as probably the greatest single change in 
the way that the Oireachtas conducted its business since the foundation of the 
state (Noel Dempsey, government chief whip, Dail debates, 18 February 1993). 
With a view to examining this development further, I began by compiling an 
inventory of the perceived functions of parliaments as presented in literature by 
such academics as Norton (1990, 1992, 1993], Wheare (1968), Laundy (1989) and 
others. This revealed that parliaments are generally acknowledged as being 
entrusted with tasks embracing legislative, policy-making, scrutinising, 
representational, educational, teaching, elective and debating functions. Each of 
these facets of parliamentary activity are discussed in chapter one. At a later 
point case studies are presented which examine in detail the activities of two 
revamped Oireachtas committees which explore the impact, if any, their 
operations have had on both the functions of the Irish parliament (Oireachtas) 
and on the parliamentary members themselves.
To this end I studied literature highlighting the many tasks associated with 
parliaments in a number of jurisdictions and in different constitutional 
arrangements in order to gain an international view on the subject. With a view 
to placing the then current new practices in an historical context in terms of the 
development of the Oireachtas, some of the debates on Irish parliamentary reform 
over the past twenty years were reviewed in order to elicit the members own
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views on the  topic w ith a focus on instances w here parliam entary  com m ittee 
utilisation w ere discussed.
Various forces w hich m ight im pact on th e  proceedings of com m ittees and their 
m em bers w ere exam ined in an  a ttem p t to  identify key factors w ith  a  bearing on 
the  fortunes of com m ittees. Secondary literature, d iscussed in ch ap ter four, 
p resen ts and  considers a range of com ponents such  as th e  degree of 
specialisation by m em bers, role of the  m edia, powers of com m ittees, provision of 
facilities and  the  role of outside bodies w hich authors su ch  as Shaw  (1979), Olson 
and Norton (1996) and  others indicate have consequences for the quality, 
efficiency and  effectiveness of parliam entary  com m ittees and  are linked to th e  
wider totality  of parliam entary  activities. A rgum ents both  for and  against the  use 
of com m ittees are p resented  reflecting th e  views of w riters in  a nu m b er of 
countries such  as Baines (1985) and  Donnelly (1997) in  Britain, Heidar (1997) and  
Andeweg (1997) in  o ther parts  of Europe and  O’Halpin (1986) and  Arkins (1990) 
relating to Ireland.
As it would have proven im possible to realistically exam ine all th e  com m ittees of 
the  27 th  Dail/Oireachtas, I decided to p resen t an  overview of the  com m ittees, 
existing in  1993 -1996, to highlight a  n u m b er of com m on issues such  as scale of 
m em bership, rem uneration  and  the  position of w om en in O ireachtas com m ittees 
and to concentrate in g reater detail by  m eans of two case stud ies on one select 
com m ittee, confined to Dail m em bers, w ith  a  large legislative workload and  a 
jo in t com m ittee, draw ing m em bers from bo th  Houses and  concentrating 
prim arily on policy m atters. To th is end, I selected th e  Select Com m ittee on 
Legislation and  Security and  th e  Jo in t Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs.
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This dissertation is based primarily on the proceedings of the sample committees 
from 1993 until the end of 1996, even though the 27th Dail continued to operate 
until mid 1997, and a number of changes to the then system have occurred since 
that time and are noted in the conclusions. The study involved the examination 
of all the printed and published records of relevant committee proceedings, 
annual reports, newspaper articles, contact with committee secretariat in Leinster 
House and correspondence/interviews with some officials of the Houses of the 
Oireachtas. The case studies entailed the examination of the operations of the two 
committees on a year-by-year basis from 1993-1996. The reason for adopting this 
methodology was to conform with the availability of records and reports and also 
to facilitate the study of changes and trends over the passage of time in such 
matters as attendance, difficulties, reactions to output, level of expertise of 
members, commitment and attitudes of members, government and associated 
forces. Tables are presented which endeavour to illustrate the workload of both 
committees, the attendance and input/contribution rates over the period of the 
review and the expenditure considered by the committees in the estimates 
process. Many of the calculations are purely to demonstrate the scale of 
operations and commitment to the committees and are in no way an attempt to 
adopt a score card approach to committee operations as this would serve no 
useful purpose. Unfortunately, I found that the proceedings of committees, other 
than the consideration of estimates and the committee stage of legislation, ceased 
publication after a short time allegedly in order to save expenditure. Furthermore 
not all committees published annual reports in spite of the requirement that they 
so do and several that were published arrived late. Whilst this defect had the 
effect of hampering my study to a certain degree and proved less than 
satisfactory in some instances, there was still plenty of material available to
perm it a realistic portrayal of events during the  period 1993 - 1996. Given th a t 
so m any m eetings appeared  to go undocum ented, a t least as far as public 
scru tiny  w as concerned, there  is a danger th a t dem ocracy an d  the  principle of 
public accountability w ere com prom ised by the large degree of parliam entary  
business conducted de fa c to  "behind closed doors" insofar as while som e 
m eetings m ay  nom inally have been  held in  public, th e  lack of public records 
rendered th em  inaccessible to in terested  parties in  practical term s.
This work follows on th e  previous s tudy  by A udrey Arkins relating to the  24th  
Dâil, w hich found th a t parliam entary  com m ittees w ere largely abandoned upon 
the  dissolution of th a t O ireachtas. This curren t experim ent w ith  O ireachtas 
com m ittees appeared to generate  a g reater en thusiasm  am ong both  m em bers, 
adm inistration and the  governm ents of the 27th  Dâil and the  recent, positive 
decision of the O ireachtas to continue w ith the usage of parliam entary  
com m ittees in a refined and  streng thened  m anner, is, I subm it, as a  resu lt of the  
m any lessons learned, by the  O ireachtas from the activities of the  com m ittees of 
the 27 th  Dâil.
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CHAPTER 1 - PARLIAMENTS AND PARLIAMENTARIANS 
Introduction
In considering the issues relating to this subject I have studied the work of 
several authors who write on the functions of parliam ent not only in Ireland but 
in m any other countries also. This led to an exam ination of m any of the forms of 
assembly found throughout the world.
I was struck by the absence of agreem ent am ongst writers on the precise 
meaning and role of parliam ent in whatever mode it existed in particular 
countries. Whilst m any comm entators agreed on specific functions as being 
relevant to a parliament, the vast range of activities highlighted by the literature 
in this field is impressive.
I decided to examine the role of parliam ent and parliam entarians in a range of 
states and to establish w hat both these institutions and their m em bers should do. 
I propose therefore to review some definitions of parliam ent and to discuss a 
range of associated functions of sam e as suggested by a num ber of writers. This 
will lead to a consideration at a later stage of an analysis of and a com m entary on 
the actual performance of the Irish parliam ent and its m em bers m easured against 
the range of activities which I will outline as being considered proper to 
parliaments (s)/parliamentarians. The im pact of comm ittees on this work will be 
reviewed later also.
1
Parliam ent - L egislature
Laundy (1989, p .30) sta tes  th a t parliam ents are cen tral to m ost system s of 
governm ent adding th a t ‘ 145 countries have Parliam ents of one kind or an o th er’. 
Several authors com m ent on the  in terchange betw een  the  use of "legislature" and  
"parliam ent", finding no difference betw een these  two titles in  use as ‘su ch  bodies 
have in com m on .... th a t they  are constitutionally  designated  institu tions for 
giving assen t to b inding m easures of public policy ... on behalf of a political 
com m unity’ (Norton 1990, p .l) . W hilst S trom  (1997) points out th a t ’the  two 
term s have different Origins, and  th a t there has been  a tendency  to apply th e  ... 
term  [legislature] m ainly to national assem blies in  presidential sy s tem s’, he also 
uses ’the term s "parliam ent" and  "legislature"’ in terchangeably . Laundy (1989, 
p .65) suggests th a t th e  two te rm s ‘are often used  synonym ously’. W heare (1968, 
p .l  ] agrees b u t adds th a t th is can  be m isleading ‘for a large p art of th e  tim e of 
these bodies is no t devoted to law-m aking a t all’. T hese reservations concerning 
their law-m aking role would seem  to  correspond w ith  P ackenham ’s (1970, p. 81) 
view ‘th a t the  principal function of m ost of th e  w orld’s legislatures is not a 
decisional function’. Indeed Rose referring to the  UK parliam ent (1986, p. 15) 
com m ents th a t ‘it is wrong to describe parliam ent as a  legislature, for it does not 
m ake law s’.
Accepting th e  m isgivings claim ed by m any  w riters in  th is field, I propose to 
proceed as if there  w ere no basic difference betw een  both  types and  to adopt the  
view of Norton (1990, p .l]  th a t these titles (and others) are bu t a generic nam e for 
institutions of th is nature.
2
Functions of Parliam ent
Turning now to the functions of parliaments. I have m ade reference earlier to the 
large volume of tasks attributed to these bodies by various authors. In 
commenting on these tasks it m ust be noted that differences will arise depending 
on whether the parliam ent operates in a multi-party democracy, a W estm inster 
model scenario, a  single party state or a country where the executive 
(government) is completely separate from the legislature (parliament). I found 
diverse tasks allocated to parliam ents where each of thé above exist.
(i) Law - making
Amongst those who proclaim the law m aking function of parliam ent are Beer 
(1992, p .12), Suleimann (1986, p .5), Mann (1986), Laundy (1989, p.65) W heare 
(1968, p.3) and Norton (1992, p.3). Indeed "on face value", you would assum e it 
to be one of a  legislature’s principal tasks. FitzGerald (1997) states that ’the 
quality of the review and revision of legislation ... is the real test of the quality of 
parliam ent’s work’. Parliaments are at least theoretically the sovereign body in 
m ost countries/constitutions and thus the principle of parliam entary suprem acy 
in the enactm ent of legislation is present in m ost democracies in the world. 
Acceptance of this would lead one to assum e that parliam ents possess strong 
powers in both the initiation, consideration and ultim ate fate of legislation.
However a study of the literature in this area would suggest that in practice the 
power of parliam ents is often more limited than  the theory would suggest.
Several authors (Saalfeld, Arkins, Gladdish, Norton, 1990) cite the classification
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of legislatures by Mezey (1979) and referred to by Suleim ann (1986, p .5) which 
describes three models used to decipher the proper place of parliam ents in 
democratic societies and label m ost West European states as belonging to the 
‘modest policy-making power’ category. Suleimann attributes some of the loss of 
parliam entary sovereignty to government to the emergence of m ass political 
parties although he modifies this in the cases of m ultiparty coalitions and the 
instances of undisciplined parties. This is sum m arised in Figure 1.1:
Party System Legislature’s and Legislator’s Independence
Majority Party 
Multiparty Coalition 
Undisciplined Parties
Strong Moderate Weak
X
X
X
Source Suleimann (1986, p.6J
FIGURE 1.1 : Classification of legislatures by Mezey [1979]
Because parliam ents represent the electors who appoint them , it is proper that 
they should have the right to initiate and ultim ately accept, modify or reject 
proposed legislation. The position as found in m any legislatures is that because of 
party political power and executive dominance the actual role of parliam ent in 
the formal passage of legislation is marginalised.
The rise in the power of and the increased professionalism of political parties in 
most legislative assemblies coupled with the high degree of voting cohesiveness 
displayed by government supporters witnessed in parliam ents have ‘served as the
conduits for the transfer of policy-making power from legislatures to executives’ 
(Norton, 1990, p .5).
Many authors qualify the law-making task of parliam ent by relating to the 
position of parliam ent in society to-day, the power of the governm ent to initiate 
legislation and to control its passage through parliam ent and the fact that in the 
main a governm ent’s legislation is rarely defeated because of its hold over 
parliament ("cabinet dictatorship") and the party  political "whipped" system  
which sees a governing party’s supporters vote in favour of their governm ent’s 
proposals in almost all cases. In m any cases such as Ireland and the UK (Rose, 
1986, p. 14) this voting cohesion can be because m any of the m em bers of 
parliam ent aspire to office themselves and would not therefore countenance 
"rocking the boat" and earning "black marks".
In France, Frears (1990), whilst acknowledging that parliam ent makes a 
constructive contribution to the legislative process, concludes.that the executive 
exercises complete suprem acy in the m atter. Saalfeld (1990) also records that in 
Germany m ost legislative proposals are prepared by the governm ent and are 
rarely defeated. This practice in m odem  parliam ents is repeated in several 
legislatures.
It should be noted, however, that some countries recognise the efforts of their 
parliamentarians and endeavour to involve them  at an early stage in the 
proceedings and introduce some elem ent of consensus into the process and we 
will be introduced to these concepts when the Select Committee on Legislation 
and Security (SCLS) is considered below. Furlong (1990) indicates how in Italy,
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government-introduced legislation often includes m easures previously presented 
in private bills and that this increases the likelihood of consent to the eventual 
government bill. There was some evidence of this approach at the SCLS as will 
be outlined in a later chapter.
Sweden has long included MPs, including m em bers of the opposition on 
commissions empowered to consider issues which often result in legislation. Even 
in this more relaxed, less autocratic seeming parliament, the governm ent can, at 
the end of the day, still get its m easures through by the num erical strength  of its 
supporters in the Riksdag. W hat is unusual is the strong influence which that 
parliament exerts both by forming back bench cross party coalition groups to 
promote regional issues and the substantial use of comm ittees in the legislative 
process.
A feature of the Swedish system  (also found in some other countries) is the 
practice whereby government proposals usually go direct to the comm ittee before 
a second reading in the plenary session, thus affording m em bers an opportunity 
to exert influence at a earlier, critical time before they become major political 
issues on the floor of the house. All of these result in some erosion of 
adversarialism according to Arter (1990) and an enhanced perception by 
Swedish MPs them selves of their role as legislators. This is close to the 
description of ‘classical’ or ‘genuine legislator’ applied to parliam entarians in the 
United States which Bogdanor (1985, p .5] and Laundy (1989, p .70] suggest are 
the prime examples of m em bers of a national parliam ent exercising significant 
power in the area of law-making. The eventual and welcome introduction of this 
practice into the Oireachtas will be found w hen the SCLS and other committees
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are discussed below.
Writing about the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, Heidar (1997) points to the 
rise in the occurrence of minority governm ents in Norway in the 1970s and 
1980s and associates this fact with various reports of Olsen (1983) and 
Rommetvedt (1992) concerning the ’increase in the importance of the Storting in 
Norwegian politics during this period’ which tends to confirm the first elem ent in 
the table above. Similarly, referring to the second component of the sam e table, it 
could be argued that O’Halpin (1996) was of a similar m ind when he alluded to 
’the emergence of coalitions as the dom inant model of governm ent’ in Ireland 
coinciding with ’a modest strengthening of the legislature’s powers of oversight 
and enquiry through specialist com m ittees’ and this fact is further dem onstrated 
by the sam e author’s attribution of the very formation of the Jo in t Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in 1993 to Labour Party insistence as part of the coalition 
government formation arrangem ents with Fianna Fail (despite the latter party’s 
historic resistance to same).
Mann (1986, p.223) refers to A m erican exceptionalism in the universe of 
democratic legislatures’ when writing about the US Congress which, as it is 
completely separate from the executive branch (the government) has ‘an 
independent capacity, frequently exercised, to mould and transform  proposals 
from whatever source into laws’ (Polsby, 1975).
In the United Kingdom, which spawned the "W estminster model" of parliament, 
the adoption of which by Ireland is blam ed for m uch of the perceived weaknesses 
of the Oireachtas, the formal legislative process is often viewed as m erely a
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legitimation function and an occasion for political parties to register their views 
on issues. Norton (1993, pp. 54-55) com m ents on the role of MPs as facilitators, 
who accepting tha t the governm ent dom inates the parliam entary time table, 
introduce groups to Ministers and hope to gain acceptance of am endm ents in that 
way. Outlining the formal m ethods by which MPs and peers m ay introduce 
am endm ents to legislation he adds (p.81) that for m any reasons - time; expertise; 
knowledge - ‘in practice the potential far exceeds the practice’. Whilst it is open 
to private m em bers of both the  House of Commons and House of Lords to initiate 
legislation, the reality is that apart from a few celebrated - often non contentious 
pieces - such private m em bers bills Eire usually doomed to failure because of lack 
of government support and thus parliam entary time. (Witness the com m entary 
by political correspondents regarding the likelihood of the failure, for the very 
reason above, of the proposed anti-hunting legislation, a private m em ber’s 
measure, despite a huge vote in the House of Commons in favour of the move.]
Because m inisters in the UK (and presum ably in other similar type parliaments) 
do not want to alienate their own supporters unnecessarily, back bench influence 
on legislation is effected "behind the scenes" at parliam entary party  meetings 
such as back bench committees or if negative parliam entary reaction from own 
backbenchers is anticipated, steps are taken by the executive to address the 
problem (Norton, 1993, p.69). Therefore the real law-making m ay be said to occur 
to some extent in the party rooms outside of the parliam entary cham ber. Indeed I 
suspect that this approach was tactically adopted at the SCLS when an apparent 
impasse concerning the appointm ent of judges was under consideration as 
revealed in a later chapter relating to the proceedings of the SCLS in 1995.
Patzelt (1997) referring to the position in Germany cites the existence of a "new
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dualism" of the executive and the supportive parliam ent m ajority and declares 
that since the parliam entarians would be loathe to jeopardise the stability of their 
government, this forces consideration by both governm ent and MP of each others 
view when adopting positions. Damgaard (1997) illustrates the case of Danish 
MPs with those supporting the governm ent having ready access to m inisters to 
discuss their views on legislation and the opposition having to rely on formal 
preparation of bills by them  in order to advance their proposals.
Ireland
In Ireland, the Constitution acknowledges the legislative role of the Oireachtas in 
Article 15.2:
The sole and exclusive power of m aking laws for the State is hereby vested 
in the Oireachtas:
However the Oireachtas, Dail and Seanad (excluding the President who is 
sometimes referred to as the third House of the Oireachtas) seem  to be as 
restricted in their legislative deliberations as the parliam ents of m ost other 
European democracies.
‘The government has an almost exclusive initiative in proposing m easures ...
[and] controls the passage of business through the two houses’ (Chubb, 1982, 
p. 175). This power over the Oireachtas by the governm ent which illustrates the 
reality of the situation, whatever the Constitution m ight say, has eroded the law­
making functions of parliam ent (Arkins, 1990).
This is not to say that parliam ent and its m em bers have no influence on the
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legislation proceeding through parliament, as in m ost jurisdictions the process 
involves a num ber of stages even prior to presentation to parliam ent at all. Bills 
go through what Laundy (1989, p.69) refers to as pre-consideration stages before 
parliament:
They will probably have originated in a governm ent departm ent and will 
certainly have been considered in cabinet. In m any cases there will 
probably have been an input from outside bodies and experts with an 
interest in the subject of the legislation.
At this juncture ‘the public procedures - that is, the parliam entary stages ... 
begin’ (Chubb, 1982, p .181). In the m ain it has been the practice that once a bill 
has been introduced, the sponsoring m inister has been "locked-in" to a specific 
course of action/policy which was practically sacrosanct and would rarely 
countenance any change to the m easure being formally considered.
However the attitude that only the government m ay be right is slowly being 
altered especially through the advent of the new legislative comm ittees and 
deputies have been reported as lauding this new "law-making role".
Amendments appear to be accepted by the governm ent to a greater degree than 
before as the review of the SCLS later illustrates. However initiation of legislation 
continues to be thw arted by the government. Mention is still m ade of the few 
private m em bers bills passed - some as long ago as the 1930s, Alan Shatter’s two 
bills on family law and adoption, the acceptance by the governm ent of the Eoin 
Ryan TD, sponsored bill relating to child sexual abuse abroad and the "adoption" 
by the last cabinet of Fianna Fail inspired draft anti-crime legislation. The record 
of Seanad private m em bers bills is worse, with the Protection of Animals 
(amendment) Act, 1969 being quoted as a rare example (Me G Smyth, 1972, p.
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69) .
(ii) Policy - making
Whilst the law making role of parliam ent is disputed by som e people writing in 
this area, the capacity of parliam ent to influence policy is alluded to by m any 
writers. Referring to one of the elements of the UK parliam ent, Rose (1986, p. 15) 
accepts that the House of Commons ‘influences the clim ate’ in which laws are 
enacted and has a task of ratifying the legislation. The point is m ade by other 
authors th a t parliam ent and its m em bers are but one elem ent in the forces that 
influence policy in the public arena along with a variety of interest groups and 
organisations which are adept at getting their point across to the law drafters. 
Nevertheless it is clear that parliam entarians have varying degrees of success in 
influencing policy. Arter (1990, p .125] highlights the participation of Swedish 
MPs, including the opposition, in ‘commissions tha t are routinely engaged in the 
gestation and formulation of public policy’. As the US Congress possesses very 
strong independent powers in this area Mann (1986, p.227] acknowledges its 
ability to shape policy to an extent not enjoyed by m any other parliam ents 
throughout the world. The Irish situation in this regard is that m ost 
comm entators would agree w ith O’Halpin (1992, p. 179) th a t ‘the Oireachtas is 
conspicuously weak’. Arkins (1990, p .101] would seem  to concur when she says 
that ‘backbenchers in Ireland .... play a  subsidiary role in policy formulation [ to 
the executive]’. She concludes that Dail Eireann enjoys m odest policy-making 
power insofar as it is capable of modifying bu t not rejecting policy proposals’ 
when she "measures" the power of the Dail against the standard set by Mezey
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(1979) (also employed by Suleim ann above) when classifying legislatures as 
having "strong", "modest" or "little/none"policy-making power. Therefore in 
m any cases the parliam ents only exercise a legitimation function by giving its 
"stamp of approval" (Packenham 1992, pp. 88-89) to m easures before it. He was 
in this instance referring to the  proceedings of the Brazilian Congress but this 
could apply to m any parliam ents in the world especially those following the 
"Westminster" model.
An apparent air of frustration felt by m em bers of parliam ents at their actual 
plight (contrary to any formal superior status) is given expression in a com m ent 
from an organisation entitled Global Legislators Organisation for a Balanced 
Environment (Globe)
Parliamentarians are thw arted in their work by the  inadequacy of their 
powers to act upon the executive, or otherwise by their inability to use 
effectively the powers which they do have.
(iii) Talking/debating
The common impression of parliam ents and their m em bers is that they seem  to 
involve a lot of talking. While some would condem n this it rem ains a m ost 
im portant aspect of parliam entary life according to others. The word parliam ent 
is partly derived from the French word "parler" - to talk (Laundy 1989, p .l) and if 
one extends this definition to include ‘discuss’ (Rose, 1986, p. 16) or debate 
(Laundy 1989, p .63), (Wheare, 1968, p.3), it would seem  that this activity is a 
m ain feature of m ost parliam ents. Indeed it can allow the m em bers to express the 
will of the people as Beer, Mann and W heare suggest and can therefore exist as a 
"safety valve" to defuse issues of national excitem ent or outrage (Packenham, 
1970, p.89). Mann (1986) talks of the US Congress as being ‘especially adept at
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expressing public opinion’ and Wheare (1968, p. 113) cites John  Stuart Mill’s 
words:
I know not how a representative assembly can more usefully employ itself 
than  in talk, when the subject of talk is the great public interests of the 
country, and every sentence of it represents the opinion either of some 
im portant body of persons in the nation, or of an individual in whom some 
such body have their confidence
when he describes ‘criticism of Parliaments, that they do nothing but talk’ as 
"misplaced derision".
(iv) A dm inistrative oversight
Many writers on this subject refer to the role of parliam ent in ‘m aking the 
government behave’ (Wheare, 1968, p .77). This is an im portant function for 
parliam entarians as argued by Frears (1990, p .34) when he advocates that one of 
parliam ent’s m ain tasks is ‘to scrutinise’ and ‘to w arn’ and to prevent the 
executive from ‘abusing its powers’. Similarly Packenham  (1970, p .93) suggests 
that a role of a legislature is the provision of ‘adm inistrative oversight’.
A num ber of authors illustrate the case where governm ents in recent years have 
acquired m uch additional power by delegation of very generous powers, for 
example the widespread use of "Statutory Instrum ents", "Orders in Council" or 
other similar forms of secondary legislation. Whilst there is usually provision for 
parliam ents to annul these, it is necessary for vigilance to be displayed in the 
monitoring of these often far-reaching powers. In m any cases the parliam ent 
possesses the ultim ate power of forcing the resignation of the government. This 
could occur in Ireland, Italy or the UK where m easures deem ed to be of a 
confidence nature are defeated by the legislature leaving the governm ent with no
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option but to resign. This has happened in Ireland in recent years with the defeat 
of the Bruton budget in 1982; the "no confidence" motion which brought down 
the Haughey government shortly after and the collapse of the Reynolds 
government in 1994 following the withdrawal of the Labour party from the then 
governing coalition. [Indeed this latter dram atic occurrence and the series of 
events associated with it led in  no small way to the further development of the 
Irish parliam entary comm ittee system  as the circum stances surrounding the 
breakup of the government were the subject of a  unique investigative sub­
committee of the Dail.] In Britain the Callaghan governm ent fell in 1979 due to 
loss of confidence in the administration by the lower house of parliament.
The above action m ight be som ewhat extrem e bu t it can still be the result of a 
parliam ent using its powers to show displeasure at governm ent action or 
inaction. In m any other countries such as the US, this can not happen even 
though the Congress fully utilises its power as ‘the overseer of Federal 
Bureaucracy’ (Mann, 1986, p.242) in a very strong fashion. Several countries 
seem  to prevent this threat of early dissolution by not treating every issue as a 
potential confidence m atter and occasionally accepting defeat in specific m atters.
Parliamentarians possess a range of possible m ethods of criticising the executive 
(Laundy, p . l l ;  Wheare, 1968, pp.79-86). Most parliam ents incorporate some form 
of question period, either w ritten or oral, which allows a m em ber to question the 
appropriate government minister. This is certainly the norm  in countries 
following the "Westminster" model. Matters critical of the executive m ay be 
raised during debates on legislation or by way of specific motion. Even m em bers 
of parliament who support the  government are not to be taken for granted in all
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m atters. Braine (1987) referring to the House of Commons in the UK advanced 
the view that ‘not being able to take the House for granted helps to keep 
Ministers on their toes and is essential for Parliam entary dem ocracy’.
(v) R epresentation
Many would agree with the assertions of Patterson (1966, p. 114) and quotes by 
Wahlke (1992, p .114) that ‘a legislature .... is a symbol of representative, 
democratic, governm ent’. Indeed this whole issue of representation is confirmed 
as being of utm ost importance by all of the authors whose works I studied. 
Suleimann (1986, p.3) refers to the ‘elected representatives of the people’, Rose 
(1986, p.21) to an MP as, ‘a constituency representative, Wahlke (1992, p .107) to 
the ‘behaviour of representatives’. Laundy (1989, p. 11) writes that ‘the essential 
function of a popular assem bly is the representation of the people as a  whole’ and 
further suggests that ‘ perhaps the true common denom inator [of parliaments], 
regardless of a country’s political system, is that of representation!
(vi) Financial control
This representation would lead to the elem ents of financial control exercised by 
parliam ents (as representatives of the people) over taxation and spending m atters 
by the executive. Closely linked with this issue are the tasks outlined by Beer 
(1992, p.71] of ‘controlling and restraining the executive’ and ‘presenting 
grievances’. Parliam ents’ interest in taxation/financial m atters would seem  to 
stem  from the accounts w ritten by Laundy (1989, pp. 75-76) of how English 
parliaments were sum m oned by kings to advance monies to finance the costs of 
fighting battles and used the opportunity to raise grievances with the m onarch 
before granting supply of money. This practice is reflected to some extent in the
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current position in the UK House of Commons whereby "Opposition days" are 
provided for the purpose of a free - ranging debate often lasting throughout the 
night, on a range of grievances raised by m em bers, and the instance of Australian 
grievance days for similar purposes in the Australian parliam ent. This control on 
money m atters by the elected cham bers of parliam ent (in bicameral situations] 
continues in m ost countries but the introduction of m easures to spend m oney is 
often a retained function of governments in order, it is said, to prevent m em bers 
of parliament authorising/promoting the expenditure of funds but vetoing the 
raising of taxes to cover same.
(vii) R elationship w ith  constituency
When we discuss the representation role of m em bers of parliam ent we should be 
very conscious of the relationship between the m em ber and his/her constituency 
and constituents. The constituency work of a parliam entarian is often derided but 
is carefully nurtured by the m em ber concerned. Packenham  (1970, p .94) referred 
to it as ‘errand - running’ whilst Frears (1990, p.44) uses the term  ‘localism’ to 
refer to the practice of legislators in France ‘of spending more time on local issues 
than being a national legislator’. Wheare (1968, p.47) reflects on the "surgeries" 
held by British MPs in their constituencies and states that this provides the MP 
‘with an opportunity of knowing how people in his electorate are thinking and 
feeling ... discover from his party supporters ... attitudes they take on the issues 
under discussion’. This closeness to constituents and their "problems" is often 
raised in Ireland also and is sometimes referred to as "clientism", being viewed 
‘as a negative phenom enon’ (Gallagher and Komito 1992, p. 149). Gallagher 
(1996) in an examination of electoral system s, annexed to the Report of the 
Constitution Review Group (1996), addresses this point as follows:
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No-one has argued tha t representing the individual and com m unity 
interests of constituents is not an im portant part of the responsibilities of a 
m em ber of parliament. Nor, as far as I know, has anyone suggested that 
TDs deal w ith genuine cases purely out of a  desire to be re-elected, as if, 
were the electoral incentives to be removed, TDs would feel free to close 
their ears to those needing assistance. It can be taken for granted tha t the 
great majority of TDs, like parliam entarians in m ost countries, will always 
feel obliged to lend their expertise and assistance to constituents who turn  
to them  with a genuine problem, even if resolving this problem will be 
complicated, time-consuming and perhaps not very fulfilling.
It is clear from the literature that the relationship between the electors and the
elected varies depending on the electoral system  employed. In m ulti-seat single
transferable vote constituency system s as in Ireland where competition between
sitting m em bers is often exacerbated by the need to prevent a candidate from the
sam e party from unseating a TD, extensive constituency work is undertaken in
order to m aintain a local political profile. This particular feature is noted in the
Report of the Constitution Review Group (p.53) where it notes tha t there is a
feeling abroad tha t the present constituency arrangem ents are such ’tha t there is
too m uch competition for the loyalty of constituents between Deputies from the
same party’. It can result in a closeness often absent from European parliam ents.
This can apply even if the m em ber is a governm ent m inister [and it m ust be
noted that the practice in m any European states and the US Congress is that
ministers are not m em bers of the parliament] as related by Gemma Hussey when
she referred to her dual role as a TD and a Minister for Education and the
demands this put upon her (Hussey, 1990, p. 172). The structure of constituencies
obviously plays a large part in this relationship with constituents. British voters
refer to "my" MP due to the single m em ber constituency, US Congressmen are
very close to their district, while it is argued that in Netherlands there is little of
such "closeness" as MPs are elected on a country - wide list basis. Germany
would appear to have tackled this problem by devoting some seats in parliam ent
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to a single-member constituency system  and the balance to a national list system  
to ensure greater representation.
(viii) Other a c tiv itie s  o f Parliam ent
In addition to those tasks outlined above, a review of the literature also reveals a 
num ber of other activities relating to legislatures/parliaments which include the 
whole process of recruiting and training politicians for future positions including 
membership of governments which in m any jurisdictions would require that they 
surrender their seat in parliament. In those countries which embrace the 
W estminster model and where cabinet m inisters are m em bers of parliam ent 
(such as Ireland, the UK and m any Commonwealth states) it would be usual for a 
junior m em ber to "serve his/her time" as a backbencher before appointm ent to 
"the bottom rung of the ministerial ladder", thus allowing tim e for socialisation 
into the accepted role of m inisters and their relationship w ith parliam ent and the 
civil service.
Bagehot (1867, p.3.7] m akes m ention of the ‘elective function’ of [the UK] 
parliament. This could be extended to refer to the election of a prim e m inister - 
either directly as in Dail Eireann or indirectly following subm ission to a vote of 
confidence in the appropriate cham ber as in Italy. Many parliam ents also 
endorse/confirm a  range of appointm ents such as judges, am bassadors and other 
public officials as is the case in the United States, Peru, Mexico, Switzerland and 
Portugal [Laundy, 1989, p.40). Some parliaments/legislatures constitute 
themselves as an electoral college for the election of a President - head of state. 
This applies in such countries as Israel, Nauru, Greece, Malta (Laundy 1989,p.38) 
and in Italy where the m em bers of both cham bers of parliam ent are joined by
regional delegates.
Amongst the m ost striking and thought provoking functions of parliam ent tha t I 
encountered was their ‘teaching function’ (Bagehot 1867, p .38). This author 
emphasised parliam ent’s role in altering society which corresponds with Mann’s 
view (1986, p.242) that the US Congress had a responsibility as a ‘mo[u]lder of 
public opinion’ and therefore engaged in a proactive approach to issues of public 
importance, in effect leading the people on certain m atters. It could be argued 
that committees of parliam ent undertake this task when they consider m atters of 
public interest, hear witnesses, receive evidence and conclude their deliberations 
with the issuing of reports on given subjects which usually call for certain action 
by government and a similar type role for comm ittees m ay have been alluded to 
by O’Halpin (1986) when he rem arked that there ’is some scope for committees to 
develop a useful role as informed com m entators on policy options’.
I have in this chapter examined the role/operation of parliam ents per se and 
intend to examine the role of parliam entary committees in a later chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 - WHY THE OIREACHTAS ACCEPTED THE STATUS QUO?
In the first instance the m em bers of the Oireachtas were not completely bypassed 
in the legislative process. Because governm ents only get their m easures through 
the Dail on the goodwill of their supporters in parliament, and mindful of the 
similar situation applying in other parliam ents such as Denmark, Britain, USA 
and Germany as illustrated above, it follows that they will usually have assessed 
the attitude of the parliam entary party before controversial issues are introduced. 
One hears m any reports of the senate and House of Representatives in the USA 
being vigorously canvassed by aides of the executive/president in order to 
facilitate the passage of a particular m easure which m ight be deemed to be 
controversial. This m ay result in the withdrawal of proposed legislation.
Gallagher (1992) gives an example in Ireland of the proposal to m ake 
contraceptives available to 16 and 17 year olds which was not pursued further at 
that tim e following back bench pressure within Fianna Fail. Social legislation 
appears to be fraught with danger in Ireland as it seem s to provoke intense 
controversy as evidenced by the referendum s on the "right to life" and divorce. 
Because of the nature of Irish society, m atters affecting agriculture have a 
sensitivity all of their own and unfavourable m easures could well invite defeat at 
the party level as m em bers of parliam ent often ‘know more than  bureaucrats 
what the public is prepared to put up w ith’ (Laundy 1990, p .75).
The vast majority of TDs spend a huge am ount of time involved with ’grossly 
excessive constituency pressures that are a feature in particular of rural Irish 
politics’ (FitzGerald, 1997) and this results in little time for influencing
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legislation. Norton, (1993, p.63) refers to a similar dilem ma in the UK. Due to the 
harsh reality of the Irish political scene - m ulti seat constituencies, the so-called 
parish pum p politics and the ever present danger of losing one’s seat to a fellow 
party "colleague" - all m em bers, including m inisters, devote a lot of their efforts 
to "tending their patch". The following table in Gallagher’s (1996) article, referred 
to earlier, serves to outline the seriousness with which politicians need to heed 
this "danger" if they are intent on continuing an active political career.
Defeated by party 
running m ate
Defeated by 
candidate of 
another party
Total defeated
1987 1989 1992 1987 ’89 ’92 1987 ’89 ’92
Fianna
Fâil
3 8 9 1 5  7 4 13 16
Fine Gael 2 5 3 12 3 8 14 8 11
Other
parties
0 0 0 6 6 5 6 6 5
Total 5 13 12 19 14 20 24 27 32
Table 2.1: Source of defeat of defeated TDs at elections of 1987, 1989 and 1992.
Source: Report of the Constitution Review Group (1996, p. 510)
Ministers have assistance in their constituency work from civil servants and
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others, therefore the back-bencher confronted with this superior "weaponry" has 
to expend more energy in local activity and thus has less time to devote to 
consideration of legislation - an exercise which m ay not generate any publicity for 
the TD/senator at local level, however laudable the idea m ay be to parliam entary 
purists. This point was advanced by John  Browne TD of Wexford as the reason 
for his lack of input into the Committee on Legislation and Security (Dail 
Debates, 9 October 1996, Col 1907) and to which I refer in the consideration of 
the SCLS below. Arkins (1990) concludes that ‘clientielist practices underm ine 
the legislative activity of the Dail deputy chiefly robbing him  of time necessary to 
formulate policy’.
Saalfeld (1990) points to the fact tha t public policy issues are complex m atters 
which require expertise only available to governments. Thus the reality is that 
m any m easures are drafted by the civil service (Arkins, 1990; Walkland, 1968, 
p .23) and demand technical specialisation often not available to the back bench 
m em ber of parliam ent who is ‘effectively an am ateur in the policy-making 
process’ (Gallagher, 1992). Walkland (1968, p.34) advances the  view that 
pressure groups are a more im portant channel of comm unication than  political 
parties for the transmission of political ideas from the ‘m ass of citizenry’ to ‘the 
rulers’ and this fact is recognised by the authorities. Therefore the interest groups 
concerned are likely to have been widely consulted when bills are being drafted. 
Faced with this fa it accompli, the m em ber of parliam ent is often forced to realise 
that there is no useful function to be served in their attem pting to alter a 
provision already agreed w ith the
industry/practitioners/interest groups concerned. There is a  lot of evidence in 
recent years of government departm ents encouraged by European examples of
consulting widely with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the 
preparatory stages of legislation and this to a large extent renders the back 
bencher redundant in the legislative process.
Norton (1990, p. 17) refers to the role of the European Com munity in legislation 
for the m em ber states. Ireland’s m em bership of the EC/EU has necessitated the 
transposition into Irish law of vast am ounts of European Directives and this has 
removed the freedom for Irish parliam entarians to enact legislation independently 
in an  increasing num ber of policy areas.
There is also the additional feature in the Oireachtas tha t all the political parties 
represented there (during the period under review), except the  Green Party, have 
participated in governments in recent years.
The following table illustrates the num ber of then  current m em bers of the 
Oireachtas who held ministerial office during or before the 27th  D&il.
HOUSE MEMBERSHIP NUMBER WHO 
HELD
MINISTERIAL
RANK
AS A
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL 
MEMBERSHIP
DAIL 166 811 48.8%
SEANAD 60 4 6.67%
Table 2.2 : Proportion of the 1996 m em bership of the Houses of the Oireachtas 
having held ministerial rank. [Sources: Nealon’s Guide to the 27th Dail & 
Seanad - Election ’92; State Directory 1995-96]
This development enhances the possibility (and the dreams) of m any m em bers of
1 Relates to m em bership a t the end of the 27th Dail. In addition four of the 
m em bers who died or retired during the lifetime of this Dail had also served as 
ministers.
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the Dail of attaining office a t some stage and can encourage m em bers to refrain 
from radically altering the sta tus quo lest it impinge on their own governmental 
actions in the future. A desire for advancem ent to high office is not by any m eans 
unique to Ireland. Searing (1995) refers to ’m inisterial aspirants’ among the ranks 
of British MPs, Patzelt (1997) concludes that German MPs strive for a position in 
the executive and view it as the ’crowning event of a parliam entary career’ and 
Strom (1997) suggests that securing office, both party and legislative is one of the 
goals of parliam entarians generally.
A more liberal attitude by the previous Irish governm ent had been detected in the 
proceedings of the relatively recent select committees. Further generosity in this 
area was to be expected following the promotion by the new government 
appointed in 1994 of m easures in this area as contained in the Programme for 
Government (Fine Gael, the Labour Party, Democratic Left 1994, p. 15). Extracts 
such as
* enhancing the role of m em bers as legislators;
* encourage Ministers and Ministers of State to discuss with m em bers where 
practicable, through the Legislation Committees, general proposals for 
legislation prior to legislation being approved and published by 
government;
* give power to the comm ittees to discuss and draft proposals for legislative 
changes and new legislation for recom mendation to Ministers;
* introduce a new system , whereby individual m em bers could seek leave to 
prepare legislation for consideration;
* introduce procedures to allow legislative comm ittees dealing with Bills to 
receive submissions and hear evidence from persons or organisations
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regarding such Bills 
indicated an apparent enhancem ent in the role of Oireachtas m em bers but it 
rem ains to be seen if such changes disprove the allegation of being "merely 
cosmetic".
The comm ent by Gallagher (1992) on the legitimising role of the Dail in the 
legislative process is worth noting. He cites Norton (1990, p. 147) in pointing out 
that parliam ents play an im portant symbolic role, and th a t for m any people the 
fact that all legislation has to be passed by a parliam ent consisting of the elected 
representatives of the people is more im portant in m aking them  feel tha t they are 
ruled democratically than  the question of how m uch real power that parliam ent 
wields.
Issues for the Irish parliam ent
Following my study above of w hat parliam ent and parliam entarians "should do", 
it would be useful to examine the performance by the Oireachtas of the various 
tasks which are considered to come within the rem it of parliaments.
The Irish parliament should be seen as a legislative assembly. Indeed m any 
comm entators criticise its m em bers for not concentrating on this aspect of their 
work more. However, as I have seen, this function is not strictly promoted in 
countries where cabinet leadership in parliam ent is the norm  as in Ireland. In 
effect this role is often seen as a formality but it m ay be argued tha t the advent of 
meaningful committees in the Oireachtas can herald a revival of this "legislative" 
activity in particular the ability of ordinary m em bers to win acceptance of their
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am endm ents by the government. A study of the operations of some Irish 
committees will reveal more about the actual situation in this regard.
Policy-making or at least policy-influencing is seen as being proper to 
parliaments. In Ireland this is often see as em anating from the ruling party 
(parties) constituting the government. Debates in the Dail have highlighted the 
deputies’ own dissatisfaction with this and repeated calls have been m ade to 
remedy this situation. It would therefore be interesting to see if in regard to both 
the above areas, w hether the presence of comm ittees - either presently in 
operation or those not reformed following elections have played a part perhaps 
through their in-depth exam ination of issues and the publication by comm ittees 
of a myriad of diverse reports during the term  of the last Oireachtas.
Members of parliam ent have a representative role as evident from the literature in 
this area. However, we are often told that the procedures of the Dail are limiting 
in this regard and tha t m em bers either do not know what their constituents feel 
about certain issues or tha t they are not articulating the views of the public 
(witness the controversy about the absence of Dail deputies from the Late Late 
Show and the argum ent about "dignity of parliament"). A study of the Dail 
proceeding provides m any examples where individual deputies raise issues of 
public concern, only to be told by the Ceann Comhairle that it could not be 
discussed. To be representative deputies m ust be able to fruitfully examine 
current m atters of interest to the electorate. I intend to exam ine the operations of 
committees to see if they afforded the m em bers a greater opportunity to represent 
their constituents viewpoints on selected topics and if so, to w hat effect.
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Supervision of the executive is seen as one of the m ost im portant roles of 
parliament. In the Oireachtas, there are m ethods of examining the actions of the 
government. These can include question time, adjournm ent debates and specific 
motions. However the time allocated for each of these activities is very limited 
and in any case is confined to those periods when the Oireachtas is sitting! As a 
consequence m any deputies and senators are unable to actively pursue the 
government on a num ber of issues which they consider im portant. In addition 
the houses of the Oireachtas seem  to stifle the activities of individual m em bers by 
allotting m ost tim e to "front-bench" m em bers who m erely adhere to the official 
party line in m ost cases. This often leaves the m em ber with no option but to "go 
through the formalities" by subm itting a question for w ritten answer, which is 
then copied to his/her local paper for publication or the recourse to the m edia 
which is widely regarded as more influential than  parliam ent in achieving results 
which benefit the ordinary citizen.
For m any years governm ent estim ates went through the Dail "on the nod". This 
was recognised as being m ost unsatisfactory as a check on the governm ent’s use 
of the sta te’s finances. In recent years the practice has developed of examining 
the estim ates in Dail committees. Whilst there existed in the past comm ittees 
such as the Public Accounts Committee, it was often seen as being less than 
satisfactory particularly as it functions as an ex post facto audit committee.
It therefore rem ains to be seen whether the creation of recent Dail and Jo in t 
committees has allowed the deputies and senators an opportunity to accomplish 
the task of executive supervision of both policy and financial m atters in a suitable 
m anner and therefore the im pact (if any) tha t comm ittees of the Houses of the
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Oireachtas had on the performance of the "job description" of parliam entarians 
indicated in this paper will be further examined.
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CHAPTER 3 - REFORM OF THE OIREACHTAS: ROLE FOR COMMITTEES
Both Houses of the Oireachtas have had debates on their role(s) and on the thorny 
question of "reform". Members of both houses have complained about "their lot" 
both in parliam ent and outside. Barry Desmond [then a TD) produced a paper 
entitled "The Houses of the Oireachtas - a Plea for Reform" in 1975 and 
advocated reform to counter the ‘parliam entary m alaise’ tha t ‘allowed our 
parliam entary institutions to atrophy so m uch so that m any deputies and 
senators are, in the parliam entary sense, politically uninvolved’. He bemoaned 
the fact that the ‘im portant right’ to initiate legislation (by the opposition] ‘is 
virtually nil’ as is ‘the real power to am end legislation’.
Desmond advocated greater use of comm ittees in the Oireachtas to debate 
estim ates and to consider ’the Committee stage of selected Bills’ (p. 11). He was 
even more radical for his tim e in his suggestion that non-contentious legislation 
ought to be considered by comm ittees at the second stage as well as at committee 
and report stage (p. 10) and he flagged the need for such com m ittees to have 
’qualified expert staff to assist them  in their work. Commenting on the 
conspicuously slow rate of innovation shown by the then party  leaders towards 
the question of reform, he warned that if the failure to tackle the current 
problems of tha t tim e continued, the Oireachtas would ’ossify into a perm anent 
state of preservation’
Oddly enough, Desmond’s bid to develop a comprehensive Oireachtas committee 
system  m ay well have been stymied by m em bers them selves rather than  the 
executive as O’Halpin (1986) relates the account by John  Kelly TD of how ’his
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efforts as government chief whip from 1973 to 1977 to develop a committee 
system  was frustrated by the unwillingness of deputies to give the necessary time 
to an activity which received no public notice’ and concludes tha t for a variety of 
reasons the ’experience of the  Oireachtas with comm ittees prior to 1982 was not 
very happy’.
The wide-ranging them e of parliam entary reform continued to interest several 
m em bers of the Dail across the political divide. In a two day debate on Dail 
reform on 26/27 January  1983 (Vol. 339), Deputies John  Bruton (Fine Gael), 
Bertie Ahem  (Fianna Fail) and Michael Bell (Labour] all referred to the 
unsatisfactory situation pertaining at tha t tim e with the latter deputy adding ‘I 
can see no useful function in being a back bencher ...(as the] m ain policy 
decisions [are] decided by the governm ent ... I do not know w hat contribution if 
any a back bencher can m ake’ (Cols. 439/440).
In a wide ranging debate Alan Shatter (Fine Gael) pointed out tha t governm ents 
dominated the assem bly and would not accept am endm ents to or opposition 
initiation of legislation as it was perceived as an attack on ministerial 
responsibility or ability, concluded tha t this often led to defective legislation (Col. 
530). Other speakers referred to the abdication of its function by parliam ent and 
one m em ber was of the opinion tha t there was ‘less power in the cham ber than... 
in the party rooms of political parties’ (Me Cartin, Col 929).
Interestingly one Fianna Fail speaker (the late Brian Lenihan) was of the view , 
that the government was the major player in governing the country and 
parliament in whatever mode had m erely a subsidiary or advisory role to play (
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Col. 913/4). Insofar as this reflected Fianna Fail’s official position it would seem  to
confirm Desmond’s earlier view expressed in his paper referred to above that
Fianna Fail was stifling parliam entary reform at that tim e as, even though
Desmond’s party  was one element of the then ruling coalition, any government
required the cooperation of the opposition in the introduction of meaningful
reforming m easures. This apparent unease felt by Fianna Fail concerning some
elements of parliam entary reform including parliam entary com m ittees was
reflected in com m ents by Arkins (1990) when she wrote:
Fianna Fail, then  [1983] and today, view the prospect of an efficient 
committee system  with suspicion, seeing it. as a potential th reat to the 
executive suprem acy so inherent in the W estm inster model of government.
O’Halpin (1996), commenting on the nomination of the sam e Brian Lenihan to 
chair the first Jo in t Committee on Foreign Affairs (JCFA), gave some further 
credence to this perceived lack of enthusiasm  by Fianna Fail for the committee 
system  by suggesting tha t Lenihan’s ’nomination to chair the new Committee ... 
probably did som ething to legitimise the Com mittee’s activities in Fianna Fail 
eyes’.
This 1983 review led to an extensive increase in the num ber of Oireachtas
committees, rising from seven at the autum n of 1982 to 16 during the following
24th Dail. In a review of then current Oireachtas comm ittees in 1986, O’Halpin
comments on the above development thus:
So far from creating a committee system  comprehensive in its coverage of 
public business, or at least one which embraces all the major national 
issues, the Oireachtas has spawned a haphazard collection, some with 
remits which seem  vague or ill-considered.
Arkins (1990) was also critical of the significant increase in the num ber of
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committees describing the enlarged network of comm ittees as ’an  uncoordinated 
mish-mash of ideas and investigations.’ She concluded, th a t for a  variety of 
reasons, including the overwhelming strain  placed on m em bers, staff and 
facilities within Leinster House coupled with the sheer m ass of material 
em anating from such committees, often ignored, ’their potential effectiveness was 
immediately underm ined by their abundance’.
The 25th and 26th Dail/Oireachtas did not re-establish the large num ber of 
comm ittees and Arkins observes tha t those ’who saw the com m ittees as tools of 
instant parliam entary reform’ seem ed ’to be som ewhat disillusioned.’ Norton 
(1990) comm enting on Arkins’ studies, notes tha t the com m ittees ’largely 
atrophied’, and he concludes that the blame for this failure stem m ed ’as m uch 
from disinterest on the part of TDs as from asphyxiation by the executive.’
The thirst for reform was to surface again in the Dail especially in 1993 when in 
another two day debate on 18/19 February, deputies once more decried the. 
situation with regard to the passage of legislation. Even though Fianna Fail were 
back in governm ent by this tim e and advocating/promoting reforming m easures 
the situation "on the ground" had not altered. Alan Dukes in this contribution of 
19 February 1993 comm ented (Col. 833):
Let us look at what happens in practice. In practice legislation passed by 
the Oireachtas is legislation tha t is desired by the governm ent and is in a 
form decided by the government. Am endments tha t are unacceptable to 
the governm ent rarely find their way on to the sta tu te  books.
It was interesting to read of a  new batch of m em bers alm ost 20 years after the 
Desmond reform plea and ten  years after the Bruton package still caught in the
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This last debate did lead to some further reform in the area of comm ittee 
formation both jointly with the Dail/Seanad and with Dail select comm ittees to 
discuss legislation. This had the effect of removing m ost bills from the whole 
House after the second reading for a more detailed exam ination in committee.
The undertaking given by Minister of State, Noel Dempsey - Chief Whip during
the debate on the creation of the new comm ittees sum s up the then  executive’s
stated approach to reform (Dail Debate, 18 Feb. 1993, Vol 426, No.3, Col 604):
The new committee system  being introduced is probably the greatest 
single change in the way the House conducts it business since the 
foundation of the State. The potential for each Deputy to influence 
legislation and spending by Departm ents should no t be under-estim ated ... 
In general, when special comm ittees considered Bills in the past 
am endm ents and ideas from back benchers on all sides of the House were 
accepted more readily than  across the floor of the House, the atm osphere 
being less confrontational and adversarial, and everybody m aking a 
contribution. The Government is anxious to ensure tha t this approach 
continues with the new comm ittee system.
It was in the spirit of the above th a t the latest experim ent in comm ittees of the 
Oireachtas was introduced in 1993 with particular em phasis on legislative 
committees. The principle comm ittees created to examine legislation (from the 
Dail] a t tha t tim e were:
Select Committee on Social Affairs 
Select Committee on Finance and General Affairs 
Select Committee on Enterprise and Economic Strategy 
Select Committee on Legislation and Security
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs (includes some m em bers of the
vicious circle of government domination.
Seanad)
Joint Committee on European Affairs 
(State Directory 1995 - 96 pp. 19-20)
Seanad com m ents on O ireachtas com m ittees.
The senate availed of the opportunity to have a debate on this topic during the
consideration of the motion to establish a Jo in t Committee on Foreign Affairs on
13 May 1993 (Seanad Debates, Thursday, 13 May 1993, Vol. 136, No. 4, Col 359).
Whilst details of this debate are included in the later chapter relating to the
formation of the JCFA, some com m ents by senators on the place of committees
in overall Oireachtas reform are appropriate at this point. Senator Maurice
Manning, in the course of his contribution, spoke at length about ’the committee
system ’ per se. He was of the view that ’the culture underlying the committees
m ust change’. He insisted tha t m inisters and civil servants would have to listen
to the views of the committee m em bers and appreciated tha t this would require a
m onum ental change to the system  as practiced heretofore whereby m inisters
decided issues with backbenchers having little or no input into the decision
process (Cols 357/8). Concluding his optimistic rem arks regarding committees in
general, he added:
Everyone who wants to see Irish parliam entarianism  develop will watch 
the progress of the comm ittees with great interest, because it is widely 
accepted that the parliam ents which give the highest level of job 
satisfaction and produce the best legislation with the widest degree of 
consensus are those with the m ost developed com m ittee systems.
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(Seanad Debates, Thursday, 13 May 1993, Vol. 136, No. 4, Col 359).
His colleague, Dick Roche, also with an interest in this subject adm itted to 
awaiting ’with trepidation w hat will happen to this [JCFA] com m ittee’ (Col 362). 
He spoke with the benefit of academic and practical experience of parliam entary 
committee operations in Ireland. He used words such as "rubber stamp", 
"gladiatorial sparring arena", "sterile" and "stubborn" as appropriate to describe 
the executive dominated legislative process in Ireland to date. He hoped that this 
practice m ight change as ’an appropriate comm ittee system  would allow more 
compromise’ (Col 361) in the formulation of Irish public policy. Concluding tha t 
particular debate the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs assured the senators 
that the government intended to take the committee [JCFA] seriously, listen to its 
views conceding that ’we [the government] do not have all the answ ers’ (Col 377).
Further am endm ents - 1995
On 1 March, 1995 during another debate on reform of Oireachtas committees, 
which followed the change of governm ent during the 27th Dail, am ended term s 
of reference were considered by the Oireachtas. Introducing proposals which the 
government considered ’far-reaching’ the governm ent chief whip, Sean Barrett, 
TD, spoke of m aking ’society more dem ocratic’ and ’the governm ent more clearly 
accountable to the Dail and the Dail more accountable to the people’. He 
continued ’we will also be getting the Dail to work more effectively; all new 
legislation - and the spending by each Government Departm ent - will be 
examined more thoroughly and more efficiently’ (Dail Debates, Wednesday, 1 
March 1995; Vol. 449, No. 8; Cols 2174 & 2175). He acknowledged that some
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Oireachtas reform had taken place in the past bu t pointed to the need for more 
fundam ental changes in order to m ake ’it an Oireachtas geared for the 21st 
century’. The enhancem ent of the role of m em bers as legislators together with 
their powers to hold the executive to account were, he claimed, the prim ary aims 
of the innovative m easures then  being proposed by the new governm ent (Dail 
Debates, Wednesday, 1 March 1995; Vol. 449, No. 8; Col 2176).
Highlighting the additional powers of committees to invite Ministers to appear 
before them  ’to discuss current policies and their im plem entation in their 
D epartm ents’, the Chief Whip also emphasised the strengthening of Oireachtas 
committees resulting from their ability to now call before them  ’holders of high 
office in the s ta te ’ for discussions. The vital and worthwhile role of the 
committees in the processing of legislation was acknowledged together with the 
realisation that Deputies them selves had gained considerable expertise in subject 
m atters relevant to their comm ittees through their involvement in this legislative 
deliberations.
Proposed new ’empowerment and consultative’ roles for the legislative 
committees ’in relation to preparatory legislation which would offer m em bers an 
opportunity to m ake an input to legislation before it comm enced the formal 
process was not considered likely to prejudice the m em bers, either governm ent or 
opposition when Bills were finally introduced into parliam ent. The ability of 
interested organisations to gain access to m em bers of comm ittees considering 
Bills in order to comm ent on issues and m ake subm issions was cited by the 
Minister of State as a m ethod of increasing democratic accountability. Some 
degree of nervousness at this proposal was voiced by m em bers later in the debate
as (even with the  admission tha t public as distinct from private lobbying was 
preferable) they foresaw a need to regulate these contacts to some degree lest the 
system  became "bogged down" due to a potential overload arising from the 
envisaged consultative dialogue.
Most m em bers welcomed the revam ped committee system  although a succession 
of speakers listed the various difficulties they considered the new formulation 
would inevitably attract. In addition to the fear of a procession of interest groups 
commanding considerable lobbying time, Deputies drew attention to the lack of 
staff and resources already experienced and the inevitability of these handicaps 
being exacerbated under the extended system. As these am endm ents proposed 
the formation of four new comm ittees (hence the reduction in m em bership of the 
legislative committees), some Deputies were concerned at potential clashes of 
business/engagements, poor attendance by m em bers except for party 
spokespersons and the prospect of a further reduction in the already poor 
publicity of the operations of the committees with no consequent m edia 
recognition of TDs’ work outside the Dail chamber.
Charges were m ade concerning the m anufacture of positions - chairpersons and 
convenors of committees - as consolation prizes for Deputies not appointed to 
government positions. The now familiar assertion tha t backbench m em bers were 
only "lobby fodder" and tha t the "true" legislative process and cycle of civil 
service inspired legislation, approved by the governm ent and presented to the 
Dail with a "theoretical" but rarely used (in substantial issues) ability to m ake 
am endm ents pertaining in reality. This alleged incapacity of the Dail to exercise 
its full legislative potential, considered a by-product of the current electoral
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process - m ultiseat constituencies - caused m em bers to devote up to 80% of their 
time to constituency business at the expense of their legislative role adm itted 
several Deputies.
However even with the m any reservations mooted by Deputies, the proposed 
changes and additions to the term s of reference of com m ittees were approved by 
the Dail (Dail Debates, Wednesday, 1 March 1995; Vol. 449, No. 8; Cols 2174- 
2232).
Dail debate on reform  • 1996
A debate on m any areas of Dail reform was held on 9 October, 1996 and whilst it 
embraced m any aspects of parliam entary business, Deputies availed of the 
opportunity to voice their concerns at the strain experienced by them  in servicing 
all the committees of the Oireachtas. Consequently some of the comm ents from 
m em bers are pertinent to the  examination below of the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security and the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs.
The Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach and governm ent Chief 
Whip introduced the motion and no doubt already aware of m em bers’ misgivings 
regarding the operations of committees, indicated a need for some reform of the 
current system. Announcing the widening of the rem it of comm ittees which 
would provide for m inisters to ’address issues relating to policy’ with comm ittees 
and the examination of departm ental strategy statem ents by Oireachtas 
committees along with m inor changes with regard to sub-committees of select 
committees, he appeared to attem pt to pre-empt impending criticism from 
m em bers by stating that he had invited all comm ittee m em bers for suggestions
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on reform of the current system  without receiving ’a single reply’. Perhaps aware
of the oft repeated claim in the past that m em bers had no real power, he
reminded them  of the changed circum stances thus:
I am  ... aware that we can expect contributions from Members who 
will probably express themselves on current Oireachtas procedures, 
particularly relating to the committees. Before they are tem pted to 
do so, the committee [of whips charged with examining Dfiil reform] 
will be m ost im pressed if any such contributions are forthcoming 
from those Members who use the procedures to the full. All 
Members are now eligible to a ttend comm ittee m eetings and to 
contribute to the proceedings. If they fail to do so, they cannot be 
taken seriously if they deride w hat is available to them  by way of 
such facility.
(Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday, 9 October 1996, Col 1705-1709).
The then opposition Fianna Fail whip countered this last piece of criticism by 
stating that even though they were the largest party  in the House, they were ’put 
to the pin of ... [their] collar to have Members attending all the m eetings of the 22 
committees of the House’ along with all the other dem ands on their time. He 
further commented tha t they ’find fault with the committee system  and tha t is a 
view shared by sections of the media which find it impossible to cover all the 
committee m eetings’ (Parliamentary Debates, W ednesday, 9 October 1996, Col 
1715-1716).
A steady stream  of deputies, contributing to this debate highlighted the problems 
of the existing committee practice. One m em ber (Pat Upton) drew ’an analogy 
between the committee system  and the lady or gentlem an who decides to go into 
a restaurant and eat everything on the m enu’; his point being that there were too 
m any committees. He also deplored the inability of governm ent backbenchers 
[the concept of which he humorously likened to ’a  lady or a gentlem an who has 
virtually no ideas or proposals and in the event of such backbenchers being 
contaminated by an idea, they will have the good sense to keep their m ouths 
shut ... [and] sing ... [the] party  song... [be it] good, bad or indifferent’ (Col 1720)] 
to promote private m em ber’s legislation.
In the course of a forceful contribution, Des O’Malley reflected on the reduction in 
the power of parliam ent relative to the executive and the fact that it was the
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government which in reality decided what happened in the Oireachtas and that
this ’House is here to simply accept and put up with whatever the Government
decides’ (Col 1723). Describing his endeavours to attend the m eetings of the five
committees of which he was a m em ber and the difficulty this posed for smaller
parties, he remarked, perhaps with great accuracy and foresight,
We are being told by our m em bers and by people on all sides of the 
House that, electorally at least, we are wasting our tim e because the 
public do not give a dam n w hether I go to m y five m eetings or 
whether Deputy O’Donnell goes to hers. We are doing it because we 
are trying to m ake the system  work in this House. It is not working.
(Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday, 9 October 1996, Col 1721-1724).
Observing tha t ’the entire committee system  ... is little better than  a joke’,’a 
farce, a stunt and a device’, Willie O’Dea, who had attended on a frequent basis 
both as a m inister of state  and latterly as an opposition m em ber at one of the 
select committees that I studied, was of the view that it did not m ake 
backbenchers more relevant and powerful. ’I have not found any evidence to 
suggest that because ... [an] am endm ent is being proposed in the cosy context of 
a committee, rather than  in a full session of the House, it will m ake any 
difference to the Government’s attitude’ (Col 1736).
Others m em bers spoke of meeting ’Deputies wandering the corridors of Leinster 
House, with a glazed look in their eyes and folders under their arms, searching 
frantically for the committee room they are required to be in. ... Enormous 
powers of bilocation or even trilocation are required ... in respect of the 
committee system  as it currently operates’ (Col 1739). Deputies on all sides of the 
House had concerns about the committee regime as it then operated and in 
addition to the complaints about the plethora of committees, they were also 
unhappy with their facilities for research, publication of proceedings and 
resources to operate more effectively.
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A num ber of Deputies adm itted tha t they felt obliged to give priority to 
constituency duties if they wished to be re- elected. John  Browne of Wexford 
referring to constituency competition (especially with ministers] confessed ’I am  a 
m em ber of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security and I seldom, if 
ever, attend meetings of tha t committee other than  when a vote is taking place.
... I find it almost impossible to attend comm ittee meetings and carry out my 
constituency work.’ (Col 1907).
The consensus amongst those that spoke was that there were too m any 
committees, that they had the potential to bring the whole parliam entary process 
into disrepute and that the num ber should be drastically reduced and their duties 
reappraised. The Chief Whip, in reply, conceded the point and spoke of the need 
’to rationalise them ’ (Parliamentary Debates, Wednesday, 9 October 1996, Col 
1911), which will presum ably be reviewed by the 28th Dail following the 1997 
general election.
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C H A P T E R  4  - C O M M I T T E E S  A S  E L E M E N T S  O F  P A R L I A M E N T S ’ O P E R A T I O N S
Introduction
It seems apparent from earlier consideration of literature on the subject that 
parliam ents have suffered at the hands of the executive in m any countries. This 
stranglehold on parliam ents has resulted in their inability to effectively undertake 
m any of the functions outlined in chapter one. The resulting frustration felt by 
m em bers of parliam ents in m any parts of the world, the need to process business 
more efficiently together with the perceived increase in the workload of 
parliaments are among the reasons for the widespread use of comm ittees in 
parliaments.
Almost all of the w ritten work that I studied m akes reference to the use by 
parliaments of comm ittees to can y  out their work. Laundy (1989, p .72) states 
that ‘committees play an im portant part in the legislative process in m ost 
Parliam ents’ and adds (p. 110) ‘in m ost Parliaments, comm ittees operate as 
component parts of the parent m achine’. He concludes [p. 116)
the evidence indicates that the contribution of comm ittees in the 
parliam entary process is positive and of incalculable value. Few 
Parliaments, even among the smallest, would be able to operate without 
them.
Suffice to state at this stage that comm ittees provide parliam ents with a  greater 
ability to perform their varied functions and fulfil the m any responsibilities
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allocated to them  in the individual jurisdiction in which they are placed. The 
specific juncture at which comm ittees are empowered to act is of critical 
importance in relation to their im pact on legislation/events as is their composition 
and their relationship to the plenary assembly.
Many com m entators dwell on the positive effects of comm ittees which they argue 
contributed to the empowerment of m em bers of parliam ents to reclaim some of 
their ancient functions. Referring to one of the accepted roles of parliam ents, 
namely overseeing the activities of administrations, and the view of Turpin (1989) 
that the ’enforcement of accountability depends largely on the ability of 
Parliament to prise information from governm ents’, the ’establishm ent of the 
select comm ittees [was seen] as another useful supplem ent to the arm oury of 
parliam entary scrutiny [in the  UK]’ (Morris, 1984).
Committees would appear to be a common feature of legislatures attem pting to 
counteract governm ents’ grasp on parliam entary affairs, being employed 
amongst other reasons, as part of the fightback against the  UK governm ent 
which ’seeks to m anage Parliam ent’ (Giddings, 1997) for its own ends, the Irish 
government which ’exercised unfettered dominance in Dail and Seanad’
(O’Halpin, 1996) and in France where ’they have assum ed a new importance 
since upon them  falls the responsibility of protecting the authority of Parliament 
from further erosion’ (Laundy, 1989, p. 102).
Argum ents in  favour of parliam entary com m ittees
Commenting on the  situation in Britain, Baines (1985) points to the loss by the
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House of Commons of the capacity to ’challenge the governm ent’ or ’act as a 
check on the actions of m inisters’ and concludes tha t ’specialized select 
com m ittees’ are ’the best - indeed the only - w ay’ to restore parliam ent to its 
proper position.
Donnelly (1997) compares a com m ittee of the whole House (of Commons) and a 
standing committee and highlights among the advantages of the latter the facts 
that parliam entary time is saved, more legislation is dealt w ith and ’there is a 
greater willingness [by participants] to m eet critics half way’. She adds that 
because proceedings on the floor of the Houses of parliam ent tend ’to bring out 
the confrontational and party political characteristics of parliam entary debate’, 
attracting a higher, profile and given the hitherto reluctance of governm ents to 
accept opposition am endm ents, the prospect of concessions by governm ents to 
other points of view, however laudable, was remote. Continuing on this broad 
them e I found m ention by m any authors of the different "roles" adopted by 
parliam entarians in committees from that found in plenary sessions of 
parliam ents (Heidar, 1997; Andeweg, 1997). Heidar cites Hem es and Nergaard 
(1989) ’committees [of the Storting] are for compromise, while the open debates 
in the house are for confrontation’. Andeweg, somewhat similarly views plenary 
debates of the Dutch parliam ent as provoking a ’partisan’ response from MPs 
whilst committee m eetings afforded m em bers an opportunity to take the 
’advocate’ role with considerably more ’freedom of m anoeuvre’. It is valid I 
submit, to apply, in this instance, some of the views/experiences above to Ireland 
and to speculate that a similar response will be encountered in comm ittee 
proceedings in the Oireachtas. The views expressed at the inauguration of the 
JCFA in chapter ten  reflect these aspirations.
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’Committees ... play their part in refining and improving legislation (Laundy, 
1989, p. 116). In view of the increase in technical and specialist aspects of 
legislation the generalist skills often associated w ith the m ass of parliam entarians 
has rapidly proven to be inadequate. It would appear th a t com m ittees play a 
major part in the teasing-out of the finer points in legislative proposals and help 
to prevent the enactm ent of ill considered or unworkable legislation by allowing a 
more thorough examination of proposals presented to parliam ent by a small, 
perhaps partially specialised group. It will be clear from the later discussion on 
the som ewhat fortified legislative role of Oireachtas com m ittees in both the SCLS 
and JCFA as outlined in m y case studies of both these com m ittees, that m any 
Oireachtas m em bers shared this view. W heare (1968, p .91) holds tha t it is 
through law-making tha t legislatures find their principal opportunities to control 
the executive and ’the chief instrum ent in this work [legislation] is the committee 
system ’. ’Committees play a crucial part in the legislative process in all the 
Scandinavian Parliam ents’ (Laundy, 1989, p .107) and their use for the effective 
division of work in legislatures in USA, South America, China and Central Europe 
amongst others points to the valuable role played by com m ittees in 
parliam entary affairs worldwide.
It will be recalled from chapter one that one of the other roles of parliam ent 
relates to the training, socialisation and education of parliam entarians. In 
addition to instructing m em bers of parliam ent (Drewry, 1985, p .7) in m atters 
pertaining to government and the operations of the civil service (Englefield, 1984, 
p.xvi] [especially m em bers of the opposition], it perm its those m em bers with 
continuous service to develop expertise in their subject area with benefits both to 
the m em bers concerned in affording them  opportunities for influential and
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informed debate (du Cann, 1984) and in respect of their own promotional
prospects. The experience gained in this m anner has led to the advancem ent of
legislators in the USA, Britain and it is claimed in Ireland. Labour MPs at
W estm inster allegedly use parliam entary committee m em bership as a way to
their ’front bench’ (Irons, 1985) and a com m ent on the beneficial training gained
by committee m em bership in the Oireachtas was alluded to by the late Brian
Lenihan in 1995 upon the formation of the "rainbow" governm ent when he
stated at a m eeting of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs:
This committee m ust be a good training ground [for m inisters and 
ministers of state] because a substantial num ber of Members were 
promoted such as Deputies Nora Owen, Michael Lowry, Proinsias De 
Rossa, Phil Hogan, Sean Barrett and Bernard Durkan.
(Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs [JCFA], Thursday 19 January  1995, FA5,
No. 1, Col 3].
Closely allied to the subject of the education of m em bers of parliam ents through 
their m em bership of comm ittees is the question of the  broadening of the rem it of 
parliam entarians and an associated increase in job satisfaction enjoyed by 
m em bers as a result of their expanded role in the parliam entary process. This 
perceived benefit is evidenced by the ability of com m ittee m em bers to m ake 
better use of their newly acquired skills and information to ask more pertinent 
and well briefed parliam entary questions (Heidar, 1997). It could be argued tha t 
backbenchers are considerably better informed and educated than  in the past and 
dem and a meaningful involvement in the affairs of parliam ent as highlighted by 
Mitchell (1997) referring to the strong desire of the new breed of British MPs for a 
more modern role. Their involvement in committees m ay provide such an avenue 
for them.
The fact that in Ireland so m any m em bers of parliam ent have had experience in
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recent years of both "gamekeeper" and "poacher" roles due to the varied 
composition and turnover of recent governments, coupled w ith the tradition of 
backbenchers defending their party  when in governm ent, should have gone some 
way towards both m inisters and backbenchers being m ore appreciative of each 
others position given that the situation where "the boot was on the other foot", in 
term s of power and influence would be familiar to m ost. As m any m em bers 
served consecutively as m inisters and as m em bers of com m ittees (and vice- 
versa), you would think tha t current m inisters (of w hatever ilk) m ight show more 
understanding towards backbenchers given their recent taste  of similar position.
Argum ent against parliam entary com m ittees
Baines (1985) highlights a num ber of reasons why select comm ittees were 
frowned upon in some quarters in Britain. She quotes em inent British 
parliam entarians such as Butler and Kaufman as believing th a t such comm ittees 
are more suited to America and ’Eire incompatible w ith a system  where 
parliam ent exists to sustain a governm ent in power’. This view is not very far 
removed from that already cited by the late Brian Lenihan during a debate on 
Dail reform where he clearly viewed parliam ent (the Oireachtas) as occupying an 
inferior position to tha t of the governm ent (Dail Debate 26/27 January, 1983, Cols 
913/4).
The distraction from the activities on the floor of the parliam entary cham ber, 
cited by Baines and the theory tha t consensus in com m ittees would lead to a 
’lack of focus’ on issues ’if one dulls the political edge’ (du Cann, 1984) have been 
presented amongst others as argum ents against the com m ittee system.
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The danger that two classes of m em bers of parliam ent would be created - those 
with a great deal of information on given subjects as a result of their committee 
m em bership and those without such knowledge - and the accompanying strain 
that this might generate betw een parliam entarians is also outlined by Baines.
Another cause for concern could include the danger that decisions m ight be 
taken by a small num ber of m em bers, who could be open to intense personalised 
pressure from groups and individuals with the potential for abuse to occur if such 
m atters were to be decided in a subset of parliam ent separated from the plenary 
body and its broader review of issues. This potential risk is highlighted in the 
case study below on the SCLS when Deputy Liz O’Donnell expressed concerns at 
the few m em bers of the com m ittee in attendance w hen im portant legislation 
regarding the reorganisation of the courts was being considered. Whilst O’Halpin 
(1986) also commented upon this danger, the Oireachtas, however, has addressed 
this possible cause for concern to some extent, by perm itting m em bers of the 
Oireachtas other than  the designated m em bers of com m ittees to participate at 
committee m eetings without voting rights and by conducting the Report stage of 
bills in the full plenary session of the Houses.
Finally both Arkins (1990) and O’Halpin (1986) point to the  nature of the 
relationship between comm ittees and m inisters and departm ents close to the 
m atters under consideration at any given time, w ith Arkins observing ’such 
relationships could shift between antagonism  on the one hand or sym pathy and 
fraternity on the other. Both situations would im pair a com m ittee’s ability to be 
impartial and exacting.’
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I propose to com m ent in greater detail on aspects of operations of comm ittees in 
various parliam ents and exam ine their practical application and experience in 
Ireland.
Factors which im pact on com m ittees
A num ber of factors have an im pact on the way in which comm ittees actually 
operate and I propose to introduce a range of m atters which I consider relevant 
and discuss some of them  in greater detail.
Shaw (1979), in the course of an  examination of parliam entary comm ittees in a 
num ber of countries concluded that the power of such comm ittees is greatly 
influenced by such factors as the degree of party  political control of committee 
operations, with loose control by parties over com m ittee deliberations resulting in 
stronger and more independent-m inded committees; the 
parliam entary/constitutional system  in place also is alleged to determ ine the 
strength of committees with both a presidential and continental-style 
parliam entary regime being viewed as more conducive to powerful comm ittees 
than  the tighter W estm inster model of parliam entary government. Shaw also 
states tha t the tim ing of parliam entary consideration by legislative comm ittees is 
of great significance given th a t referral to a com m ittee before debate in plenary 
sessions gives comm ittees greater opportunities to influence details of legislation 
before proposals are finalised, confirming a point touched upon earlier in this 
thesis. Olson and Norton (1996), continuing the sam e them e, point to the  use of 
committees in the parliam ents of the emerging countries of Central/Eastern
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Europe and highlight the considerable power exercised by these comm ittees in 
the earlier and thus more influential stages of the legislative process [before 
plenary] and, agreeing with other com m entators on this topic, conclude tha t this 
practice enhances the power of the legislators. As will be shown in the later 
discussion on am endm ents to the term s of reference of Oireachtas committees, 
this procedure was availed of during consideration by the SCLS of the Refugees 
Bill and was subsequently introduced on a broader and more formal basis by the 
insertion of a provision into revised term s of reference allowing for consideration 
by committees of issues and discussions with relevant m inisters regarding 
pertinent m atters before eventual drafting of legislation.
It is clear, therefore, tha t the term s of reference of an individual comm ittee are of 
crucial importance given tha t these set the param eters for the operations and 
deliberations of the m em bers. As will be noted in a  consideration of the SCLS 
below, the term s applied to Irish comm ittees were considered by some m em bers 
to be too restrictive and, on occasion, provoked m uch criticism from participants. 
If, as it appears in m any cases, it is the executive’s proposals for parliam entary 
com m ittees’ guidelines tha t are adopted, the potential to be too cautious [perhaps 
to limit the ceding of power away from the government) can render the 
committee "toothless" in respect of real meaningful duties. Paniagua Soto (1997) 
describes the existence of parliam entary com m ittees in Spain ’with complete 
legislative com petence’ adding that these types ’of legislative comm ittees are 
rare’ existing also in Jap an  and Italy. The unique position in the USA is 
described by Laundy (1989, p .110) and illustrates the legislative strength  of US 
congressional comm ittees which largely determ ine the fate of legislation. In 
France, committees ’have had the power to hold public or semi-public hearings ...
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call government m inisters and civil servants’ (Rizzuto, 1997). It could be argued 
that the term s of reference of the Oireachtas comm ittees created during the 
Fianna Fail/Labour governm ent during the first part of the  last Dail were seen as 
too weak in these areas and the later comm ittees set up following the change of 
government were able to learn from these m istakes and enjoy a m uch looser, yet 
elevated regime.
Directly linked to the above is the importance that plenary sessions of 
parliam ents and governm ents attach to the outcome of com m ittees’ work and 
how they respond to recommendations, findings and reports of committees. 
Drewry (1985) highlighted this point by quoting from Robinson’s work of 1978 
when she concluded that it was difficult to isolate com m ittees’ influence on 
government decisions from a plethora of other factors tha t m ay contribute to the 
bringing about of change. Arkins (1990), in a som ewhat similar vein, concluded 
that the select comm ittees of the 24th Oireachtas ’m ade some im pact on 
government policy’ bu t ’to suggest a direct causal relationship would be 
misleading’. She cites acknowledgement by a governm ent departm ent in a policy 
docum ent of a  parliam entary com m ittee’s proposals relating to the amalgam ation 
of unemploym ent and training agencies as some evidence of im pact on 
government policy. Instances will also be illustrated of where the Irish 
government responded, favourably or otherwise, to Oireachtas com m ittees’s 
submissions on m atters ranging from legislation appertaining to refugees, the 
trade embargo against Cuba and qualifications for appointm ents of judges.
Committees are affected in m any other ways by governm ents’ actions. The 
im pact of m inisters’ deeds on m em bers own perception of their sta tus needs to be
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considered in a sensitive m anner in order to foster good relations between a 
committee and the executive. During the proceedings of the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security in 1994 the disquiet felt by some m em bers at the poor 
degree of respect shown to the committee by m inisters who were alleged to have 
m ade policy announcem ents outside parliam ent regarding issues upon which 
Deputies had tabled am endm ents and which were due for im m inent discussion 
was highlighted. This "playing politics" was deem ed by some m em bers to have 
damaged the ’s ta tu s’ of the committee in the eyes of the public and led one 
Deputy to rem ark ’Democracy is not helped by announcem ents m ade outside the 
House and its comm ittees when they could well have been m ade there’ (SCLS, 18 
May 1994; L2, No. 11, Cols 642, 723, 728 & 730).
Composition of com m ittees
The quality of the work of an individual comm ittee depends greatly on the 
composition /m em bership of the  committee. In m any states, such as France,
Israel and Japan  places on committees are allocated in proportion to the party 
strengths in the appropriate house of parliam ent (Laundy, 1989, pps. 103-109) 
and this principle applies in the m ain to com m ittees established in the Irish 
parliam ent also. The consistency of m em bership is very im portant in term s of the 
degree of expertise gained by m em bers through persistent and continuous 
membership of committees. Olson and Norton (1996) referring to the new 
parliaments of the emerging states of Central and Eastern Europe, highlight this 
point, stating, ‘continuing service by incum bents m ay build up both a  collective 
expertise and a more independent [from government, party, caucus] ethos‘, the 
absence of which would limit the capacity of the comm ittees to act
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independently. In states such as the USA m em bership is considered vital to the 
apprenticeship of junior m em bers while in Japan  every m em ber of the Diet m ust 
serve on at least one standing committee (Laundy, 1989, p. 109) and in Norway 
’each representative is a m em ber of one - and only one - com m ittee [except for 
the foreign affairs committee] (Heidar, 1997). Similar conditions apply in the 
Czech Republic, Estonia and the Russian Duma (Reschova and Syllova, 1996; 
Kask, 1996; Remington and Smith, 1996). Because com m ittees in m any states 
are representative of all the elements in parliam ent, they serve to involve the 
opposition parties in the formal detailed work of the state. The view outlined 
earlier regarding the promotion of the better type of comm ittee m em ber is 
validated by the conclusion of Englefield (1984, p .62) that turnover erodes the 
quality of m em bership since it is often the best m em bers who are prom oted..
Specialisation by m em bers of parliam ent/com m ittees
Consequent upon the last paragraph, it is necessary to reflect upon the degree of 
specialisation by m em bers of parliam ents and the impact, if any, this would have 
on their deliberations. I intend to focus primarily on specialisation by m em bers of 
the Oireachtas bu t will refer to examples from other parliam ents also.
Specialisation in  th e  Irish parliam ent
There are 166 TDs and 60 senators in the Oireachtas. ‘One trend in recent years 
has been the increase in full-time deputies, who now m ake up a strong majority 
of the Dail’ (Gallagher & Komito, 1992). Many senators also describe their 
occupations as "full-time public representatives". Thus a large num ber of
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Oireachtas m em bers rely on their continued m em bership of the Dail/Seanad for 
their sole income (Irish Times, 11 May 1996). This trend is continuing in m any 
parliam ents such as the  UK and Germany where Saalfeld (1997) observes that 
membership of parliam ent is an increasingly full tim e role although De W inter 
(1997) states tha t ’nearly half of the Belgian MPs exercise a private occupation 
aside with the [parliamentary] m andate’.
Accordingly all the TDs (including the Ministers bu t possibly excluding the 
Ceann Comhairle who is returned automatically to the next Dail following an 
election] and a large proportion of the Seanad, who m ay be nursing or cultivating 
a Dail seat for themselves, devote m ost of their energies to their "constituency 
case load". This often necessitates the holding of "clinics" or advice centres in 
various localities in their constituencies in order to build up a supply of political 
kudos for return  at election times. The range of issues which the politician 
encounters by providing this service often dem ands that he/she m ust adopt w hat 
Judge (1981, p.12) refers to as a ‘generalist role’. This is to say th a t because of 
the plethora and range of subjects the Oireachtas m em ber m ust service, it would 
be impossible to allocate valuable tim e to pursue a "specialist role". In addition 
the "return on investm ent" on such specialisation m ight be unattractive to a 
public representative due to the multiplicity of issues tha t dem and ... attention 
(Judge, 1981, p .65].
Arkins (1990) considering the situation in Ireland, refers to the num ber and 
nature of parliam entary questions in support of her argum ent that
specialisation is not a common feature of parliam entary life. Deputies
cultivate the  parliam entary profile m ost suited to their constituents. Thus
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they focus on constituency m atters and articulate issues of interest to the 
local rather than  the national community.
Members of the government are precluded by law from m em bership of local 
authorities. This ban does not apply to non office holders on both the government 
and opposition sides of both Houses. It is a feature of Irish political life tha t m any 
back benchers are and seem  determ ined to rem ain m em bers of county councils, 
urban district councils and corporations. The argum ent has raged for years as to 
whether TDs/senators should continue such dual m em bership but it is believed 
that they prefer to retain local m em bership as it "keeps them  in close touch with 
local issues". A cynic m ight say tha t it also keeps their nam e before the electorate 
(at local authority elections) and also affords the TD/senator an opportunity to 
"keep a wary eye" on any ambitious councillor with aspirations of Dail 
membership. This feature is by no m eans confined to the Oireachtas. 
Commentators allude to similar type arrangem ents operating in Germany 
(Saalfeld, 1997) whilst Patzelt (1997) reports tha t 29 per cent of German MPs also 
hold seats on city councils and 22 per cent are also m em bers of district councils, 
and in Belgium, De Winter (1997) states that ’Belgian MPs cum ulate their 
parliam entary m andate with an office in local government, which constitutes an 
electoral asset and source of influence and personal satisfaction’
In addition m any m em bers of the Dail are required as cabinet ministers' (15); 
m inisters of state  (17) and chair duties (2). The opposition also provides 
spokespersons and whips and thus a large proportion of the  m em bership is 
engaged in activities that prevent him /her from self-selected specialisation.
These factors can be presented as im pedim ents to specialisation by TDs. I would
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add to the above the feature of cohesiveness of party supporters on m ost issues 
that surface in the Oireachtas. The following com m ent by Judge (1981, p .12) in 
relation to the UK parliam ent forgoing the need for any specialisation m ay also be 
valid when referring to the Oireachtas
conformity to the party line provides the back bencher with a relatively 
cost-free mode of decision - making, which allows him  to reach a decision 
on any particular issue without necessarily having a detailed 
understanding of the subject involved. Adherence to party  ideology thus 
provides another simple and effective partial solution to the problem of 
decision-making in a complex environment.
However it m ust be understood tha t TDs and senators em bark on their public 
representative career "with baggage". All of them  will have been m em bers of a 
profession or have followed a career before entering the house as the table below 
indicates and indeed m any of them  will continue to practice their profession on a 
part-time basis. In addition m any of them  will have served in local governm ent as 
indeed was the situation with regard to the new MPs in the British House of 
Commons (Daniel, 1997) which will have im pacted on them .
5 6
MAIN OCCUPATIONS IN WHICH DEPUTIES ARE OR
HAVE BEEN ENGAGED
Education 38
National teachers 15
Secondary teachers 12
V ocational teachers 2
U niversity  and College Lecturers 3
Other Teachers 6
Farmers and Farm Owners 23
Clerical and Technical 15
Company D irectors and M anagers 14
Lawyers 16
Solicitors 11
B arristers 5
A ccountants 8
Science and Engineering 9
H ealth Care 5
B usiness in terests 9
Trade Union O fficials 5
Econom ists 4
Insurance 2
Journalists 2
(Source: Nealon’s Guide to  2 7 th  Dail and Seanad E lection  ’92 , p. 174)
Table: 4.1 - Main occupations of D eputies e lected  to th e  2 7 th  Dâil.
It would be ludicrous to suggest tha t they could jettison or ignore all of their past 
experiences when speaking in the House and consequently we find several 
m em bers of both Houses of the Oireachtas who possess w hat Walkland (1968, 
p.25) refers to as ‘technical specialisation’ and contribute to debates of a specific 
nature and refer to their own specialised knowledge in the subject area. TDs and 
senators who have medical qualification frequently were heard in debates in this 
area - Dr. J im  Me Daid, TD; Senator Mary Henry; Dr. Rory O’ Hanlon. When 
business m atters were discussed in the senate you would expect contributions 
from Senators Fergal Quinn and Shane Ross. Therefore m any who are specialists
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before entry to politics often continue to specialise whenever possible.
Arkins (1990) states tha t some Dail deputies ‘have developed strong profiles in 
areas such as family law reform or wom en’s rights’. A study of past Dail debates 
would dem onstrate the specialist approach of Alan Shatter TD to family law 
m atters. This Deputy, through his contributions to comm ittee proceedings, 
appeared to confirm the view of Searing (1995) tha t specialists are attracted to 
committees which create an incentive for them  ’to keep up with ... [their] subject 
... [and] provide an unusual opportunity to grill m inisters and civil servants’. 
Women m em bers of both Houses - such as former Deputy Monica Barnes [since 
re-elected] were to the forefront in considering issues affecting women. A feature 
of this policy area was the deliberate decision by m any female deputies such as 
Mary Harney, Maire Geoghegan Quinn and other not to align them selves solely 
with "female issues" but to address a more general list of concerns affecting their 
electorate. Michael Woods, a t a m eeting of the SCLS com m ented on the 
advantage of ’practicing TDs’ considering m atters a t that com m ittee as it implied 
a superior approach to issues under consideration in that the discussion would be 
undertaken by people with real experience of the subject under review.
Another factor that encourages some elements of specialisation is the fact that 
m any m em bers through their appointm ents as m inisters, m inisters of state, 
shadow m inister or opposition spokesperson are obliged to specialise to some 
extent by the confines of their portfolios. Indeed m em bers of small political 
parties in the Oireachtas including the Progressive Democrats, Democratic Left, 
the Labour Party are almost always spokespersons on a range of issues 
(especially when in opposition] and are thus compelled to specialise to a degree
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on more than one policy area.
The advent of select comm ittees and joint comm ittees has also bred an element 
of specialisation by the m em bership appointed. Continuity and stabilisation of 
m em bership would lead to a continued growth of specialisation as evidenced by 
the acquisition by British MPs of detailed knowledge of their brief arising from 
such perm anence. Saalfeld (1997), Damgaard (1997) and Heidar (1997) all 
com m ent upon the specialisation tha t is developed by com m ittee assignm ents in 
Germany, Denmark and Norway. This desire tha t specialisation would be 
cultivated was a key element in the proposal by Desmond (1975, p .l  1) that 
committees be formed as part of Dail reform in order tha t ‘those m em bers with 
specialist knowledge ... [would] engage in the long and detailed analysis ... [of the] 
committee stage of a Bill’ and furtherm ore tha t Estim ates be considered by 
committees ‘composed of m em bers with special interest or qualifications relating 
to the Departm ent under debate’. This would go some way to what Judge refers 
to as division of labour among parliam entarians and would result in a more 
efficient use of m em bers’ time.
The formation in recent years of Select comm ittees to exam ine estim ates and 
legislation goes a long way to accomplish Desmond’s proposal. Some success in 
this aspect of parliam entary activity is noted by Norton (1990, p. 145) in relation 
to the U.K. and by Arter (1990) in the restructured unicam eral Swedish 
parliament.
It m ight be added that m em bership of these comm ittees forces some 
specialisation amongst m em bers who now m ust respond to "having their b lu ff
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called in relation to a worthy role for m em bers of parliam ent and who frequently 
have to "perform" under the full glare of the media. Consequently an 
improvement in the m aterial prepared for delivery a t com m ittee m eetings is to be 
expected.
Concluding this segm ent of m y dissertation I find some m ovem ent in the area of 
professionalism rather than  specialisation by m em bers of the  Dail and Seanad. 
However the situation "on the ground" rem ains the sam e w ith a "survival of the 
fittest" scenario existing in relation to constituency politics. Roisin Shorthall, TD 
(Labour) in a recent Prime Time interview indicated tha t constituency work was 
essential for a Dublin TD and estim ated this work as being worth an additional 
4% on polling day. [If this is accurate then this Deputy’s close re-election justified 
her attention to constituency m atters]. As long as this stressful situation 
continues, deputies m ay find less tim e to research and brief them selves 
adequately on specialist topics as they confront the varied subject m atters offered 
by their constituents. On the other hand concentration on constituency m atters is 
not unknown in m any other parliam ents also and the practitioners there m anage 
to juggle both their parliam entary, party  and constituency/district/electoral 
duties. Pre-occupation with getting re-elected is to be found in m any parliam ents 
in the world. This focus by politicians is noted in the USA (Sowell, 1996) and 
Strom (1997) includes the desire for re-selection followed by re-election as among 
the primary goals of m ost parliam entarians and therefore strategies (which would 
include considerable attention to constituency m atters) are devised to achieve the 
preferred goals.
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O utside bodies
It is evident tha t com m ittees interact in very m any ways w ith groups, 
organisations and individuals outside of the parliam entary and civil 
administration of the country concerned. Countries have different ways of 
regulating representations from pressure groups and lobbyists with some 
parliam ents insisting that such groups are registered. Whilst there is a danger 
that a committee considering a m easure could be misled into supporting a 
dubious or undesirable proposition as a result of intense yet skilful lobbying, the 
push for transparency in the relationship between parliam ents and outside forces 
should reduce such fears and win acceptance that briefings, submissions and 
evidence from third parties all contribute to a more informed and balance debate 
on issues under consideration. Miles (1997) refers to the situation in Sweden 
where ’public and private organisations considered relevant to ... proposal ... have 
the right to subm it com m ents to the respective ... parliam entary com m ittee’ 
adding tha t this ’open system  of policy deliberation and formulation’ occurs at an 
earlier stage in Sweden than  in m ost other West European countries’ while 
Heidar (1997) reports tha t the lobbying activities in the Norwegian Storting 
’naturally focus on the comm ittees and on the representatives as committee 
m em bers’. Allowing groups to m ake representations to m em bers of a legislature 
is not in itself unhealthy. Indeed it is a feature of pluralist dem ocracy’ (Norton, 
1997) with benefits for both sides including the acquisition by parliam entarians, 
including m em bers of committees, of information and advice which m ight 
otherwise have been denied to them . This factor played a major part in the 
education and awareness raising of m em bers regarding a num ber of major issues 
at both the SCLS and the Jo in t Committee on Foreign Affairs (JCFA) as
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evidenced in the case studies below. This them e is repeated by Patzelt (1997) 
who speaks of strong interest groups operating in Germany, viewed as ’role 
partners of MPs’ who supply otherwise unreported information to MPs. This sam e 
author also reveals that the close ties between MPs and interest groups is 
explained by the fact that m any German MPs entry into public life arose from 
their original involvement with a plethora of in terest groups. Thomas (1995) 
recounts efforts to upgrade the somewhat sinister perception of lobbyists, who he 
claims rank very, very low on the scale of social acceptability, as ’would-be 
hijackers of the democratic process’. Like other authors above, he speaks of their 
im portant service to industry and parliament, keeping politicians ’up to speed on 
issues tha t affect both their constituencies and careers’ and quotes Michael 
Portillo’s description of them  as a "political lubricant". '
INTEREST GROUPS
Ireland has no shortage of pressure groups, som etim es referred to as interest 
groups. They are evident in all sectors of Irish society - agricultural, economic, 
social, political, environm ental and cultural am ongst others.
The explosion in the num ber of such organisations is referred to by Richardson 
(1993, p .7) when he observes ‘new interests are constantly being formed in 
society, to press for policy change. There are two very spectacular examples of 
this process in all W estern democracies since the 1970s: the rise of 
environmentalists and of wom en’s groups’.
Interest groups in Ireland ‘can be divided into two broad categories: those with a
62
sectional base, such as trade unions, farmers associations or professional bodies 
and those that are cause centred, such as Greenpeace or SPUC’ (O’Halpin, 1992). 
Most of these groups have become rem arkably robust and professional in pursuit 
of their cause as witnessed in a range of campaigns in recent years. For decades 
the "agricultural lobby" has enjoyed a unique relationship with Irish policy 
m akers - at all levels - and as such were seen to exert significant power and 
influence over all governm ents in office.
Special interest groups formed to alter some issue in Ireland or to oppose the 
alteration of the status quo have reaped enormous am ounts of publicity in the 
Irish media with a consequent "knock - on" effect on politicians. Members of 
parliam ent in the UK are targeted frequently by interest groups seeking new 
legislation in their area of interest (Miller, 1987, p.61) and similarly m em bers of 
the Oireachtas can be expected to be canvassed and those considered 
sym pathetic to a cause by a group would be contacted personally (Chubb, 1982, 
p. 134). During very emotive periods in Irish political life, when m atters affecting 
social or religious concerns are being considered for am endm ent, advocates both 
for and against a given proposal can put enormous pressure on TDs and senators. 
During the "Pro-life" campaign in the 1980s, several TDs gave accounts of people 
attending their advice clinics and disrupting proceeding by im prom ptu recitals of 
the rosary or at public m eetings continuously interrupting (in excess of the 
accepted "heckling") any speaker deemed sym pathetic to the cause not finding 
favour with the protestor. Dr. J im  Me Daid, TD, gave an account of upsetting 
articles forwarded to him in the mail during the abortion debate. The very recent 
divorce campaign witnessed a very effective campaign by forces opposing change 
who agreed that targeting apparently sym pathetic or vulnerable public
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representatives formed part of their tactics.
The very holding of the referendum  on the "Pro-life" issue is credited with being 
as a result of pressure group tactics on both Dr. Garret FitzGerald and Mr.
Charles Haughey - in effect pitting them  against one another and the final 
wording of the am endm ent pu t to the people in the referendum  was not that 
preferred by the governm ent of the day bu t was am ended by the Dail following 
pressure on selected deputies, sym pathetic to the issue.
Whilst these illustrations are very familiar to the public due to the colourful 
debates that ensued and the publicity generated by the cam paigns there are other 
situations perhaps more m undane in which interest groups also have exerted 
influence. The incidences in the UK of ‘business friendly’ (Hollingsworth, 1991, 
p.21) politicians have been the subject of m any articles by com m entators and 
comparable allegations of politicians being similarly found to be associated with 
events in Irish industrial and commercial life have sim m ered over the years. In 
addition the lobbying of MPs in an attem pt of use them  to influence m atters 
(Berry, 1992; Hollingsworth, 1991, p.22) has long been a cause for concern in 
Britain. In Ireland the disclosure of interests by deputies and senators following 
the enactm ent of "the ethics" act; the controversy over the use of official 
notepaper for political party  fundraising and the aborted Labour party  lunch for 
business people w ith Minister for Finance, Ruari Quinn TD before he "finalised" 
the Finance Bill have rekindled interest among the public in this issue. Me Cann 
(1993) states that business cannot ignore the reality of ‘resource allocation’ being 
a ‘political decision’ and therefore business m ust seek to influence political 
opinion in its favour. The locus of public policy formation is however not
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identified with the Irish parliam ent but with the governm ent and consequently 
pressure groups tend to address their activities in the direction of the executive 
and the civil service (Chubb, 1982, p.140/1).
As a consequence politicians have had to realise tha t as W alkland (1968, p.33/4] 
indicated some years ago the political parties are not the sole vehicle of political 
ideas and that pressure groups have developed the contact and expertise to 
enable them  to put their case to the real policy m akers. Except for the celebrated 
social issues in Ireland, m ost issues are decided upon by the governm ent and 
formally legitimised by the parliament. Therefore as one com m entator has 
suggested continuing lobbying of m em bers of parliam ent is m erely playing along 
with this notion of their power (Berry, 1992).
Some exceptions to this rule are evident by the relative success on occasions by 
certain professions in having legislation am ended in their favour. The well 
publicised intention of the Minister for Justice (in both the previous 
administrations) to remove "the barrister’s wig" from Irish courts was quietly 
amended to be an option for barristers, not a  requirem ent. This am endm ent was 
piloted through by m em bers of the Dail close to the legal profession.
A feature in Ireland related to the current system  of m ultiseat constituencies is 
the success of interest groups who target TDs on local or constituency issues. 
Witness the examples in recent years of Willie O’Dea TD in Limerick voting 
against his governm ent on the Barringtons Hospital closure in Limerick or the 
Labour TDs who voted against the governm ent w ith regard to the Team  Aer 
Lingus issue - the num ber of local TDs of all parties who criticised proposals with
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regard to the Phoenix Park casino; the Kill dum p or the change in sta tus for 
Shannon airport. Because of the pressure on local m atters and the need for 
parties to tackle "single issue candidates", som e degree of maverick Dail voting is 
deemed acceptable although it m ay result in some notional political punishm ent 
(eg withdrawal of whip) in order to preserve the illusion of party discipline in the 
Oireachtas. Shades of this approach to discipline are also recorded by Heidar 
(1997) when, referring to the dissention by party  m em bers in the Norwegian 
parliament, he notes that party leadership m ay show a degree of "understanding" 
towards m em bers, adding ’dissent on local issues are the e a s ie s t... to tolerate ... 
sam e applies to strongly held ethical views’. In Ireland the targeting of politicians 
by local groups in this m anner has resulted from purely electoral purposes in 
some success for pressure groups - examples offered include the Knock airport 
construction and the prevention of the closure of rural post offices.
Therefore whilst m any back bench m em bers of parliament, including m em bers of 
committees, m ay have been happy to "make representations" on certain m atters 
and to be seen to do so, the interest groups have included them  on their contact 
list as merely one element in the policy chain involving government, civil service 
and in recent years, Brussels! with varying degrees of success. It will be 
concluded when considering the proceedings of the two Oireachtas comm ittees 
that I studied, tha t m any groups and bodies provided valuable briefing to 
members.
Other factors
Amongst the m any other issues which affect the work of parliam entary
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committees are the provision of adequate resources by the adm inistration in 
term s of secretarial and clerical assistance, travel/consultancy and research 
budgets, extra rem uneration for mem bers, especially officers of committees. In 
addition there is the question of adequate tim e being allowed for m em bers to 
brief themselves correctly, to study docum entation often of a technical level. Klug 
et al (1996) refer to a questionnaire recording views of UK MPs relating to 
standing committees. The conclusions indicated that they felt tha t ’they were 
poorly resourced ... required more detailed background information’ and a desire 
that opposition MPs should also be serviced by the civil service. This view 
corresponds with the frequent and oft repeated com m ents of Oireachtas m em bers 
on this same m atter. Examples to illustrate this can be found in the records of 
m any of the comm ittee meetings that I studied. During 1993 the m em bers 
themselves emphasised m any of the issues which caused them  concern. The 
m ain weakness at that tim e would appear to have been the lack of technical 
assistance afforded to opposition and backbench m em bers in the preparation of 
amendments. This restricted the Deputies’ abilities to produce wording that was 
legally satisfactory and acceptable to the parliam entary draftsm an. This led Gay 
Mitchell to propose ’that the clerk be directed to report to the com m ittee on 
precisely what assistance is available to Opposition spokesm en on drafting of 
technical am endm ents. If we are to do our job properly it is a m atter which m ust 
be addressed’ (SCLS, 22 July, 1993; LI No. 5, Col 405). This defect in the 
committee system  was referred to later by the sam e Deputy when he spoke on a 
later Bill admitting ’It is difficult for me, speaking on behalf of 62 Members of the 
Oireachtas and not having any resources ... am endm ent m ay have shortcomings 
but it sets out to provide [alternative provisions] ...’ (SCLS, 9 November, 1993; LI 
No. 10, Cols 780,781). Another m em ber - Eam onn Gilmore - alluded to this
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handicap when he stated during the debate on his am endm ent to a Bill 
’unfortunately on the Opposition side of the House we have to table ... 
am endm ents from the point of view of principle rather than  from their technical 
correctness’ (SCLS, 9 November, 1993; LI No. 10, Col 792). This grievance was 
noted by the Minister of State, Willie O’Dea, during the debate when he agreed 
with complaints ’about the lack of resources available to backbenchers and to 
people who are not in governm ent’. He was familiar w ith the difficulties this 
presented to the opposition and was content therefore to ’deal w ith the  principle’ 
(SCLS, 10 November, 1993; LI No. 11, Col 831) as was the Minister for Justice 
in other debates.
In 1994 the lack of resources provided to m em bers of the  opposition (and 
presumably to governm ent backbenchers also) to enable them  to tackle the 
technical aspects of legislation was again aired on m any occasions by m embers. 
This was highlighted most forcefully by Eam onn Gilmore when an opposition 
am endm ent had fallen foul of the chair’s ruling:
Members of the Opposition, who are trying to perform constructively, 
labour under a regime where we do not have the panoply of assistance and 
advice both from the Civil Service and the ministerial office tha t is 
available to Government Ministers. I accept that perhaps in the very fine 
print of an Opposition am endm ent it is possible that there m ay be some 
technical faults but it is not acceptable that this kind of offside trap is 
being used against Members of the Opposition who are simply trying to 
improve the legislation.
(SCLS, 27 April 1994; L2, No. 7, Col 374).
Similar complaints featured at further m eetings of both this comm ittee and the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs (as detailed below) during the lifetime of the 
last Dail under both adm inistrations as the resulting limitations imposed on the 
ability of Deputies to function as lawmakers, exacerbated by frequent incidences
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of little time elapsing between the tabling of complex am endm ents by ministers 
and their consideration by the committee were felt to impose a consequent 
handicap on members.
Other internal factors include the approach adopted by the chairs of such 
committees, the perception by backbenchers of their own role in the 
parliam entary process and the citizens’ view of their parliam ent in general and 
their awareness (if any) of how these comm ittees contribute to the public 
administration of their country.
Publicity
Central to the final point in the paragraph above is the degree to which the 
committees deliberations are covered by the media.
Norton (1997) observes that ’citizens [in the UK] have difficulty perceiving the 
distinction between government and Parliam ent’. Whilst he lays m uch of the 
blame for this at the door of the British education system , it is clear that the 
m edia coverage of parliam entary affairs is less than  he would like and 
recognising the commercial reality that coverage of parliam ent ’would not 
increase newspaper sales or viewing figures’, he concedes that ’ coverage of 
committees ... would convey a more rounded picture of Parliam ent’.
He relates the popular view of parliam ent seen by the public on television with 
rows of em pty seats and those present engaged in ’partisan point-scoring’. The 
absence of m em bers from the cham ber, even if ’attending com m ittees or m eeting 
m em bers of the public’ draws a cynical response from the m edia and likewise the
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public who rely on the m ainstream  press, radio and television to form their 
opinions of parliam entary business. Franks and Vanderm ark (1995), in a study of 
television coverage of the UK parliam ent, found that backbench MPs welcomed 
coverage of committees as it was often their only chance of appearing on 
television given the concentration on front bench action in the cham ber and the 
substantial regional appeal com m ittee coverage provided for m em bers anxious to 
increase their constituency profile. Norton suggests that one of the advantages 
that flow from greater coverage of parliam entary proceedings, including 
committee sessions, is the realisation by the public of the ’extent to which special 
interests do or do not influence proceedings and thus, it could be argued that, 
with appropriate media coverage, a less hyped-up and extrem e view of the 
lobbying process such as operates in Ireland at present would be presented to the 
public a t large. On the other hand, Strom (1997), speaking of the different goals 
and strategies of parliam entarians such as renom ination and re-election to their 
national parliaments, advances the view that ’if comm ittees engage in highly 
visible and well-publicised hearings or investigations’, they m ay use these venues 
to wear their "partisan" hat to advance their own position, possibly at the 
expense of a better, more thoughtful, consensual outcome, a fear which O’Halpin 
also highlighted when he referred to the danger that m em bers or whole 
committees, subject to such coverage, ’m ight play to the gallery at the expense of 
serious consideration of a question.’
This strive for the ideal balance is not confined to any one country. In Spain, the 
’m edia has exclusive access to sessions of the com m ittees’ (Paniagua Soto, 1997) 
bu t ’it has been claimed t h a t ... program m es reporting the activities of the Cortes 
are usually broadcast during odd hours, when audience levels are low, and, a t the
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sam e time there is little inclination to watch these program m es’.
As a contrast, m edia coverage of the Swedish Riksdag is described by Miles 
(1997) as ’relatively high’ and he adds that this fact coupled w ith the Swedish 
stress on freedom of information has a linkage to the em phasis by King-Hall ’on 
the notion that popular awareness of the activities of the country’s legislature is a 
central attribute of a healthy parliam entary dem ocracy’.
Greater accurate and indepth coverage of a parliam ent’s proceedings in all its 
forms would contribute to a  more accurate understanding by the public of the 
work of their legislators and would perhaps diminish some of the apathy and 
disillusionment shared by citizens when asked for their views in this area as 
statistics such as the Eurobarom eter indicate. Eurobarom eter 44 of late 1995 
showed that only forty eight per cent of the general public in the EU had trust in 
their national parliament. W hen taken in conjunction with the  view of Norton 
(1997) tha t popular awareness of the activities of a legislature derives from three 
principal sources namely, passive observation through watching television news 
or reading a newspaper, deliberate observation by m eans of dedicated 
programmes and newspaper articles on legislative activity and finally through 
direct contact with m em bers of legislatures, and noting his reference to the later 
Eurobarometer data for Spring 1996 which showed a m ere forty five per cent 
popular trust in national parliam ents across the fifteen m em ber states of the 
European Union, it can be argued tha t the m edia has a  pivotal role to play in the 
formation of the public’s perception of parliam entary activities with all the 
associated responsibilities which FitzGerald (1997) outlines below .
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Norton’s observation that (in the UK) there ‘is a disparity between the work done 
by MPs and how citizens view that work ’ is echoed by Irish parliamentarians. 
Dail debates in 1993, 1995 and 1996 all contain instances of concern by 
m em bers regarding m edia coverage of their activities. Deputies Eamonn Gilmore 
(Dciil Debates, 18 February 1993, Vol 426, Col 672), Tony Killeen (Col 675), John  
Browne (Carlow-Kilkenny) (Cols 678 8s 679) voiced concerns about m edia 
coverage with the latter deputy advising the need to ‘counteract the rubbish we 
hear regarding the workings of Dail Eireann’ and claiming that ‘the public m ight 
not understand the system  because it has never been explained to them ’. Sean 
Barrett, government chief whip, rem arked during a debate in 1995 that the 
‘reality is that a great deal of work is done here about which the public are not 
aware and for which credit is not given’ (Dail Debates, 1 March 1995, Vol 449, 
Col. 2230).
This m atter continues to be relevant as the proceedings of the Oireachtas 
committees that I studied are sprinkled with com m ents from m em bers about
sparse and unsatisfactory m edia coverage of their proceedings. Oireachtas
\
m em bers such as Alan Shatter (Select Committee on Legislation and Security 
[SCLS], 21 May 1993, L I, No. 3, Col 229) and Jim  Kemmy (SCLS, 22 Ju ly  1993, 
L I, No. 5, Col 372) were critical of the reporting of the comm ittees both in term s 
of accuracy and of the fact tha t coverage frequently failed to include 
backbenchers undertaking tasks such as committee work. Interestingly, O’Halpin 
(1996) contends that print and broadcast ’media coverage of Oireachtas 
proceedings has ... increased m arkedly in scope and depth since the m id-1980s’ 
with a consequent improvement in committee proceedings by mem bers. In 
contrast with this view FitzGerald (1997) appears to concur with Norton’s view
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above, writing about the duty owed by journalism  to politics, namely ’to inform 
the public adequately about the legislative ... process’ argues that ’for m any 
years, serious coverage of the work of the Dail and Seanad has virtually been 
abandoned’. Conceding tha t m uch of the output m ay not be worth reporting and 
recognising that m uch of the contentious, "newsworthy" proceedings are covered 
he complains that m uch of ’the extensive work of the Dail and Seanad and their 
com m ittees’ is ill-reported. Allowing for the technical nature of m uch of this work 
he claims that the committee and report stages of debates (which is m uch of the 
principal work of the new legislative committees) are not referred to in the press 
at all and this renders the public ignorant of the true law making process and 
unable to judge the effectiveness of individual m em bers of parliam ent. Therefore, 
whether one agrees or not th a t the current m edia reporting of parliam entary 
affairs is satisfactory, there is a clear relationship between publicity/coverage and 
potential benefits either in the scale of public understanding/appreciation of 
parliam entary work and the quality of the input from Oireachtas mem bers.
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There were 23 different comm ittees operating in the Houses of the Oireachtas in 
the life of the 27th Dail.
These committees could be grouped on a functional basis as follows:-
committees concerned with the efficient running of the Oireachtas such as 
the Dail and Seanad committees on Procedure and Privileges, the two 
committees of Selection and the Joint Services Committee.
committees concerned with the functions of parliam ent relating to public 
spending and the monitoring of state-sponsored bodies. These included the 
Dail Committee of Public Accounts and the Jo in t Committee on 
Commercial State-sponsored Bodies.
Functions of the Oireachtas in relation to legislation were dealt with by the 
Select Committees on Social Affairs, Finance and General Affairs,
Enterprise and Economic Strategy, Legislation and Security and by the 
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Committee on European 
Affairs.
Furthermore, there were a num ber of ad hoc comm ittees dealing w ith specialised 
subjects such as -
•  Joint Committee on W omen’s Rights,
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•  Joint Committee on Sustainable Development,
•  Joint Committee on Small Business and Services,
• Joint Committee on the Family, and
•  Comhchoiste don Ghaeilge.
In addition new comm ittees created during the term  of the last Oireachtas 
included the Dail and Seanad committees on m em bers’ interests and the liaison 
committee which attem pted to draw together the Operations of all the various 
committees in the Oireachtas.
Committees were composed of m em bers of either house, but Jo in t Committees 
were composed of m em bers of both houses.
Details of each committee including both its m em bership during the latter half of 
the 27th Dail/Oireachtas and degree of secretarial assistance (where available) are 
contained in Appendix I.
M embership of Com m ittees
Legislation provides for 166 m em bers of the Dail and 60 m em bers of the Seanad. 
Analysis of committee m em bership shows that 124 TDs and 53 Senators were 
mem bers of at least one committee in the last Oireachtas.
Participation by m em bers of th e  Dail in  com m ittees:
The 124 TDs referred to above who participated in the work of at least one
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Oireachtas committee during the second half of the last Oireachtas included the 
Ceann Comhairle (Chairman of the Dail comm ittee on Procedure and Privileges) 
and the Chief Whip (Chairman of the Dail com m ittee of Selection). By including 
the 15 m em bers of the Cabinet and the rem aining 16 Ministers of State who m ay 
be ex officio m em bers of committees if m atters relating to their portfolio are being 
considered, a total of 155 out of 166 TDs formally engaged them selves in 
Oireachtas committee work. Two of the rem aining 11 deputies -Bertie Ahern 
(then leader of the opposition) and Joe Jacob (then Leas Ceann Comhairle) could 
be deemed to have had other pressing duties to occupy them . The 9 rem aining 
non-office holders not listed as participating in the work of Oireachtas comm ittees 
were:
Bhamjee, Moosajee, Lab
Clohessy, Peadar PD
Collins, Gerard FF
Gallagher, Pat the Cope FF
Hyland, Liam FF
Keaveney, Cecilia FF
Lenihan, Brian FF
Noonan, Michael J  (Limerick West) FF 
Reynolds, Albert FF
Deputies Collins, Gallagher and Hyland were all FF m em bers with a dual 
m andate in the European Parliament. Deputies Lenihan and Keaveney won seats 
at by-elections during the lifetime of the 27th  Dail and were not featured in the 
records although Brian Lenihan was a m em ber of the non-Oireachtas
Constitutional Review Group2, 3.
Analysis of details supplied by the Houses of the Oireachtas indicate that:
47 TDs were m em bers of one comm ittee only 
43 TDs were m em bers of two comm ittees 
25 TDs m em bers of three committees 
7 TDs were m em bers of four comm ittees 
2 TDs. were m em bers of five committees
Given the large num ber of Dail m em bers involved in governm ent and opposition 
front bench duties, there would statistically appear to have been a commendable 
involvement by Dail m em bers in the formal work of the committees.
Participation by m em bers of the Seanad in  Com m ittees
53 of the then current 59 m em bers of the Seanad (one vacancy) were listed as 
being m em bers of at least one Oireachtas committee. These m em bers not 
appearing on committee m em bership lists included Senators Joe Doyle, Cathy 
Honan, Joe Lee, Patrick Me Gowan, Francis O’Brien and Sam Me Aughtry.
31 Senators were m em bers of one comm ittee only 
18 Senators were m em bers of two comm ittees 
3 Senators were m em bers of three comm ittees
2 Correspondence with governm ent press office 
Conversation w ith Deputy Lenihan’s aides
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1 Senator was a m em ber of 4 committees.
This showed a formidable involvement by the Upper House parliam entarians in 
the formal operations of the committees.
Paym ents to  chairpersons
A feature of the committees established during the last Dail was the fact that 
chairpersons of certain designated Oireachtas comm ittees were entitled to an 
allowance. This, it was claimed by some critics, such as J im  O’Keefe (Dail 
debates, 18 February 1993, Vol. 426, Col 636), Dermot Ahem  and Liz O’Donnell 
(Dail Debates, 1 March 1995, Vol. 449, Col 2188 and Col 2195), Des O’Malley and 
Willie O’Dea (Dail Debates, 9 October 1996, Vol. 469, Col. 1724 and Col. 1736) 
was another way to spread the patronage available to the governm ents to their 
supporters in parliam ent as m ost of the plum  positions of chairperson were 
allocated to governm ent supporters with the occasional exception such as the 
Committee of Public Accounts which, by tradition, is chaired by a m em ber of the 
opposition. Seventeen comm ittees were chaired by non-office holders such as the 
Ceann Comhairle, Cathaoirleach of the Seanad, Chief Whip. Thirteen of these had 
a government supporter as chair whilst the opposition chaired four. This drew 
complaints that far from contributing to the meaningful reform of the Oireachtas, 
the new appointm ents were m erely additional "jobs for the boys" (Michael Martin, 
Dail Debates, 1 March 1995, Vol 449, Col. 2219). Laundy (1989, pps. 108-110) 
relates that the chair of a parliam entary committee is in the gift of the 
government in Israel; in Japan  the chairs are appointed by the presiding officer of 
the relevant house and in the USA the chairs of comm ittees and sub-committees
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belong as a right to the majority party in the house concerned.
The additional allowances available to chairpersons were as follows:
The Committee of Public Accounts £ 10,874
The Joint Committee on the Irish 
Language
£ 7,213
The Jo in t Committee on W omen’s 
Rights
£ 7,213
The Joint Services Committee £ 7,213
The Joint Committee on Commercial 
State Sponsored Bodies
£ 10,874
The Select Committee on Finance and 
General Affairs
£ 10,874
The Select Committee on Enterprise 
and Economic Strategy
£ 10,874
The Select Committee on Legislation 
and Security
£ 10,874
The Select Committee on Social 
Affairs
£ 10,874
The Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs
£ 10,874
The British- Irish Inter-Parliamentary 
Body
£ 7,213
The Joint Committee on European 
Affairs
£ 10,874
The Jo in t Committee on Small 
Business and Services
£ 7,213
The Jo in t Committee on Sustainable 
Development
£ 7,213
The Joint Committee on the Family £ 7,213
Source: Public Relations Office - Houses of the  Oireachtas
Table 5.1: Allowances for chairpersons of certain Oireachtas com m ittees 1994- 
1997
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Women in  com m ittees
At the conclusion of the 27th Dail/Oireachtas there were tw enty two women TDs 
and eight women senators (State Directory 1995-6). This represented 13.25 per 
cent of TDs and 13.33 per cent of senators. The Oireachtas had thirty  women 
m embers, 13.27 per cent of the total.
Upon examination of twenty of the com m ittees (excluding the liaison and two 
m em bers’ interests committees) the female composition of the committees 
created following the appointm ent of the rainbow coalition is as follows:
COMMITTEE TOTAL NUMBER OF 
MEMBERS
NUMBER OF
WOMEN
MEMBERS
PERCENTAGE 
OF WOMEN 
MEMBERS
COMMITTEE OF 
SELECTION - DAIL
13 2 15.38%
COMMITTEE OF 
SELECTION - SEANAD
11 1 9.09%
COMMITTEE OF 
PROCEDURE AND 
PRIVILEGES - DAIL
18 2 11.11%
COMMITTEE OF 
PROCEDURE AND 
PRIVILEGES - SEANAD
11 1 9.09%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
STANDING ORDERS - 
PRIVATE BUSINESS
6 0 0
STANDING JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON 
CONSOLIDATION BILLS
6 0 0
COMMITTEE OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTS
12 0 0
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
SEMI-STATE BODIES
11 1 9.09%
SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
SOCIAL AFFAIRS
21 5 23.81%
SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCE AND GENERAL 
AFFAIRS
21 0 0
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
ENTERPRISE AND 
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
21 2 9.52%
SELECT COMMITTEE ON 
LEGISLATION AND 
SECURITY
21 1 4.76%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
30 3 10%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
18 2 11.11%
COMHCHOISTE DON 
GHAEILGE
17 2 11.76%
JOINT SERVICES 
COMMITTEE
19 1 5.26%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
WOMENS RIGHTS
17 12 70.59%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE 
FAMILY
19 8 42.10%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
SMALL BUSINESSES AND. 
SERVICES
19 3 15.79%
JOINT COMMITTEE ON
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
19 2 10.53%
Table 5.2: Women m em bership of Oireachtas comm ittees - 1996
Source: State Directory 1995-6
The following facts emerge from the exam ination of the position of women in 
Oireachtas committees:
•  Only one woman occupied a position of chair of an  Oireachtas committee 
- Mary Wallace, Jo in t Committee on Womens Rights;
•W omen were principally represented on "social affairs" type committees 
such as W omens Rights (12/17); Family (8/19); Select Committee on Social 
Affairs (5/21);
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•W omen had minimal representation (one member) on five committees;
•No women recorded as m em bers of four comm ittees including 
-Select Committee on Finance and General Affairs and 
-Committee on Public Accounts, both of which would have occupied a 
prime position in Oireachtas affairs;
•All non-ministerial women TDs are recorded as m em bers of a t least one 
committee with the exception of Cecelia Keaveney (returned a t a by- 
election late in the Dáil) and
•Seven of the eight female senators were listed as m em bers of a t least one 
committee, the exception being Cathy Honan.
Case stu d ies
As it would not be possible to realistically examine every Oireachtas committee, a 
more detailed study of two com m ittees will form part of this thesis - namely the 
Select Committee on Legislation and Security and the Jo in t Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. This afforded m e an opportunity to examine a predom inantly 
legislative committee (SCLS) and one which was more policy/issues focused 
(JCFA) as well as looking at a "deputies only" committee (SCLS) and one which 
num bered senators among its m em bership (JCFA). This, I believe is a realistic 
"sample" of the then Oireachtas committees.
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY
This committee was first created in the 27th Dail on 7 April 1993. This was 
during the FF - Lab governm ent and consisted of FF - 12; FG - 8; Lab - 6; PD - 2; 
DL - 1; Ind - 1. = Gov - 18 Others - 12. The Chairman was a governm ent 
nominee - Dan Wallace (FF).
Whilst m em bers of all comm ittees were discharged on 24 January  1995 upon the 
change of government, some m em bers forming the sub-com mittee of the select 
committee considering the fall of the previous governm ent were to continue in 
office until the sub-committee discharged the functions assigned to it.
Following the change in Government, the Dail appointed a new  committee on 10 
March 1995, consisting of 21 m em bers (9 less than previous).
Composition: FF - 8; FG - 7; Lab - 4; PD - 1; Ind - 1 =
Gov 11; Others 10.
Chairman : Charles Flanagan (FG)
8 of those appointed to this comm ittee were not m em bers of the previous 
committee
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY
ORDER APPOINTING 7 April 1993
MEMBERS APPOINTED 10 March 1995
MEMBERSHIP 21* Deputies and Minister (ex officio)
QUORUM 5 Members
CHAIRMAN Charles Flanagan
CLERK TO COMMITTEE John  Roy croft
SECOND CONTACT PERSON to be decided
MEMBERSHIP
John  Browne John  Browne Jim  O’Keeffe
(Carlow-Kilkenny) (Wexford)
Brendan Kenneally Derek Me Dowell Alan Shatter
Liam Fitzgerald Paul Me Grath Micheál Smith
Charles Flanagan John  Mulvihill Godfrey Timmins
Tony Gregory Willie O’Dea Dan Wallace
Paddy Harte Liz O’Donnell Eamon Walsh
Jim  Kemmy John  O’Donoghue Michael Woods
Note: * The num ber of m em bers on the Committee was changed from 30 to 
21 pursuant to an Order of the Dail of 1 March 1995.
84
FORMER MEMBERS ON SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND 
SECURITY
Michael Ferris (Discharged 05-05-1993}
Mary Harney [Discharged 30-11-1993)
P.J. Morley (Discharged 29-04-1993)
The Deputies listed below were appointed on 28 April 1993 (unless otherwise 
stated) pursuant to an Order of the Dail of 1 April 1993. All of them  were 
discharged pursuant to an Order of the Dail of 24 January , 1995. The Deputies 
indicated with the * rem ained as m em bers of the sub-committee of the Select 
Committee until it discharged its functions on 28 February, 1995.
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Dermot Ahem *
Sean Barrett 
Ben Briscoe
John  Browne * (Carlow 
Kilkenny)
Ivor Callely *
Donal Carey *
Peadar Clohessy 
Gerard Collins
Sile de Valera 
Liam Fitzgerald
Denis Foley 
Eamon Gilmore 
Tony Gregory *
Paddy Harte
Jim  Kemmy 
Brian Lenihan 
Derek Me Dowell *
Gay Mitchell 
John  Mulvihill
Liz O’Donnell
(appointed 30-11-1993)
John  O’Donoghue *
Jim  O’Keeffe *
Sean Power 
Eoin Ryan
John  Ryan
Alan Shatter
Roisin Shorthall
Godfrey Timmins
Dan Wallace * (appointed
29-04-1993)
Eam onn Walsh *
(appointed
05-05-1993)
Deputies Willie O’Dea * and Desmond J . O’Malley * substitu ted for a Fianna Fail 
m em ber of the Select Committee and Deputy Peadar Clohessy respectively and as 
such became m em bers of the Sub-Committee.
The term s of reference, including am endm ents m ade during the lifetime of the 
27th Dail are to be found at Appendix II.
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CHAPTER 6 - SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY
Introduction
As indicated above this new committee composed of m em bers of the Dail only 
was one of the two Oireachtas committees that I chose to study in more detail.
1993
The committee m et on a total of 17 occasions during 1993. The business 
considered by the committee was as follows:
PURPOSE OF MEETING NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Inauguration 1
Private 3
Estimates 5
Legislation 8
Table: 6.1 - Number of m eetings of SCLS during 1993 
Source: Official debates and annual report
A ttendance
Excluding the inaugural and three private m eetings there was a total of 13 
working meetings of the comm ittee during the year.
In considering this workload it should be rem em bered th a t the Select Committees 
were created in April of 1993 and their first m eetings were held in May.
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Of the 13 m eetings the m em bers were present at or were substituted for as 
follows:-
NAME OF 
MEMBER
NUMBER OF
MEETINGS
ATTENDED
NUMBER OF 
MEETINGS AT 
WHICH
MEMBER WAS 
SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF 
MEETINGS AT 
WHICH 
MEMBER 
CONTRIBUTED
AHERN D. (FF) 7 (54%) 4 (31%) 6 (46%)
BARRETT S.(FG) 9 (69%) 1 (8%) 9 (69%)
BRISCOE B.(FF) 11 (85%) 1 (8%) 7 (54%)
BROWNE J . (Carlow- 
Kilkenny] (FG)
13 (100%) 0 (0%) 13 (100%)
CALLELY I. (FF) 10 (77%) 1 (8%) 10 (77%)
CAREY D. (FG) 8 (62%) 2 (15%) 3 (23%)
CLOHESSY P. (PD) 3 (23%) 4 (31%) 1 (8%)
COLLINS G. (FF) 6 (46%) 4 (31%) 3 (23%)
de VALERA S. (FF) 3 (23%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%)
FITZGERALD L. (FF) 12 (92%) 0 (0%) 10 (77%)
FOLEY D. (FF) 10 (77%) 3 (23%) 5 (38%)
GILMORE E. (DL) 7 (54%) 3 (23%) 7 (54%)
GREGORY T. (IND) 7 (54%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%)
HARTE P. (FG) 9 (69%) 0 (0%) 5 (38%)
KEMMY J. (LAB) 9 (69%) 2 (15%) 8 (62%)
LENIHAN B. (FF) 4 (31%) 4 (31%) 4 (31%)
McDOWELL D. (LAB) 9 (69%) 1 (8%) 8 (62%)
MITCHELL G. (FG) 11 (85%) 0 (0%) 9 (69%)
MULVIHILL J . (LAB) 9 (69%) 4 (31%) 1 (8%)
O’DONNELL L. (PD) 
and HARNEY M. (PD) 
[switch 12/93]
11 (85%) 2 [(15%) 11 (85%)
O’DONOGHUE J . (FF) 6 (46%) 3 (23%) 6 (46%)
O’KEEFE J . (FG) 9 (69%) 2 (15%) 6 (46%)
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POWER S. (FF) 6 (46%) 1 (8%) 4 (31%)
RYAN E. (FF) 9 (69%) 0 (0%) 5 (38%)
RYAN J . (LAB) 6 (46%) 3 (23%) 1 (8%)
SHATTER A. (FG) 8 (62%) 3 (23%) 7 (54%)
SHORTHALL R. (LAB) 5 (38%) 3 (23%) 0 (0%)
TIMMINS G. (FG) 7 (54%) 3 (23%) 0 (0%)
WALLACE D. (FF) 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 13 (0%)
WALSH E. (LAB) 13 (100%) 0 (0%) 13 (100%)
Table: 6.2 - Attendance and contributions by m em bers to SCLS during 1993.
Source: Parliamentary Debates- Select Committee on Legislation and Security;
7,14,21, May 1993; 13,22 Ju ly  1993; 14,15,20,22 Septem ber 1993; 9, 10, 25 
November 1993; 15 December 1993 and Report of the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security for the period 7 April, 1993 to 31 December, 1994.
As can be seen from the above the attendance rate (either in person or by 
substitution) was quite high. A num ber of Deputies were present or represented 
at almost all meetings. The following statistics em erge:-
PERCENTAGE OF MEETINGS AT 
WHICH MEMBERS WERE PRESENT 
OR SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF MEMBERS
100% 6
91% - 99% 2
81% - 90% 6
71% - 80% 6
61% - 70% 6
51% - 60% 3
> 50% 1
Table: 6.3 - Sum m ary of attendance - SCLS during 1993
Source: Parliamentary Debates- Select Committee on Legislation and Security;
7,14,21, May 1993; 13,22 Ju ly  1993; 14,15,20,22 Septem ber 1993; 9, 10, 25
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November 1993; 15 December 1993 and Report of the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security for the period 7 April, 1993 to 31 December, 1994.
A study of the attendance as extracted from the comm ittee proceedings reveals 
that the average attendance during this first year of existence was 24 m em bers or 
80% which I suggest is a very respectable turnout given m em bers’ other duties.
Substitution was perm itted under paragraph 9 of the orders of reference. This 
had a num ber of advantages; it allowed the work of the comm ittee to continue 
even if m any of the m em bers were unable to attend. This would be a regular 
feature of Irish political life due to the m any com m itm ents of parliam entarians 
including constituency business, m em bership of other Oireachtas comm ittees 
sitting at the sam e tim e or even attendance at the plenary session of the Dail. 
Another practical benefit for political parties was tha t it enabled parties to 
m aintain their num bers in the event of a division being challenged. During 1993 
a total of 3 divisions were called and the use of substitutes was widespread.
Contrary to the perceived advantage gained through consistency of committee 
membership outlined earlier during the consideration of this feature in the 
literature, it could be argued that, the provision for substitution in Oireachtas 
committees actually facilitated an elem ent of specialisation to operate within the 
Oireachtas as, given the sm all pool of potentially qualified participants available 
to committees and parties, situations where an especially technical issue was 
being considered could be better serviced by appropriately skilled and informed 
members on the day . An example which clearly illustrates this point occurred 
during the committee stage of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Bill, 1993 and 
the Criminal Procedure Bill, 1993. The Progressive Democrats [a small party]
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m em bers were able to substitute Michael McDowell, TD, for Peadar Clohessy, TD, 
on a num ber of occasions and enabled him  to utilise his expertise in legal m atters 
which resulted in improvements to the Bill. His contribution was acknowledged 
by the sponsoring m inister during the deliberations. Similarly, Democratic Left 
were able to substitute Liz McManus for Eam onn Gilmore w hen Equality and 
Law Reform m atters were being discussed and enabled tha t party  to present its 
policies and views to the committee. Because the com m ittee’s rem it embraced 
the portfolio of more than  one party  spokesperson, both parties were able to send 
their preferred m em ber in "to bat" depending on the subject m atter under 
discussion although it rem ains tha t one danger of widespread and ad hoc 
substitution of m em bership is that it dilutes the potential expertise which 
m em bers m ight develop from dealing w ith related topics over a period of tim e 
and which I referred to in an earlier chapter.
The above factors could be seen as evidence of the ability and com m itm ent of the 
m em bers and their parties to "work" the committees.
There was also provision under term s of reference for Deputies who were not 
m em bers or substitutes to attend m eetings and participate bu t w ithout a vote at 
divisions. During 1993 only one Deputy, Joe Costello, availed of this opportunity 
to "voluntarily" a ttend meetings of this select committee. It would be wrong to 
infer from this tha t Deputies were not sufficiently interested in participating in 
this new parliam entary work as evidence presented earlier clearly indicates that 
m any factors could be the  cause of their inability to attend.
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Contributions at m eetings
The first table above indicates the num ber of contributions by m em bers at this 
committee during 1993.
The table at appendix VI illustrates the actual num ber of interventions by 
Deputies attending each of the 13 committee m eetings referred to earlier 
including those occasions where they functioned as substitutes or attended out of 
interest. It is included to give an indication of the degree of interest shown by 
deputies in the operations of this comm ittee insofar as contributions and 
frequency of interventions could be deem ed to be one of the m easures (albeit a 
rather crude one) of such interest.
The figures, which do not include the relevant sponsoring m inister, indicate that 
a distinct core of Deputies contributed to the discussions and "teasing out" of the 
legislation under consideration. As would be expected the m ain contributors were 
the then opposition spokespersons on Justice, Law Reform and Defence m atters - 
Mitchell, Harney, Gilmore, Shatter, O’Donnell and Barrett. However it is 
significant that the  table of regular speakers includes several backbenchers, both 
government and opposition, with an interest in the areas under consideration.
ESTIMATES
In the m ain the discussions which centred on estim ates for the Departm ents of 
Justice, Equality and Law Reform and Defence were availed of by the m em bers 
as an opportunity for a wide-ranging debate on the affairs of the Department 
concerned. A ttem pts by the chair to discipline/ restrict debate to specific
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subheads in some order were often frustrated by the speakers.
The views of Deputies on this new select committee m echanism  for discussing 
estim ates varied. Deputy G. Mitchell wished ’to pu t on record tha t there is m uch 
confusion about how these comm ittees will work’ (SCLS, Friday, 7 May 1993; LI, 
No.l Col.2) a t the outset of the comm ittee proceedings. At the sam e meeting, 
Proinsais De Rossa welcomed the formation of the comm ittee as it brought ’the 
Dail into the 20th  if not the 21st century in term s of the way we do our business’ 
(Col. 20). Deputy Alan Shatter welcomed ’the fact that we are dealing with 
estim ates in this way’ bu t wished to reserve his view ’as to how well these 
committees function’ (Col. 51). By the second m eeting this Deputy succeeded in 
irritating some other m em bers who accused him  of adopting an ’adversarial ... 
totally inappropriate’ approach. Shatter’s response was to agree for the need for 
’constructive m eetings’ but he was ’not going to participate in a politically 
cosmetic exercise in which ... all come ... and talk blancm ange’ (SCLS; Friday, 14 
May 1993; L I, No. 2 Col. 109). Mary Harney rem arked th a t ’the m ost useful part 
of these committee m eetings will be the question and answer sessions’ (Col. 122).
’Members of Fine Gael ... will ensure th a t these comm ittees work ... they will not 
be "love-ins"’ was the view of John  Browne (Carlow-KilkennyJ (SCLS; Friday, 14 
May 1993; L I, No. 2 Col. 153). Sean Power of Fianna Fail asked the comm ittee to 
’put party politics aside’ and work ’as a unit ... constructively together’ (SCLS; 
Friday, 14 May 1993; L I, No. 2 Col. 158). These com m ents reflect to a large 
extent the m any positive features associated with the utilisation of parliam entary 
committees highlighted earlier in the discussion of the literature in this field 
insofar as there is a view abroad, which can be deduced from the rem arks of
93
several deputies, that a different approach to parliam entary work is expected 
when the Oireachtas operates in comm ittee w ith a consequent reduction in 
partisan, adversarial debate resulting in a more considered, issue-focused 
attention to proposed legislation.
At the third m eeting of the comm ittee Alan Shatter referring to the need for press
coverage of committee meetings in order that the public m ight learn what
transpires at these meetings rem arked:
This committee covers im portant issues in going through Estim ates for 
different departm ents. We tease through m atters. On occasions we m ay be 
critical of the Minister, a t other occasions we m ay be supportive, or 
perhaps we m ay be ju s t looking for information. These com m ittees will not 
work if they become internal psychotherapy sessions for frustrated 
m em bers of the Oireachtas raising questions tha t they w ant answers to 
and are not paid attention to by the public.
(SCLS; Friday, 21 May 1993; L I, No. 3 Col. 229).
He was being critical of the fact that any reporting only concentrated on the 
speeches of the m ain spokespersons and thus did not truly reflect the work of the 
entire committee and this view relates very well to com m entary in the  literature 
outlined in chapter four regarding publicity for committee proceedings.
/
In 1993 the committee devoted a total of 15 hours 38 m inutes to the 
Consideration of estim ates (including supplem entary estimates) for the 
departm ents within their remit. The Defence estim ates for 1993 including arm y 
pensions am ounted to £406,790,000 (SCLS, Friday, 7 May 1993, L l,N o.l, Col 
9,10). The record indicates that this estim ate was considered by the committee 
for a period of 4 hours 27 m inutes prior to being ‘reported to Dail E ireann’ (Select 
Committee on Legislation and Security for the period 7 April, 1993 to 31 
December 1994, p .174). This equates to a sum  of £1,523,558 approved per
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m inute of debate.
1993 estim ates for the Departm ent of Equality and Law Reform am ounted to 
£5,795,000 (SCLS, Friday 14 May 1993, LI,No.2, Col 95) and were debated for a 
period of 3 hours 17 m inutes or £29,416 per m inute of consideration. A 
supplem entary estim ate am ounting to £250,000 for this sam e departm ent was 
considered later in the year for a period of 2 hours am ounting to £2083 per 
m inute (SCLS, 25th November 1993 LI No.12 Col 923). The Departm ent of 
Justice had estim ates for £515 million considered for a period of 5 hours on 21 
May 1993 or £1.72 million per m inute (SCLS, Friday 21 May, 1993, L I, No. 3,
Col 175). A further supplem entary estim ate amounting to £6,175,000 was 
examined on 16 December, 1993, LI No. 13, Col 963 and 964).
The above calculations show the variation in am ounts of expenditure of public 
money in the three departm ents being monitored by this Select Committee and 
are for purely indicative purposes only. It m ust be noted however tha t the 
Department of Equality and Law Reform was at that tim e a new departm ent with 
a very small budget and staff and this was the first opportunity for detailed 
v, consideration of its operations by Deputies.
This trawl through the record of the proceedings which considered the estim ates 
of these three Departm ents in 1993 would conclude tha t m em bers were able to 
air a num ber of grievances th a t concerned them . In the m ain the views of the 
m em bers who spoke was tha t the select committee was a positive force in their 
role as legislators although there was evidence of an elem ent of cynicism to be 
detected in the contributions of some Deputies.
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L egislation
During 1993 the committee completed consideration of two pieces of legislation - 
the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Bill, 1993 and the Criminal Procedure Bill, 
1993. These were two major Bills which attracted lively debate across the parties 
and whilst m uch of the cut and th rust of debate involved the m ain players - the 
m inister and the spokespersons - the nature of the subjects under discussion, 
various forms of crime, allowed m any Deputies an opportunity to contribute as 
they all appeared to have first hand knowledge of the extent of crime in their 
constituencies.
The discussions were aided considerably by private briefings given to all 
m em bers by civil servants before public discussion/debate. This ’was a 
worthwhile exercise’ (Collins, G., SCLS; Tuesday, 13 Ju ly  1993; L I, No. 4 Col. 
292) as it enabled m em bers to acquaint them selves with the official position and 
thinking on the legislation, including technical data, as distinct from the political 
background and thus hopefully perm itted a  more balanced, realistic debate.
In the m ain the work of the comm ittee proceeded in a business-like fashion w ith 
serious consideration being given to the sections under review. There was m uch 
evidence of the minister heeding the views of both the opposition and indeed her 
own backbenchers in considering am endm ents to the Criminal Justice (Public 
Order) Bill, 1993. In reading reports of the  parliam entary debates relating to this 
committee, it is clear that the m em bers adopted the view of Gay Mitchell that 
their job ’is to examine legislation, to go through each section word by word on 
Committee Stage’ (SCLS; Tuesday, 13 Ju ly  1993; L I, No. 4 Col. 338).
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During the Committee Stage of the Bills under consideration num erous 
am endm ents were proposed, principally by the leading opposition 
spokespersons - Mitchell, O’Donnell and Gilmore in addition to the 
Minister/Minister of State.
From an examination of the comm ittee reports there appear to be m any instances 
where the Minister for Justice was prepared to either accept an opposition 
am endm ent or at least to sym pathetically consider m em bers’ suggestions before 
Report Stage in the Dail following receipt by the Minister of additional technical 
or legal advice from officials such as the parliam entary draftsm an. In m ost cases 
the Deputy proposing a certain course of action was agreeable to deferring final 
consideration of an am endm ent until the Report Stage as it ensured tha t the 
wording would be technically correct if refined by the officials or draughtsm en. 
Even if a proposal was likely to be opposed by the m inister, this deferral at least 
gave the m em ber an opportunity for "another bite at the cherry" possibly 
involving some outside lobbying on the m inister and/or Department. There were 
however, instances where the m inister was unable to accept proposals and 
outlined the reasons for this course of action.
Examples of the complete range of the above outcomes are to be found during the 
Committee Stage of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Bill, 1993. In the vast 
majority of cases the m inister held out some hope to m em bers proposing 
am endm ents by conceding a review of the issue under discussion prior to the 
Report Stage. This approach was adopted when replying to am endm ents 
proposed by Mary Harney, Eam onn Gilmore (SCLS, 13 July, 1993; LI No. 4, Cols 
296 and 321), Gay Mitchell (SCLS, 22 July, 1993; LI No. 5, Col 397) and
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following num erous interventions by m any m em bers, including government 
Deputies (SCLS, 14 September, 1993; LI No. 6, Col 502). The m inister’s 
agreem ent to "look again" at a section of the Bill causing concern to Deputies on 
both sides was warmly welcomed.
The m inister acknowledged m erit in the argum ents of opposition m em bers on 
m any occasions (SCLS, 15 September, 1993; LI No. 7, Col 595) and interestingly 
adm itted that some of the elem ents of her Bill had been spawned by an earlier 
Progressive Democrats Private Member’s Bill. This latter fact corresponds to the 
Italian experience recounted in chapter one where private m em bers legislation 
was incorporated in revised governm ent proposed legislation and was viewed as a 
positive move. There were also several instances during the  passage of legislation 
in 1993 where the relevant m inister piloting the Bill through the Dail accepted 
am endm ents proposed by the opposition (SCLS, 20 Septem ber, 1993; LI No. 8, 
Cols 655,656,658,659).
During consideration of the Criminal Procedure Bill, 1993 which dealt with
alleged miscarriages of justice, the Minister of State at the Departm ent of Justice,
Willie O’Dea also responded in a similar m anner to the Minister for Justice when
considering opposition am endm ents. He accepted a Progressive Democrat
am endm ent stating:
The am endm ent proposed by Deputy O’Donnell is excellent. I thank her for 
bringing this point to our attention and I accept the am endm ent.
(SCLS, 10 November, 1993; LI No. 11, Col 918).
He also refused in some cases to accept am endm ents whilst conceding the 
strength of opposition argum ents advance during the debate (SCLS, 10
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November, 1993; LI No. 11, Col 829). On occasion he also declined to completely
veto a particular proposition from an opposition m em ber and promised a review
before the Report Stage although he was quite prepared to bluntly decline this
approach in instances where he felt it appropriate as illustrated by his following
com m ents when ruling out a  particular course of action:
As they [opposition amendments] are being opposed in principle, there is 
little point in going into the details and looking at any possible drafting 
shortcomings.
(SCLS, 10 November, 1993; LI No. 11, Cols 829 and 830).
Due to the fact tha t there was at this time a Fianna Fail/ Labour government,
with a m inister and a m inister of state from the former party, a certain unease
was evident from the contributions of Labour Deputies. Indeed there are
num erous examples where intervention by governm ent Labour party Deputies
supporting the views of opposition m em bers could be construed as contributing
to the decision of the m inister to accept some opposition viewpoints and indicate
a re-examination of an issue before the Report Stage. The rather unusual
situation of the Minister finding herself attracted to the th rust of an opposition
am endm ent which ran contrary to some of the com m ents uttered by her Labour
Party government supporters was resolved following acceptance by all sides of a
compromise solution which forced Joe Costello to confess on one occasion:
I am  being put in an  invidious position because we are supporting the 
Minister and now find she is not supporting us. It is the Minister’s tex t we 
are defending.
(SCLS, 20 September, 1993; LI No. 8, Col 646).
This dilemma recurred later at the Report Stage and the sam e Deputy rem arked:
This is not the first tim e I have come in to support the Minister’s Bill only 
to find that she has underm ined my position ... and has accepted 
am endm ents to her Bill [without informing the Labour Party].
9 9
(Parliamentary Debates, 20 October, 1993; Vol. 434, No. 9, Col 1781).
However this subtle pressure did not result in any cracks in government 
solidarity in divisions that were challenged. In all three divisions the Fianna Fail 
and Labour m em bers voted together even in cases where strong reservations had 
been voiced by governm ent m embers.
Follow-Up to  th e  Com m ittee Stage
A study of the Report Stage of the Criminal Justice  (Public Order) Bill, 1993 in 
the Dail revealed tha t in m any cases the Minister for Justice  had honoured her 
undertaking given at the Committee proceedings to review certain aspects of the 
Bill and agreed to some further am endm ents (Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, 
1993; Vol. 434, No. 8, Cols 1685,1686). Gay Mitchell, T.D., reflected the views of 
some of the m em bers of the opposition to the m inister’s response to one 
particular concern expressed during the Committee Stage when he com m ented ’I 
am  pleased with the wording of the Minister’s am endm ent. The Minister is taking 
into account m any of the reservations expressed on Committee Stage’ (Col 1688).
Whilst the m inister introduced a num ber of am endm ents at the Report Stage on 
foot of com m itm ents given during the Committee Stage (Dail Debates, 20 
October, 1993; Vol. 434, No. 9, Cols 1969,1970) which would accord, to some 
degree, with the proposition advanced by some com m entators in the earlier 
review of related literature regarding the likelihood of a more flexible stance by 
m inisters in comm ittees rather than  plenaries, the records also indicate tha t there 
were instances where a re-examination of particular m em bers’ concerns by the 
m inister did not lead to acceptance of the proposed course of action by the
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m inister (Cols 1942-1946). This inevitably disappointed certain m em bers and led 
to further divisions being called, with the governm ent side winning.
R esponse of m em bers
During 1993 Deputies responded to this new committee system  in a  variety of 
ways. Some agreed with Liam Fitzgerald, TD tha t ’a fresh approach has been 
brought to these proceedings on Committee Stage’ (SCLS, 22 September, 1993; 
LI No. 9, Col 768) and would concur with the views of the then  chairm an of the 
committee, Dan Wallace that ’the committee system  works and will work’ (SCLS, 
22 September, 1993; LI No. 9, Col 772). It is clear tha t the approach of the 
m inister was of param ount importance in the perceived success of the committee 
at that time by those m em bers who viewed its operations as fruitful. The Minister 
for Justice had indicated tha t she was ’flexible in relation to suggestions tha t 
m em bers might have or am endm ents tha t they would like to pu t forward’ and 
referring to possible improvements to the Bill did not m ind where (ie which side 
of the house) they came from (SCLS, 14 September, 1993; LI No. 6, Cols 439 and 
468). This approach pleased m any m em bers who complimented the m inister on 
her willingness to proceed where possible on the basis of consensus not 
confrontation and her acknowledgement th a t the opposition took their jobs as 
legislators seriously (SCLS, 20 September, 1993; LI No. 8, Cols 649 and 650).
Problem s and d ifficu lties encountered
During 1993 a num ber of difficulties in the operations of Select Committees in 
general and of this com m ittee in particular cam e to light.
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The m em bers themselves highlighted m any of the issues which caused them  
concern. The m ain weakness at that tim e would appear to have been the lack of 
technical assistance afforded to opposition and backbench m em bers in the 
preparation of am endm ents. This restricted the Deputies’ abilities to produce 
wording that was legally satisfactory and acceptable to the parliam entary 
draftsm an and was referred to in greater detail earlier in the chapter relating to 
the provision of resources for committees.
A num ber of "housekeeping" difficulties surfaced during this first year of 
committee proceedings. The danger of clashes betw een com m ittee m eetings with 
some m em bers holding dual m em bership was articulated on more than  one 
occasion as was the need to delay a committee session if certain Dail business 
such as the Order of Business was scheduled for the  sam e tim e (SCLS, 14 May, 
1993; LI No. 2, Col 94). Other problems identified included the venue (Col 115) 
and the apparent lack of rem uneration for Deputies who undertook additional 
work.
The relationship between the committee and the m edia was the subject of some 
disappointment to some m em bers. I have already referred to the com m ents of 
Alan Shatter above when he bemoaned the fact tha t reporting of the proceedings 
in the media were sparse and failed to present an  accurate picture of the 
contributions of m em bers. This could be linked to the  ongoing distorted image 
abroad of the full and complete workload and role of Oireachtas mem bers. It is 
often believed to be a  fact of political life tha t politicians need the oxygen of 
publicity to sustain in the m ain their constituency profile and thus secure re- 
election. Therefore it can be argued that this alleged failure by the press to
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publish substantial accounts that reflect the inputs of all m em bers militates 
against those m em bers who actively try  to devote considerable energy to their 
role as legislators rather than  their colleagues who give greater priority to 
constituency business. The sad reality tha t political kudos is more often gained 
by "bread and butter" politics attracting local publicity is difficult to counter and 
therefore one can sym pathise with those m em bers such as Jim  Kemmy who were 
concerned at the criterion adopted for m easuring their effectiveness as legislators 
(SCLS, 22 July, 1993; LI No. 5, Col 372). The views of Norton, FitzGerald and 
O’Malley in the earlier review of this m atter are pertinent to this issue as is the 
electoral fate of m any of those deputies who could be considered to have devoted 
m uch attention to committee m atters.
In addition to those com m ents above, I have also learned from contact w ith the 
Houses of the Oireachtas tha t due to shortage of staff in the Office of the Editor of 
Debates, the only Committee proceedings th a t are always published by th a t office 
are: - Committee Stage of Bills and
Committee consideration of E stim ates’4 
Failure to guarantee publication of other m eetings add to the problems referred to 
in the paragraph above and do the com m ittee m em bers a disservice.
Finally it was evident in m y examination of this first year of committee 
proceedings that governm ent backbenchers rarely formally proposed 
am endm ents of their own although they did voice their concerns at certain 
aspects of the legislation under consideration and could be presum ed to have
4 Letter from public relations Office of the  Houses of the Oireachtas to the 
author, 12 February 1997.
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exerted some influence over the minister which would have been recognised by 
the minister and particularly the officials in the period between the Committee 
Stage and the Report Stage of Bills. However, as noted earlier even when there 
were some misgivings on the part of certain government members at the issue 
under discussion, the reality of adherence to the government line as evidenced in 
the divisions triumphed.
This commentary on year one of the committee is based on reports of the 
proceedings of that year only together with the annual report and as will be 
observed, circumstances and opinions of the parliamentary practitioners changed 
over the following few years.
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CHAPTER 7 - REVIEW OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND 
SECURITY - 1994.
In 1994 the committee continued its work of consideration of the estimates for 
the Departments of Justice, Defence and Equality and Law Reform together with 
the committee stage of several pieces of legislation in both the civil and criminal 
law fields.
Furthermore the committee entered new territory by
considering its first piece of Private Members legislation - Landlord and 
Tenant (Amendment) Bill, 1993 sponsored by Alan Shatter, T.D. (SCLS, 11 
January 1994; L2, No.l);
debating a Bill - Refugee Bill, 1994 ’in advance of Second Stage’ debate in 
the Dail. (SCLS, 27 September 1994; L3, No.l) which the discussion on the 
literature in previous chapters highlighted as an important capacity for 
parliaments anxious to make real impact on proposed legislation ; and
creating its own place in Irish parliamentary history in the consideration of 
the issues surrounding the collapse of the Reynolds government initially 
by the entire Select Committee and ultimately by a Sub-Committee of the 
Committee (SCLS, 7 December 1994; L3, No.3,4 and 5).
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In addition the committee "flexed its muscles" somewhat in bemoaning its terms 
of reference and demanding additional powers of consultation and ability to invite 
interested groups to appear before it. There is evidence that these concerns as 
voiced by members at several public sittings and repeated at its annual general 
meeting were successful in the revision in 1995 of the terms of reference of Select 
Committees in general.
Workload
In 1994 the records show that the Select Committee met in public on 18 
occasions and transacted the following business
PURPOSE OF MEETING NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Estimates 3
Legislation - Committee Stage of Bills 13
Consideration of orders of the Dail 
relating to the fall of the FF/Lab 
government
2
Table: 7.1 - Purpose of meetings of SCLs during 1994 
Source: Official debates and annual report.
I propose at this stage to concentrate on the 16 meetings relating to the "normal" 
work of the committee in considering the activities of 1994 although reference 
will be made later to the unique role played by the committee in examining the 
sensational fall of the government.
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Attendance
In relation to the 16 meetings referred to above the attendance of the 30 members 
of the
Select Committee as indicated by the official reports is as follows:
Name of member Present Substituted Number of 
meetings at 
which 
contributed
Ahem D. 8 (50%) 4 (25%) 5 (31.25%)
Barrett S. 6 (37.5%) 6 (37.5%) 2 (12.5%)
Briscoe B. 13 (81.25%) 1 (6.25%) 5 (31.25%)
Browne J. 
(Carlow/Kilkenny 
)
14 (87.5%) 2 (12.5%) 13 (81.25%)
Callely I. 15 (93.75%) 0 7 (43.75%)
Carey D. 8 (50%) 1 (6.25%) 5 (31.25%)
Clohessy P. 3 (18.75%) 7 (43.75%) 1 (6.25%)
Collins G. 1 (6.25%) 6 (37.5%) 0
de Valera S. 5 (31.25%) 2 (12.5%) 1 (6.25%)
Fitzgerald L. 14 (87.5%) 0 11 (68.75%)
Foley D. 11 (68.75%) 1 (6.25%) 3 (18.75%)
Gilmore E. 8 (50%) 5 (31.25%) 7 (43.75%)
Gregory T. 8 (50%) 0 2 (12.5%)
Harte P. 8 (50%) 1 (6.25%) 3 (18.75%)
Kemmy J. 8 (50%) 2 (12.5%) 4 (25%)
Lenihan B. 3 (18.75%) 3 (18.75%) 3 (18.75%)
McDowell D. 10 (62.5%) 1 (6.25%) 8 (50%)
Mitchell G. 9 (56.25%) 0 8 (50%)
Mulvihill J. 6 (37.5%) 2 (12.5%) 2 (12.5%)
O’Donnell L. 11 (68.75%) 1 (6.25%) 11 (68.75%)
O’Donoghue J. 9 (56.25%) 3 (18.75%) 6 (37.5%)
O’Keefe J. 9 (56.25%) 4 (25%) 6 (37.5%)
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Power S. 13 (81.25%) 1 (6.25%) 5 (31.25%)
Ryan E. 11 (68.75%) 0 6 (37.5%)
Ryan J. 1 (6.25%) 1 (6.25%) 0
Shatter A. 9 (56.25%) 1 (6.25%) 8 (50%)
Shorthall R. 6 (37.5%) 1 (6.25%) 0
Timmins G. 3 (18.75%) 5 (31.25%) 0
Wallace D. 14 (87.5%) 1 (6.25%) 14 (87.5%)
Walsh E. 13(81.25%) 0 3 (18.75%)
Table: 7.2 - Attendance and contributions of members of SCLS during 1994. 
Source: Official Records and Annual Report.
The average attendance at meetings of the committee was 20 members - 66.67
per cent, which was a decrease on the previous year [80 per cent]
The attendances indicate that the relevant party spokespersons attended most 
frequently with a fair sprinkling of other members and substitutes.
The attendance can be summarised as follows:
PERCENTAGE OF 
MEETINGS AT WHICH 
MEMBERS WERE 
PRESENT OR 
SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF MEMBERS CHANGE FROM 1993
100% 1 -5
91-99% 2
81-90% 6
71-80% 5 -1
61-70% 5 -1
50-60% 6 + 3
> 50% 5 + 4
Table: 7.3 - Summary of attendance at SCLS during 1994.
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This table Confirms the trend noted earlier of a decrease in attendance by 
members during this second year of attendance.
Interventions
In so far as the commitment of members to the committees can be gauged both 
by their attendance and frequency/number of interventions, the table in appendix 
VII illustrates both.
A number of deputies attended as substitutes at various meetings throughout the 
year. Their attendance arose out of their positions such as spokespersons (Keogh 
and McManus as Equality and Law Reform) or to maintain their party strength in 
the absence of regular attenders or simply because the particular Deputy wished 
to make a specific point relating to the debate in question.
Source: Official records and annual report.
E stim ates
In 1994 the committee met on three occasions to consider departmental 
estimates.
On 17 May, 1994 the Minister for Defence presented the estimate for his 
Department amounting to a total of £407,204,000 which was a 6% increase on 
the previous year (SCLS, 17 May 1994; L2, No. 10, Col 591). The committee
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deliberated for a period of 2 hours and 30 minutes. This afforded little time for
any indepth look at the role and performance of the defence forces and permitted
only brief statements by the Minister and spokespersons. This debate disposed of
the equivalent of £2,714,693 per minute. This cannot be considered a satisfactory
examination of the defence estimate and reflects the equally poor level of
consideration of this estimate in 1993. This is all the more disturbing when you
note the comments of Proinsias de Rossa when he declared that:
the concerns of the Legislation and Security Committee are not only what 
it costs to run the Defence Forces. We seem to have ... ignored the fact that 
the Defence Forces were redefined in a manner ... which to say the least 
ignored the role of this committee ... it is a political question
(SCLS, 17 May 1994; L2, No. 10, Col 605).
Concluding this sorry exercise the author reckons that the estimate for army 
pensions amounting to £52,975,000, taken at the conclusion of the meeting, 
enjoyed a debate of 2 minutes.
The Justice group of estimates were considered on 2 June, 1994 for a period of 3 
hours 57 minutes. ’The sum involved - nearly £558 million’ (SCLS, 2 June 1994; 
L2, No. 12, Col 743) and the debate provoked some disorderly scenes as the 
opposition sought to highlight a sensitive political issue of the day, the passports 
for cash allegations (Col 753). This served to afford many members an 
opportunity to reflect critically on the allegedly restrictive term's of reference of 
the committee and also consumed a significant amount of the time available for 
discussion of the estimates. [It also reflects on the question posed in chapter two 
concerning the ability or otherwise of members to truly reflect the 
"representational role" insofar as topical questions of that time, were not 
permitted an airing at the committee due, it was alleged, to restrictive terms of
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reference.] The length of debate corresponded with a sum of £2,354,430 per 
minute. Limited though the exercise was, it did generate a full debate over a 
range of justice related issues without the opportunity to fully tease matters out. 
It had all the appearances of a frustrating experience for members.
A period of 1 hour 50 minutes was devoted to the consideration of the estimates 
for the Department of Equality and Law Reform which amounted to £10,647,000 
or £96,790 per minute. The poor level Of concern by members for this subject 
was remarked upon by Austin Currie when he noted ’there does not seem to be 
all that much interest from other [apart from few members present at that stage] 
Members of the House’ (SCLS, 15 June 1994; L2, No. 13, Col 857). Alan Shatter 
also highlighted the poor attendance remarking that ’there were no Labour or 
Fianna Fail Deputies for the entire meeting’ (Col 861).
L egislation
The Committee Stages of the following bills were completed in 1994:
Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Bill, 1994 
Criminal Justice (No. 3) Bill, 1994 
Extradition (Amendment) Bill, 1994 
Solicitors (Amendment] Bill, 1994 
Family Law Bill, 1994 
Maintenance Bill, 1994.
The committee also held meetings on the committee stage of the Refugee Bill,
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1994 but had ’not concluded their deliberations’ before the end of the year and 
ultimately the change of government and subsequent discharge of the committee 
as constituted. (Report of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security for 
the period 7 April, 1993 to 31 December, 1994, pp. 5,6).
A considerable amount of work went into the committee stage of bills considered 
by this committee. As in the past, the bulk of the work was carried by the various 
spokespersons and the sponsoring minister with a host of other Deputies 
contributing when the issue was of interest to them.
The year commenced with the committee breaking new ground by debating their 
first Private Members Bill - Landlord and Tenant (Amendment] Bill, 1993 which 
had been piloted through the Dail by Alan Shatter. It was the view of the 
Chairman that ’the Select Committee would be ideally placed to tease out the 
difficult issues involved’ [in this Bill] (SCLS, 11 January 1994; L2, No. 1, Col 3). 
This hope, echoed by the Bill’s sponsor (Col 22) caused the chairman to remark 
that ’this reflects well on the work already done by the committee on other Bills’ 
(Col 3) and is in accordance with many of the impressions of members as to the 
potential advantages of committees outlined in Dail and Seanad debates referred 
to in previous chapters.
Throughout the year the committee pursued its work with vigour and in most 
cases it avoided what one member referred to as ’combative debate’. Indeed this 
outburst of satisfaction with the work of the committee was evident from these 
remarks by the chairman at the commencement of consideration of the Criminal 
Justice (No.3) Bill, 1993:
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Through the constructive and openminded approach which has 
characterised the committee’s consideration of other measures we have 
built up a solid track record of legislative achievements.
(SCLS, 18 January 1994; L2, No. 3, Col 99).
Amendments were proposed both by the government and the opposition and the 
proposals met with a variety of fates. Some opposition amendments were 
accepted by the relevant minister as evidenced by SCLS, 12 January 1994; L2, 
No. 2, Col 93: 19 January, 1994; L2, No. 4, Col 165: 10 May, 1994; L2, No. 8, 
Cols 463,473,482,483: 5 October, 1994; L3, No. 2, Col 91. These reveal that a 
small few opposition (Fine Gael, Progressive Democrats and Democratic Left) 
moves to amend various pieces of legislation were accepted by the government. 
Many amendments were withdrawn with the hope (and often the firm 
undertaking) that the minister would review matters prior to the Report Stage in 
the Dail (SCLS, 18 January 1994; L2, No. 3, Col 122: 19 January, 1994; L2,
No.4,Col 166:24 February, 1994; L2, No. 6,Col 339). The possibility of success at 
Report Stage was in no way guaranteed and the move often fell at this hurdle as 
the minister in looking at a matter again (and effectively receiving fresh advice) 
offered no assurance that her ’views ... [would] change substantially’ (SCLS, 19 
January 1994; L2, No. 4, Col 183).
Other proposals by opposition, sometimes with an element of support from 
government backbench members (SCLS, 11 January 1994; L2, No. 1, Col 14: 12 
January, 1994; L2, No. 2, Cols 79,88) were frequently declined by the minister 
and subsequently declared lost with those that were pressed to a division 
defeated even where some vague support had been voiced by crossparty 
speakers. The reality of the ultimate supremacy of the government/executive was
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unshaken.
There are examples, however, dotted throughout the official records where 
ministers did on occasion respond to the thrust of debate by agreeing to reflect 
further on an issue ’because of the points raised by ... Deputies’ (SCLS, 19 
January 1994; L2, No. 4, Col 168) or because of the ’widespread support for [a 
certain course of action]’ (SCLS, 10 May 1994; L2, No. 8, Col 508). Examples can 
be found where a minister was afforded an opportunity to rethink specific issues 
following interventions by opposition members. An instance to illustrate this 
point can be found in the debate on the Family Law Bill, 1994 where the minister 
initially declined to accept an amendment and later in the debate acknowledged 
that he might have been in error and agreed to review the matter again (SCLS, 18 
May 1994; L2, No. 11, Cols 704/5).
Given the circumstances and the inbuilt government majority this was often the 
best that could be achieved and reflected favourably on the work of opposition 
Deputies, a point frequently acknowledged by ministers who expressed 
themselves as ’grateful’(SCLS, 19 January 1994; L2, No. 4, Cols 185/6) for an 
opposition amendment or appreciated ’the thinking’ behind a certain suggestion 
and promised further review (SCLS, 19 January 1994; L2, No. 4, Col 156) or saw 
’the necessity to amend ... section’ following contribution by individual deputies 
(SCLS, 5 October 1994; L3, No. 2, Col 67).
The reports illustrate many instances where the minister declined to accept 
proposals and often went to lengths to explain why (SCLS, 24 February 1994; L2,
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No. 6, Col 319). Members were not always content with the responses of 
ministers and sometimes felt that governmental rejection of proposals belittled 
their ’legislative ’ mandate (SCLS, 11 January 1994; L2, No. 1, Col 26).
P ositive e lem en ts noted in  th e  com m ittee operations
It would be fair to say that much common ground existed between government 
and opposition in the desire to enact "good" legislation. This is evident from the 
detail of the study of each section and amendment by the committee as the Bills 
progressed through the system. Whilst each party advanced their own policies, 
there was in many cases a genuine wish to improve the legislation and, given the 
paucity of publicity afforded to committee proceedings by the media, there were 
little political kudos to be reaped by pursuing certain controversial lines. Indeed 
both sides were frequently generous to each other and often supported the 
’principles’ of the opponents’ amendments and proposals (SCLS, 11 January 
1994; L2, No. 1, Col 14: 12 January, 1994;L2 No. 2, Cols 71 & 79: 24 February, 
1994; L2, No.6, Col 292). In addition, the fact that government supporters on 
occasion were not afraid to criticise elements of legislation that "concerned" 
them, such as evidenced by the comments of Jim Kemmy on the committee 
stage of the Extradition (Amendment) Bill, 1994 (SCLS, 24 February 1994; L2, 
No. 6, Col 292), Ivor Callely during the passage of the Solicitors (Amendment) Bill 
1994 (SCLS, 27 April 1994; L2, No. 7, Cols 446, 448 & 449), Derek McDowell, 
when considering the same legislation (SCLS, 10 May 1994; L2, No. 8, Cols 
551/2) and during a debate on the committee stage of the Refugees Bill, 1994 
(SCLS, 27 September 1994; L3, No. 1, Cols 55 & 56), represented an abatement 
of the purely partisan approach by members often exhibited in parliamentary
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debates, although, as noted above, this did not lead to defeat for the government 
in any division challenged during the course of the year. Where this mild form of 
pressure bore some fruit was in the agreement of ministers, on occasion to review 
matters further before the next stage of the proposed legislation.
The business-like approach by members in processing legislation was, it could be 
argued, fostered by the ongoing extensive briefings given to members by officials 
before the consideration of various measures. Reference to such briefings 
described in one case as ’informative and helpful’ (SCLS, 24 February 1994; L2, 
No. 6, Col 344) is made at many sittings of the committee (SCLS, 10 May 1994; 
L2, No. 8, Col 576: 18 May 1994; L2, No. 11, Col 654; 27 September, 1994; L3, 
No. 1, Col 57).
Evidence of representations having been made to all members of the committee 
by a plethora of organisations, anxious to have their viewpoint or preferred 
measure contained in the legislation before the Oireachtas can be found 
throughout the debates. Representations and comment from a wide range of 
bodies such as RGDATA relating to the Landlord and Tenant (Amendment] Bill,
1993 (SCLS, 12 January 1994; L2, No. 1, Col 74); the Irish Banker’s Federation 
and possibly the Revenue Commissioners in connection with the Criminal 
Justice (No. 3) Bill, 1993 (SCLS, 18 January 1994; L2, No. 3, Cols 102 8s 107); 
the Law Society and others during debate on the Solicitors (Amendment] Bill,
1994 (SCLS, 27 April 1994; L2, No. 7, Cols 364, 371 &, 422); Association of 
Pension Lawyers in Ireland, alluded to during the consideration of the Family 
Law Bill, 1994 (SCLS, 18 May 1994; L2, No. 11, Col 655); Amnesty International, 
the Irish Council for Refugees, Rescue Trust and T-rocaire during the debate on
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the Refugees Bill, 1994. It says much about the belief of these organisations 
about the locus of power in relation to the measures under consideration that 
they addressed themselves in many cases not just to the appropriate minister or 
officials but as can be seen in many cases, to the entire committee membership. 
This practice was not without its difficulties, however, as comments made during 
some debates appeared to suggest that these lobbyists might have possessed 
significant influence over the committee’s deliberations and reflects some of the 
related concerns expressed in extracts from the literature referred to in chapter 
four. However, input from organisations and the admission by Deputies that it 
can, when deemed to be of benefit, sway members views with regard to particular 
measures proves that the legislation is not being processed in a vacuum isolated 
from citizens and organisations likely to be eventually affected by its enactment 
and insofar as is practicable is taking place in public.
The breadth of legislation considered by the committee certainly merits the 
praise which occasionally was directed at the committee. Mention has been 
earlier of the "solid track record" claimed by the committee chairman for the 
nature of its work. Others also found some elements of the performance to date 
laudable and frequent references to ’constructive discussion’ (SCLS, 12 January 
1994; L2, No. 2, Col 94), conceding that the minister/opposition had shown 
"flexibility" on certain matters together with the belief that certain proposals 
contributed to the effectiveness of the legislation in question can be found 
throughout the official debates.
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Hindrances encountered
the committee. Members frequently complained about engagements clashing
with the consequent frustration this caused Deputies. This was as a result of the
large number of other committees meeting and the ordinary business of the Dail
continuing together with the ongoing commitments of Deputies to constituency
and other matters. Clashes with other meetings on occasion posed a problem
amongst others for Jim Kemmy (SCLS, 11 January 1994; L2, No. 1, Col 59);
John Browne [C ar low /K ilken n y)  (SCLS, 12 January 1994; L2, No. 2, Col 82); Jim
O’Keefe (SCLS, 25 January 1994; L2, No. 5, Col 215). The need to be in the Dail
chamber for other business at the same time as the committee was sitting is
noted from the comments of Pat Rabbitte (SCLS, 24 February 1994; L2, No. 6,
Col 264) and Proinsias De Rossa (SCLS, 17 May 1994; L2, No. 10, Col 621). This
difficulty was once again voiced by Austin Currie apologising to his colleagues:
My late arrival again underlines the necessity to consider the times for 
meetings of this and other committees. I was delayed because the Order of 
Business, which is very important, was ongoing in the House. It is 
unfortunate that two important events are at the same time.
(SCLS, 15 June 1994; L2, No. 13, Col 847)
The committee had to be adjourned to permit members (including ministers) 
attend the Dail for parliamentary questions (SCLS, 27 April 1994; L2, No. 7, Cols 
347 and 393; 10 May 1994; L2, No. 8, Col 455). In addition the difficulties posed 
to rural Deputies, engaged on constituency or local authority matters by early 
Tuesday sittings was highlighted (SCLS, 12 January 1994; L2, No. 2, Cols 94 & 
95).
There were m any factors which seem ed to hinder the more effective operation of
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The committee took the unusual step of refusing to continue business with the 
attendance of a minister other than the sponsoring minister when considering the 
Family Law Bill, 1994 (SCLS, 11 May 1994; L2, No. 9, Col 588). This arose when 
the Minister for Equality and Law Reform was delayed following a national 
Arbour Hill commemoration ceremony even though other Dail members, present 
at the ceremony had ’rushed back’ for the committee meeting (Col 581). Members 
on both sides were ’not in favour of proceeding because the [appropriate Minister 
... [was] not present’ (Col 588]. Critical comments uttered referred to the 
committee ’Which has been vaunted by this Government as an extension of the 
democratic process’ (Col 583) being ’treated with contempt’ (Col 586) and being 
frustrated in its role ’to facilitate the passage of legislation with proper 
discussion’ (Col 581). Whilst there was an element of traditional party banter the 
annoyance at this treatment by members from all parties was evident and served 
to remind the executive that Oireachtas members were serious in their approach 
to their allotted tasks but expected due respect for their role as legislators. The 
disquiet felt by some members at the treatment meted out to the committee also 
embraced such grievances as the poor degree of respect shown to the committee 
by ministers who were alleged to have made policy announcements outside 
parliament regarding issues upon which Deputies had tabled amendments for 
discussion, reference to which was made earlier when discussing factors 
impacting on committees.
The lack of resources provided to members of the opposition (and presumably to 
government backbenchers also) to enable them to tackle the technical aspects of 
legislation continued to be aired on many occasions by members. This mirrors a 
similar complaint made by MPs in the UK as noted in the study by Klug e t  a l
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(1996) referred to in the earlier discussion on this m atter.
By far the most frequent and outspoken complaint from members of this select 
committee related to the allegedly restrictive nature of its terms of reference. On a 
number of occasions Deputies attempted to raise current controversial political 
matters which were deemed to be outside the terms of reference of the 
committee. Many calls were made for this situation to be altered by way of 
amendment but in the interim the chairman was obliged to comply with the 
current terms of reference although he frequently suggested that the next annual 
general meeting of the committee could be used as a platform by members to call 
for revised terms of reference. (SCLS, 27 September 1994; L3, No. 1, Col 57).
The convenor for the government supporters agreeing that restrictions operated, 
reminded Deputies that the committee was ’in its infancy’ with accompanying 
’teething problems’ when the matter was raised on 12 January, 1994 (SCLS, 12 
January 1994; L2, No. 2, Col 65). The committee was ’still in its infancy’ five 
months later according to the same convenor when he faced criticism from 
members. He was able to indicate some progress on the review of the ’efficacy’ of 
select committees and their operations. (SCLS, 2 June 1994; L2, No. 12, Col 755).
Eoin Ryan, TD, a government Deputy, perhaps articulating the reality of 
parliamentary business responded to (then opposition deputy) Alan Shatter’s 
allegations that the confined terms of reference rendered the ’security aspect of 
the brief of this committee ... little short of farcical’ with the statement that ’the 
Government allows Private Members to introduce Bills and Deputy Shatter ...
[was] taking advantage of that concession ...’ adding that the ’Deputy should be 
happy that the Government has given him the opportunity to introduce this
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[Private Member’s] Bill’ (SCLS, 12 January 1994; L2, No. 2, Col 63). This seemed 
to suggest a rather patronising approach by the government, reminiscent of the 
traditional government dominant approach to parliamentary business, towards 
members of the Oireachtas and drew the response from Alan Shatter that he 
would ’not doff [his] hat to the Government for doing my job, a job ... [I was] 
elected to undertake’ (Col 64). Emotive words such as "muzzle", steamroller 
technique" and "veto" were bandied about when the discussions got overheated. 
On one occasion Gay Mitchell spoke of seeking a judicial review of the rights of 
opposition members as the rulings from the chair were ’ not the right way to 
treat a Legislature’ (SCLS, 27 April 1994; L2, No. 7, Col 351) and his colleague, 
Liz O’ Donnell thought the lack of flexibility represented ’a slippage in 
parliamentary democracy and in the role of the Opposition ... in scrutinising 
legislation’ (Col 356). Whilst much of this pique could be taken as traditional 
adversarial politics between government and opposition, the firm view of 
members that the terms required revision would appear to have featured in the 
review of the position of select committees generally some months later.
Other a c tiv itie s  of th e  com m ittee in  1994
Consideration by the committee of the Dail motion relating to the appointment of 
Mr. Harry Whelehan as President of the High Court and other matters that led to 
the fall of the Reynolds government was quite sensational at the time. The 
committee originally met on 7 December, 1994 and appeared to attract a full 
complement of members. Given that standing orders permitted all Deputies to 
attend and speak if they wished and the fact that 49 members contributed to the 
first day’s debate, it quickly became obvious that this format would not be
appropriate to efficiently investigate the matters referred to it by the Dail. 
Subsequently a sub-committee was appointed to complete this business and 
following a delay to permit the urgent passage and enactment of legislation 
conferring privilege on witnesses, it commenced work on 15 December, 1994. 
The terms of reference of this sub-committee are at Appendix III. When the 
members of all Oireachtas committees were discharged upon the change of 
government, the members of this sub-committee continued in office until the 
completion of their task in February, 1995.
Conclusion
The range of work undertaken by the committee in 1994 served to instill further 
confidence in its members as they processed business during the year. Added to 
the experience of 1993 it also highlighted the strains in the existing system and 
forced a review of the role and terms of reference of committees and certainly 
provided a solid, firm foundation for the parliamentary committees created under 
the new government.
122
CHAPTER 8 - SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY - 1995
Introduction
This third year of existence saw the introduction of many changes in the 
operations and workload of the select committee. The highlights of the year as 
gleaned from both the published official record of proceedings together with the 
annual report, include the completion of the business of the sub-committee set up 
to consider the matters relevant to the fall of the FF/Labour government; the 
installation of the new Fine Gael/Labour/Democratic Left government with a 
stated commitment to the achievement of parliamentary reform including 
Oireachtas committees; the consequent discharge of existing committee 
membership; the decision of the Dail to amend the terms of reference of the 
committee and the appointment of a new committee with many fresh members 
consequent upon the change of government.
The revised terms of reference had the effect of conferring substantial additional 
powers on the Select Committee, as set out below:
(i) the power to discuss and draft proposals for legislative changes and new
legislation for recommendation to Ministers;
(ii) the power to receive submissions and hear evidence;
(iii) the power to print minutes of evidence;
(iv) the power to discuss with ministers general proposals for legislation prior
to such legislation being approved and published by Government;
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(v) the power to seek the attendance of appointees to high office at meetings of 
the committee; and
(vi) the power to demand the attendance of ministers before the Committee to 
discuss current policy.
These new powers correspond with and reflect the view of Shaw (1979) and 
others, outlined in an earlier chapter, as to the necessity for parliamentary 
committees to have these capabilities if they are to function as bodies with real 
capacity to effect legislative change. In addition, the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security was given specific responsibility for reviewing the 
Official Secrets Act and all other statutory provisions which restrict access to 
information and to report thereon to Dail Eireann with recommendations to bring 
them into line with the best international standards of public information 
provision.
(Report on the Select Committee on Legislation and Security for the period 1 
January, 1995 to 31 December, 1996).
A new streamlined committee with 21 rather than 30 members was constituted 
in March of this year and the committee quickly began its work with an apparent 
desire to extend the role of the committee far beyond that witnessed by the 
previous committee.
The new terms of reference [included in Appendix II] were formally moved in the 
Dail on 1 March 1995 and were approved following debate referred to in an earlier 
chapter.
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New Com m ittee
The newly appointed committee sat on Thursday, 23 March 1995 for the election 
of a chairman and other "housekeeping" business. Deputy Charles Flanagan of 
Fine Gael (a government Deputy) was elected to the chair and instituted what I 
would consider a more "hands-on" regime which continued, in my view, for the 
entire year’s proceedings. This is not to suggest that he in any way acted 
improperly, only that he involved himself many times in the substance of the 
debates concerned in a manner which differed strikingly to his predecessor. On 
one occasion he struggled with his desire to participate in a discussion on a 
matter of interest to him but conceded that to do this he might have to vacate the 
chair for the duration. Reading the debates it is evident that he wished to do 
more than merely preside over the proceedings and the apparent conflict between 
the traditional role of a "chair" and a practising TD regularly caused him to 
intervene in the subject matters of debate which some might find unusual.
The revised terms of reference drew complimentary remarks from Deputies 
meeting for the first sessions of the reconstituted committee. The new powers 
afforded to select committees appeared to permit new methods of operation 
including formation of sub-committees to investigate subjects such as drug abuse 
and the liquor licensing laws. Mindful of the oft repeated claim that 
parliamentary standing orders required revision to render them relevant to the 
present age, one Deputy stated that if the terms of reference were too strict in 
practice, he would ’have no interest in being on the committee because it would 
be largely irrelevant in practice’ (SCLS, Thursday, 30 March 1995; L4, No. 11;
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Col 1443). High hopes regarding initiatives relating to issues not specifically 
contained in legislation currently before the committee were cherished by many 
members and concerns were expressed lest the ’rigidity of the terms of reference’ 
stifled the ambitious aspirations of many newly appointed members (SCLS, 
Thursday, 30 March 1995; L4, No. 11; Col 1438). It was the perceived view of the 
committee that the terms of reference could and would be interpreted liberally 
although the chair did caution members that they must first discharge their 
mandatory obligations before they considered assuming any worthy new 
obligations (SCLS, Thursday, 30 March 1995; L4, No. 11; Col 1456). The 
consensus seemed to suggest that by virtue of the committee’s role in the 
consideration of estimates p e r  se, issues outside their strict formal remit could be 
taken on board if deemed related in any fashion to the spending activities of 
either of the three departments associated with this committee.
A ttendance
The report of the committee indicates that it met on a total of 27 occasions in 
1995. The business transacted at these meetings is summarised in the tables on 
the next page:
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BUSINESS TRANSACTED NUMBER OF MEETINGS
Committee business 2
Estimates 3
Legislation 13
Private meetings 2*
Taking of evidence 3*
Joint meeting with another 
committee
1*
Receiving submissions 2*
Establishing terms of reference for 
sub-committee
1*
Table: 8.1 - Purpose of meetings of SCLS during 1995 
Source: Official records and annual report
all of the meetings thus indicated are listed in the official annual report 
which legislative committees are obliged to produce. Details of all the 
proceedings are regrettably not available for study as previously indicated.
NAME PRESENT 
Max = 27
SUBSTITUTED 
of 27
CONTRIBUTED (nj 
(see below)
Browne J (C/K) 23 (85%) 2  (7%) 13 (72%)
Browne J. (Wex) 11 (41%) 3 (11%) 0
Fitzgerald L. 21 (78%) 2 (7%) 10 (56%)
Flanagan C. 24 (89%) 2 (7%) 15 (83%)
Gregory T. 10 (37%) 0 4 (22%)
Harte P. 7 (26%) 6 (22%) 3 (17%)
Kemmy J. 13 (48%) 3 (11%) 6 (33%)
Kenneally B. 22 (81%) 1 (4%) 8 (44%)
Me Dowell D. 14 (52%) 2 (7%) 8 (44%)
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McGrath P. 15 (56%) 4 (15%) 4 (22%)
Mulvihill J. 16 (59%) 3 (11%) 3 (17%)
O’Dea W. 14 (52%) 4 (15%) 11 (61%)
O’Donnell L. 12 (44%) 11 (41%) 8 (44%)
O’Donoghue J. 18 (67%) 0 8 (44%)
O’Keefe J. 16 (59%) 4 (15%) 6 (33%)
Shatter A. 10 (37%) 4 (15%) 6 (33%)
Smith M. 11 (41%) 3 (11%) 4 (22%)
Timmins G. 10 (37%) 3 (11%) 0
Wallace D. 14 (52%) 2 (7%) 6 (33%)
Walsh E. 23 (85%) 2 (7%) 7 (39%)
Woods M. 26 (96%) 0 16 (89%)
In) Whereas a total of 27 meetings were held during the year and attendance 
records are available from the annual report, official records of debates 
which chronicle the detailed contributions of members are only available 
for 18 as indicated earlier.
Table: 8.2 - Attendance and contributions of members of SCLS during 1995.
Source: Official records and annual report.
Whilst the average attendance at recorded meetings during the year was 16 or 76 
per cent - compared to 66.67 per cent the previous year, the attendance ranged 
from 21 to 8 members. The sparse attendance was commented upon by Deputies 
during debates with one member (Liz O’Donnell) lamenting the fact that on one 
occasion a major piece of legislation - Court and Court Officers Bill, 1995 ’ went 
through Committee Stage essentially being scrutinised by about five Deputies’ 
(SCLS, Thursday, 7 December 1995; L5, No. 11; Col 696). The erratic levels of 
attendance reflect also to some degree the huge workload imposed upon Deputies 
which embraces a range of duties and which I have commented upon elsewhere 
and tend to confirm some of the fears which were alluded to by commentators in
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the earlier discussion on the related literature on the possible disadvantages of 
committees.
PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS 
PRESENT OR SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF MEMBERS
100 -
91-99 4
81-90 3
71-80 2
61-70 3
50-60 6
>50 3
Table: 8.3 - Summary of attendance at SCLS during 1995.
Source: Official records and annual report.
[It would not be practical to compare this table with 1993 and 1994 due to the 
changes in membership and numbers on the committee.]
I realise that in 1995 the committee engaged in many activities other than the 
formal consideration of Departmental estimates and committee stage of 
legislation. These new tasks - taking evidence, receiving submissions, sub­
committees operations, a joint meeting with another parliamentary committee 
and briefing sessions engaged the attention of members to a large degree 
throughout the year and certainly added to the breadth of operations of the 
committee. However for the purposes of continuity I have indicated [ in Appendix 
VIII] the frequency of interventions by members at "reported" meetings as 
referred to earlier which it is appreciated do not reflect the true workload of 
Deputies due to the private and unreported nature of much of their committee
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business at this time.
The figures illustrate the point that most of the interventions in debates appear to 
have been made by spokespersons such as Woods, O’Donnell, Keogh,
O’Donoghue and Smith with a sprinkling of contributions from Deputies with 
particular concerns such as Gregory - drug abuse; Shatter and D. McDowell - law 
reform. Other members spoke infrequently and two members - Browne (Wexford) 
and Timmins with reasonable recorded attendance records of 11 and 10 meetings 
respectively are not credited with any contributions to debates at all.
This bears out to a large degree the criticism voiced by TDs during debate on the 
committee structure [and commented upon in the Dail debates referred to above] 
that the backbenchers would be tempted to leave the discussions in the main to 
the official spokespersons and to attend only for votes - surely a case of self- 
imposed consignment to the "lobby fodder" pit.
E stim ates
The committee continued to examine the estimates for the Departments of 
Defence, Justice and Equality and Law Reform. Given that the government 
placed great emphasis on the ability of the select committees to examine the 
estimates in great detail coupled with the desire of the committee chairman to 
ensure that all subheads receive ’due consideration’(SCLS, Tuesday, 16 May 
1995; L4, No.14; Col 1567), surely the estimates would have attracted 
considerable attention from members. The following table illustrates the degree of 
consideration afforded to the estimates relevant to this committee.
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Department Total Estimate Time spent under 
consideration
Amount 
"approved" per 
minute
Number of 
speakers excl. 
Minister and 
Chairman
Equality and 
Law Reform
£12,299,000 2hr 30 mins £81,993 7
Justice £589,575,000 5hrs (approx) £1,965,250 13
Defence £426,607,000 2hrs 25 mins £2,942,117 10
Table: 8.4 - Summary of Estimates considered by SCLS - 1995. 
Source: Official debates
The table indicates that the estimates received examination by relatively few 
Deputies. Many of the speakers made a single contribution to the debates. It is 
questionable if this review of estimates really served to fulfil in any great depth 
the ’serious obligation ... to consider whether ... sums ... expended in the most 
efficient and effective way’ as intended by the chairman (SCLS, Tuesday, 16 May 
1995; L4, No.l4;Col 1567). However where it did succeed was in the ability of 
Deputies to raise a variety of issues pertinent to the estimate/department under 
review. This opportunity for members to ’tease things out’ and give ministers the 
benefit of their views was cited as part of the job of committee members (SCLS, 
Wednesday, 7 June 1995; L5, No.l; Col 60) and is often proclaimed as one of the 
benefits of a committee system. One detrimental (to its status) aspect of the 
committee’s task included its inability to vote on any aspect of the estimates 
{restricted to the Dail in plenary) (SCLS, Friday, 9 June 1995; L4, No. 16; Col 
1724) and the little time allocated to the entire estimates examination forcing 
Deputies to ’rush matters’(Col 1746).
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The committee processed the committee stage of seven major pieces of legislation 
during 1995. The subject areas of the Bills before the committee included :
Occupiers’ Liability Bill, 1995 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons Bill, 1995 
Criminal Law (Incest Proceedings) (No. 2) Bill, 1995 
Civil Legal Aid Bill, 1995
Fifteenth Amendment of the Constitution (No. 2) Bill, 1995 
Domestic Violence Bill, 1995 
Courts and Court Officers Bill, 1995.
Most of the Bills above related to very sensitive issues including provisions allied 
to the then proposed facility for divorce and in the main were considered in a 
responsible manner by the committee. By and large the opposition parties 
provided much of the non-ministerial input into the various debates with an 
occasional flurry of activity from government Deputies [the committee had no 
Democratic Left representation at all during the year - obviously with only two 
backbenchers remaining, they were limited in what issues they could cover]. It 
was evident in relation to the variety of subjects considered that the value of the 
committee system lay (in the words of Michael Woods referring to an earlier 
committee of which he was a member) in the fact that the members were 
’practising TDs, people who knew what they were talking about’ (SCLS,
Thursday, 23 March 1995; L4, No. 10; Col 1424), a view which corresponds with 
the point made earlier regarding the practical benefits which flow from the
L egislation ,
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relationship between members of parliament and their constituents and 
supporters insofar as it presents them with an ideal opportunity to know how 
people feel on issues and respond accordingly when framing legislation. Proposed 
amendments met with a variety of fates - acceptance on some occasions (SCLS, 
Wednesday, 6 December 1995; L5, No. 10; Col 636; Thursday, 7 December 1995; 
L5, No.l 1; Col 652) and the standard familiar commitments to consider particular 
matters further before Report Stage following additional research or consultation . 
with the parliamentary draftsman in order to "tidy things up" (SCLS, Thursday, 1 
June 1995; L4, No. 15; Col 1657: Friday, 16 June 1995; L5, No. 2; Col 107). 
Ministers on occasion felt compelled to concede reconsideration of various 
sections of Bills following intensive debate as evidenced by ’a strong message 
from the committee’ during the passage of the Occupiers’ Liability Bill, 1994 
(SCLS, Wednesday, 5 April 1995; L4,No.l3 ;Col 1559), the Criminal law (Incest 
Proceedings) (No. 2) Bill, 1995 (SCLS, Tuesday, 20 June 1995; L5,No.3;Col 135) 
and the Domestic Violence Bill, 1995 (SCLS, Tuesday, 7 November 1995; L5,
No.8; Col 463) amongst others. This course of action albeit often reluctantly 
undertaken by ministers sometimes forced a rethink on certain provisions of 
proposed legislation and could be claimed to demonstrate ’the value of 
Committee Stage ... brings out the various issues’ (SCLS, Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security, Wednesday, 12 July 1995; L5, No.4; Col 257) and 
justifies, it could be argued, the referral of legislation to committees for intensive 
yet reflective debate as cited in the consideration of related literature earlier.
As on previous occasions many amendments were not accepted by the relevant 
minister and were defeated, when pressed, by either a voice vote or by a division 
of the committee. In the seven divisions in 1995, the government members
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present all "supported the line" and no defeats were suffered by the government 
at any stage.
What was referred to as a ’defining moment in the development of the committee
system’fO’Keefe, Jim, TD, SCLS, Tuesday, 5 December 1995; L5, No.9; Col 527)
occurred during consideration of the Courts and Court Officers Bill, 1995 on 5, 6
and 7 December 1995. This Bill, which provided for the appointment of
additional judges to all the courts, allowed members to consider the position of
solicitors for appointment to both the High Court and the Supreme Court -
positions hitherto barred to solicitors and confined to members of the Bar. It
should be noted that the committee membership included many Deputies with
legal backgrounds - O’Donoghue, O’Dea, O’Donnell, Browne, Shatter, McDowell
D. amongst others. A proposal from Alan Shatter of Fine Gael - a government
backbencher - to allow for the appointment of solicitors to the higher courts
received the support of all parties present at the meeting including, it must be
noted two of the three government parties (Democratic Left, though absent were
believed to be sympathetic to the proposal also). This state of events clearly
placed the Minister for Justice (who had intended to provide that solicitors be
eligible for appointment to the Circuit Court only) in a dilemma as she
acknowledged that
Representatives from Fine Gael, the Progressive Democrats, Fianna Fail 
and the Labour Party - there is nobody from Democratic left here - have all 
made an eloquent case. It would be difficult for me, if the committee 
system is to work, to disregard these views and say I will continue with the 
Bill in its present form. I am prepared to consider what I have heard but I 
cannot give a commitment... In view of the strength of the arguments 
which have been put, I would not be doing my job properly if I did not 
consider them before Report Stage.
(SCLS, Tuesday, 5 December 1995; L5, No.9; Col 522).
134
On reading the official report of the proceedings of 5 December 1995, one can 
almost sense the drama of the occasion as speaker after speaker referred to the 
uniqueness of the situation which literally assumed the position of a watershed in 
the maturing of this committee. The language used by members coupled with the 
obvious overwhelming of the minister clearly demonstrated that members of 
parliament could, when so inclined and in accordance their view of the ’common 
good’, contribute constructively to the legislative process and compel the 
executive to consider the views of backbenchers when framing legislation. It 
became clear during the debate that if ’the committee system ... to have any 
meaning’ (SCLS, Tuesday, 5 December 1995; L5, No.9; Col 526) and not merely 
exist to ’rubber stamp all legislation’ (Col 524] then the government would have 
to ’take on board’ what was happening at the committee. This ’all party 
consensus’ (Col 514), deemed ’unprecedented’ in present circumstances was 
considered as a litmus test for the future meaningful role of committees and the 
extension of genuine parliamentary democracy. Failure by the executive to 
respond favourably to the ’one voice’ of the committee on the matter under 
discussion would have questioned the worthwhile existence of committees. This 
historic opportunity for members to demonstrate real input into legislation rather 
than merely go through the motions was seized upon by Deputies all of whom 
impressed upon the minister that this ’evolution in the committee system’ had 
future implications for the integrity and credibility of the committee system 
(SCLS, Wednesday, 6 December 1995; L5, No.10; Cols 537-540).
It is clear that this insistence by the committee is a result of the ability of 
members, including government supporters, to press an issue of importance to 
them in committees, an option which realistically might not be available to them 
in plenary, as outlined in the comments of Donnelly (1997), Heidar (1997),
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Andeweg (1997] and Hemes and Nergaard (1989) in the review of related 
literature in chapter four.
In the event the minister returned to the committee on 7 December, 1995 with a 
revised proposal which went some of the way towards meeting the problems 
outlined by Deputies. The compromise intended to permit the appointment of 
solicitors to the higher courts after serving as a Circuit court judge for four years 
with a further examination of the matter promised. The minister further 
acknowledged the role of the committee in this amendment describing it as ’a 
tribute to the work of Dail committees’ (SCLS, Thursday, 7 December 1995; L5, 
No.ll; Col 653). Members differed on their reactions to the minister’s response. 
Opposition members whilst recognising some movement in the government’s 
position were critical of the minimalist position adopted dubbing it a ’small 
consolation’. Government Deputies, clearly consulted in advance and away from 
the committee meeting [as is the presumed position with many parliaments 
outlined in chapter one], were more positive in their judgements. The fact that 
the minister took the steps outlined above following committee debate vindicated 
the committee system according to Derek McDowell, a Labour government 
deputy. Quite apart from the substance of the issue which provoked the debate, 
the outcome of the committee acting e n  bloc  on the matter caused Jim O’Keefe of 
Fine Gael to comment:
I wish to refer to the important principle that has now been established for 
the committee system. I am of the view that because the Legislature has 
lost many of its powers while the Executive has gathered more, an 
appropriate counter balance is the development of the committee system. I 
was delighted to see the committee system being established and extended 
in recent years under different Governments. It has now acquired depth, 
but in order to have a future the system must be effective. This committee 
has shown that a reasoned debate can have an impact on legislation. The
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committee is not merely the rubber-stamp of the Executive whereby 
legislation is forced through, by vote if necessary. The debate in this 
committee has had an impact and has caused the Minister, as she 
promised, to rethink the situation, to confront her colleagues in the 
Cabinet and to come back with an amendment to take on board the views 
expressed here. In future I would like committees to adopt this approach to 
a greater degree. This is good for parliamentary democracy and we have 
created a precedent. This is a good day’s work.
(Parliamentary. Debates, Select Committee on Legislation and Security, Thursday, 
7 December 1995; L5,No.ll;Col 660).
Resources
The provision of adequate resources to enable committees to operate effectively 
continued to feature prominently in the concerns voiced by members throughout 
debates on their operations. This need was recognised during the Dail debate on 
the motion establishing the revised committees and was repeated at frequent 
intervals during the year. At the inaugural meeting, Liz O’Donnell spoke of the 
autonomy and resources required if the committee was to develop with 
competence (SCLS, Thursday, 23 March 1995; L4, No. 10; Col 1417). Resources 
identified as essential to the professional workings of the committee included 
staffing, record of proceedings, independent legal advice, technical assistance 
with complex matters and the very basic "bread and butter" issue of a room to 
meet in. All of the above were to feature in the difficulties faced by the committee 
during 1995. The chairman alluded to the problem regarding meeting rooms at 
the very first meeting observing ’the fact that we now have 17 committees and 
three committee rooms is an indication of the difficult task ... in ensuring that we 
have, first, a room in which to engage in our deliberations, and secondly a time 
slot within the committee system’ (SCLS, Thursday, 23 March 1995; L4, No. 10;
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Col 1415). These housekeeping matters surfaced at the next meeting: when 
considering a proposal to establish a sub-committee to consider drug abuse, the 
chairman again highlighted the absence of adequate resources concluding there 
was no point ’to the setting up of a sub-committee unless ... resources [are 
provided] ... because [there are] no officials to staff it’ (SCLS, Thursday, 30 March 
1995; L4,No.ll;Col 1455). He was joined in his protest by the previous 
chairman - Dan Wallace - who was obviously familiar with the difficulties 
encountered in this area and who stated ’we have one clerk to deal with the 
committee ... there is no point in setting up a committee and expecting it to work 
properly unless it has the proper resources’ (Col 1448). The somewhat farcical 
position which resulted from the lack of meeting rooms can be illustrated by 
extracts from the debate on the estimates for the Department of Equality and 
Law Reform on 7 June, 1995 where the chairman is quoted as announcing ’due 
to the demand on room space from other committees, we must conclude our 
discussions by 2.30pm at the latest’ (SCLS, Wednesday, 7 June 1995; L5, No.l; 
Col 3). The position was still causing concern at the end of the year when the 
committee (considering the Courts and Court Officers Bill) was restricted in the 
times it could meet due to prior engagements of the sponsoring minister (which 
was understandable) and the fact that ’the only time a room is available is
2.30pm (SCLS, Tuesday, 5 December 1995; L5,No.9;Col 484).
<
Other concerns noted included the continuing lack of adequate technical 
assistance to opposition members in drawing-up legally correct amendments, the 
limitations this imposed on the ability of Deputies to function as lawmakers and 
the short time elapsing between the tabling of complex amendments by ministers 
and their consideration by the committee with the consequent handicap this 
created for members.
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Briefings
It is clear from the debates that outside groups and organisations continued to 
target the members when issues of interest to them were under consideration. 
Brendan Kenneally on a debate concerning the Occupiers Liability Bill, 1994 
remarked ’I am sure that we have all received literature from these [recreational 
user] organisations’ when considering landowners’ liability (SCLS, Tuesday, 4 
April 1995; L4, No.12; Col 1475]. Reference is also made in debates to 
submissions received from the ’Commission on Overseas Prisoners’ (SCLS, 
Friday, 16 June 1995; L5, No.2; Col 94; Tuesday, 20 June 1995; L5, No.3; Col 
164]. Further consultations were also made with organisations such as the Law 
Society, Garda Commissioner, Coolock Law Centre, Women’s Aid and the Bar 
Council on a range of matters . These contacts were fully reported and are to be 
welcomed as they contribute to the bank of knowledge that lawmakers possess 
when framing legislation with direct impact on people and as indicated earlier are 
a common feature of legislatures. The influence that these bodies and agencies 
can exert on legislation is reflected in the comment of Michael Woods at the 
conclusion of the debate on the Domestic Violence Bill, 1995 when, in the course 
of exchanging normal courtesies at the end of a debate he added that he 
welcomed the way that the views of different bodies directly concerned were 
taken on board (SCLS, Tuesday, 7 November 1995; L5,No.8; Col 478).
Other parliam entary d u ties
There are many arguments as to whether Dail Deputies are the authors of their
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own very heavy w orkloads by  their in tense devotion to constituency  m atte rs  at
the  expense of the ir legislative functions. Referring to constituency  work,
Gallagher (1996) counters p art of th is argum en t com m enting  ’in fact, it is a  m ore
or less universal role for m em bers of parliam en t’. However given the  situation  as
it exists on the  ground and  the  cu rren t cu ltu re  operating in  Ireland in  relation to
th is m atter, it is clear th a t Deputies are frequently  p ressed  for tim e. Countless
occurrences are logged in  th e  records w here Deputies w ere obliged to adjourn  for
o ther business or arrived a t com m ittee m eetings late due to  o ther engagem ents. I
noted instances w here clashes of parliam entary  business occurred due to  the
Order of Business (SCLS, Tuesday, 4 April 1995; L4, No.12; Col 1466) and  other
legislative com m ittees (Col 1526). O ther engagem ents w ere cited for early
departu res/ad journm ents on m any  occasions (SCLS, Thursday , 1 Ju n e  1995; L4,
No. 15; Col 1623). T he allocation of tim e slots for com m ittee business continued
to pose problem s for Deputies of all parties. Exam ples can  be found throughout
the year - Michael McDowell appeared to ven t th e  frustration  felt by m any  a t th e
bizarre situation m any  found them selves in:
people w ere m issing th is m orning because for the  first tim e ever in  the  
history of th e  S tate a  Bill to am end  th e  C onstitution has been  sen t to a 
select com m ittee and  o ther D eputies and  I w ere required  to speak  on the 
Fam ine com m em oration [in plenary] a t th e  sam e tim e. We w ere told th a t 
every D eputy in  th e  House w as free to  contribute a t th is com m ittee 
m eeting. W ith respect, I say to th e  political parties who fixed th e  business 
for today, th a t it is a  bit disingenuous to say, having m oved it to a 
com m ittee, th a t o ther people w ere elsew here w hen you fixed o ther 
business w hich brought them  elsew here.
(SCLS, T hursday, 5 October 1995; L5,No.5; Col 373)
In addition th is com m ittee occasionally m e t on Fridays. This arrangem ent 
generated  further difficulties for ru ral D eputies anxious to leave for their 
constituencies and  w hen these  w ere paired  valuable expertise w as lost as 
substitu tes w ere no t so well inform ed on m atte rs  under discussion. On a  few
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occasions the  chairm an  had  to  excuse h im self and  w ithdraw  in  the  m iddle of a  
m eeting to  a tten d  to o ther business w ith  th e  consequent appo in tm ent of an  
acting chairm an  (SCLS, Tuesday, 4 April 1995; L4,N o.l2; Col 1488: W ednesday, 
6 D ecem ber 1995;L5, No. 10; Col 580). M embers had  to cope w ith  a  profusion of 
dem ands on their tim e and I am  of the  view th a t th e  quality  of debate  and 
exam ination of m any  of the  issues w hich cam e before th e  com m ittee in  1995 is a 
tribu te  to those m em bers who took the ir role as legislators seriously and  a 
justification for the  increased parliam entary  responsibilities bestow ed upon  them .
Other a c tiv itie s  of th e  com m ittee in  1995
T he Select Com m ittee a t its m eeting  on 18 October, 1995 decided to estab lish  a 
sub-com m ittee to consider th e  drugs problem . T he orders of reference of the  su b ­
com m ittee on th e  drugs problem  are se t ou t a t A ppendix IV including details of 
th e  m em bership  of th e  sub-com m ittee.
At the  first m eeting  of th e  sub-com m ittee held on 18th October, 1995, D eputy 
Jo h n  O’Donoghue w as elected C hairm an of th e  Sub-com m ittee. T he su b ­
com m ittee on th e  drugs problem  m et on th ree  occasions in  1995 (and on ten  
occasions in  1996).
The sub-com m ittee agreed th a t its w ork program m e should involve th e  taking of 
oral evidence on the  drugs problem  from  in terested  persons and  organisation, 
including the  relevan t D epartm ent of S tate. T he Sub-com m ittee agreed th a t th e  
approach to be tak en  should be area-based, and  should concentrate  on the 
practical experience of individuals involved a t th e  coal-face of th e  drugs problem .
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T he sub-com m ittee also agreed in  principle th a t it should  visit areas affected by 
the  drugs problem  and  undertook to  visit Cork City, Dublin North Inner City, 
Kilbarrack in.D ublin and W aterford. (Report of th e  Select C om m ittee on 
Legislation and  Security  for th e  period 1 Jan u ary , 1995 to  31 D ecem ber, 1996).
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CHAPTER 9 - SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY - 1996
In 1996 the  com m ittee continued its w ork of exam ining th e  estim ates for the  
D epartm ents of Defence, E quality  and  Law Reform and  Ju s tic e  in  addition to 
processing th e  com m ittee stage of legislation sponsored b y  th e  above 
departm ents. However an  exam ination of the  annual repo rt of the  com m ittee also 
indicates th a t th e  com m ittee devoted considerable tim e in  1996, often in private 
or unreported  sessions, to  th e  exam ination of issues o ther th a n  those formally 
assigned to th e  com m ittee. In th is regard I am  referring to  th e  tak ing  of evidence 
on a  range of issues relating to th e  licensing laws, drugs abuse, revision of the  
courts and  th e  review  of th e  Official Secrets Act and  related  m a tte rs  (Report of the 
Select Com m ittee on Legislation and  Security  for the  period 1 Jan u ary , 1995 to 
31 December, 1996).
A s tudy  of the  official records of th e  proceedings of th e  com m ittee also reveals a 
num ber of instances of w hat one m em ber referred to as th e  overstretching of 
Deputies in  requiring their a ttendance  throughout th e  year a t so m any  different 
m eetings relating to  various parliam entary  m atters. This w ould appear to have 
had  a  detrim ental im pact on the  quality  of parliam entary  w ork as m em bers 
scurried  from m eeting  to m eeting  som etim es giving scan t a tten tion  to th e  m a tte r 
under review as they  juggled w ith  their m any  com peting engagem ents. This 
w eakness in  the  operations of th e  O ireachtas featured prom inently  in  the  debate 
on Dail reform  on 9 October, 1996 [referred to  in  chap ter three] w hen  a  range of 
parliam entary  ills, including th e  abundance of com m ittees, w ere highlighted by
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Deputies as being in need  of correction and  w as often com plained of by m em bers 
during the  com m ittee proceedings of earlier years.
A ttendance
The records and  annual report indicate th a t the  com m ittee m e t on th irty  eight 
occasions during 1996. Tw enty m eetings were held  in  public w ith  reports of only 
these  proceedings being published in  accordance w ith  th e  lam entable restriction 
by the  O ireachtas officials highlighted earlier to confine publication to 
proceedings relating to com m ittee stages of Bills and  consideration of estim ates.
W hilst the  annual report provides the  a ttendance records of m em bers for th irty  
five m eetings, frequency of contributions are only ascertainable for th e  tw enty  
recorded m eetings. The table below illustrates the  m em b ers’ attendance, w hilst 
the  frequency and  num ber of in terventions by m em bers can  be found a t 
A ppendix IX:
NAME ATTENDED 
MAX. 35
SUBSTITUTED 
(OF 35)
CONTRIBUTED
MAXIMUM 
REPORTED 20
BROWNE J .  (C/K) 31 (86%) 2 (6%) 15 (75%)
BROWNE J . (WEX) 8 (23%) 1 (3%) 0
FITZGERALD L. 26 (74%) 1 (3%) 17 (85%)
FLANAGAN C. 33 (94%) 0 chair
GREGORY T. 13 (37%) 0 5 (25%)
HARTE P. 8 (23%) 6 (17%) 2 (10%)
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KEMMY J . 13 (37%) 0 4 (20%)
KENNEALLY B. 18 (51%) 2 (6%) 3 (15%)
McDOWELL D. 14 (40%) 1 (3%) 2 (10%)
McGr a t h  p . 17 (49%) 3 (9%) 2 (10%)
MULVIHILL J . 15 (43%) 0 1 (5%)
O’DEA W. 6 (17%) 2 (6%) 3 (15%)
O’DONNELL L. 19 (54%) 5 (14%) 15 (75%)
O’DONOGHUE J . 16 (46%) 3 (9%) 13 (65%)
O’KEEFE J . 18 (51%) 3 (9%) 3 (15%)
SHATTER A. 4 (11%) 5 (14%) 2 (10%)
SMITH M. 19 (29%) 2 (6%) 2 (10%)
TIMMINS G. 11 (31%) 1 (3%) 0
WALLACE D. 17 (49%) 2 (6%) 3 (15%)
WALSH E. 24 (69%) 2 (6%) 8 (40%)
WOODS M. 25 (71%) 0 14 (70%)
Table: 9.1 - A ttendance and  contributions by m em bers of SCLS during 1996. 
Source: Official records.
T he above a ttendance records can  be sum m arised  in  th e  tab le  on th e  following 
page:
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PERCENTAGE OF MEMBERS 
WHO ATTENDED OR WERE 
SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF 
MEMBERS
COMPARISON WITH 
1995
100 - -
91-99 2 -2
81-90 0 -3
71-80 3 + 1
61-70 1 -2
50-60 5 -1
> 50 10 + 7
Table: 9.2 - S um m ary  of a ttendance  a t SCLS during 1996. 
Source: Official records
The figures above would appear to  confirm  th a t m em bers w ere attend ing  less 
frequently  (53.88 per cen t com pared  to 76 per cen t a year earlier) and  
contributing to fewer discussions th an  w as the  case a t th e  com m encem ent of th e  
select com m ittee system .
It can  be seen from a perusal of th e  official records th a t as the  work of the  
com m ittee proceeded th e  nu m b er of m em bers speaking w as reducing w ith the 
bulk  of the  contributions com ing from  official p arty  spokespersons ap a rt from 
isolated incidents w hen very  topical subjects such  as crim e or divorce w ere under 
discussion. Indeed on reading th e  official record it appears th a t on occasion only 
th e  chair, m inister and  principal opposition spokesperson w ere present. An 
exam ple of th is can  be found a t th e  conclusion of th e  com m ittee stage of th e  
Powers of A ttorney Bill, 1995 on 13 March, 1996 w hen th e  chairm an, in tending  
to deliver som e "housekeeping" notes rem arked  ’I have a  nu m b er of notices for 
the  com m ittee bu t because D eputy Woods is th e  only m em ber p resen t th ey  m ight 
be best relayed th rough  th e  convenors’ (SCLS, W ednesday, 13 M arch 1996; L6,
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No. 4, Cols 239,240).
I propose to indicate the  a ttendance (without any  substitu tion  factor) records of 
those Deputies who w ere m em bers of the  com m ittee from  1993 - 1996. It m u st be 
rem em bered  th a t the  m em bersh ip  changed substan tia lly  upon the  change of 
governm ent in  1994.
PERCENTAGE ATTENDANCE OF EACH MEMBER 1993 - 1996
NAME 1993 1994 1995 1996
AHERN D. 54% 50% N/M N/M
BARRETT S. 69% 37.5% N/M N/M
BRISCOE B. 85% 81.25% N/M N/M
BROWNE J . (C/K) 100% 87.5% 85% 86%
BROWNE J . (WEX) N/M N/M 41% 23%
CALLELY I. 77% 93.75% N/M N/M
CAREY D. 62% 50% N/M N/M
CLOHESSY P. 23% 18.75% N/M N/M
COLLINS G. 46% 6.25% N/M N/M
de VALERA S. 23% 31.25% N/M N/M
FITZGERALD L. 92% 87.5% 78% 74%
FLANAGAN C. N/M N/M 89% 94%
FOLEY D. 77% 68.75% N/M N/M
GILMORE E. 54% 50% N/M N/M
GREGORY T. 54% 50% 37% 37%
HARTE P. 69% 50% 26% 23%
KEMMY J . 69% 50% 48% 37%
KENNEALLY B. N/M N/M 81% 51%
LENIHAN B. 31% 18.75% N/M N/M
McDOWELL D. 69% 62.5% 52% 40%
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McGRATH P. N/M N/M 56% 49%
MITCHELL G. 85% 56.25% N/M N/M
MULVIHILL J . 69% 37.5% 59% 43%
O’DEA W. N/M N/M 52% 17%
O’DONNELL L. 85% 68.75% 44% 54%
O’DONOGHUE J . 46% 56.25% 67% 46%
O’KEEFE J . 69% 56.25% 59% 51%
POWER S. 46% 81.25% N/M N/M
RYAN E. 69% 68.75% N/M N/M
RYAN J . 46% 6.25% N/M N/M
SHATTER A. 62% 56.25% 37% 11%
SHORTHALL R. 38% 37.5% N/M N/M
SMITH M. N/M N/M 41% 29%
TIMMINS G. 54% 18.75% 37% 31%
WALLACE D. 100% 87.5% 52% 49%
WALSH E. 100% 81.25% 85% 69%
WOODS M. N/M N/M 96% 71%
Table: 9.3 - A ttendance of m em bers oi' SCLS 1993 - 1996 
N/M refers to a  non-m em ber a t th a t time.
Source: Annual reports 1993-1996.
I have deliberately no t m ade any  allowance for substitu tion , a practice w hich w as 
w idespread any  very  useful in  allowing a lternate  m em bers a tten d  and  partic ipate 
w hen subject m atte rs  relevant to their portfolios, constituen ts, expertise or 
in terest were being discussed. T he purpose of th e  above tab le is m erely to 
illustrate the  attendance of th e  m em bership  assigned to th is  com m ittee over the  
duration  under exam ination.
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E stim ates
T he com m ittee considered th e  estim ates for th e  th ree  departm en ts  assigned to  it 
throughout the  year. Four m eetings w ere held  during  the  year to consider th is 
aspect of th e  com m ittee’s rem it. As o n  previous occasions th e  com m ittee 
appeared to suffer from being confined by their business/tim e m anagem en t to a 
period w hich m ay  have prevented  as full a  review  of these  m atte rs  as w ould be 
desired. Given th a t th e  chairm an  acknow ledged th a t the  Dail had  im posed a 
serious obligation on the  com m ittee to consider w hether the  significant sum s 
w ere ’being expended in  th e  m ost efficient and  effective w ay possible’ (SCLS, 
Tuesday, 14 May 1996; L6, No. 6, Col 327), th e  com m ittee com pleted 
consideration of th e  Defence estim ate of £455,632,000 in  2 hours 50 m inu tes 
w ith debate confined to six  m em bers apart from  th e  m inister, m in ister of s ta te  
and  chairm an. In tru th  the  principal speakers w ere th e  Progressive D em ocrats 
spokesperson (92 interventions), the F ianna Fail spokesperson (30 interventions) 
w ith  a single backbencher, Se&n Power of Kildare, a m ilitary  constituency, being 
the only other significant speaker w ith 13 interventions. T hus a  handful of 
Deputies com pleted a  review  of an  expenditu re  of £2 ,680,188 per m inu te  of 
debate. This having been  said, the  m em bers p resen t did succeed in  review ing a  
range of m atte rs  relevant to th e  Defence estim ates. This would conform  to 
D eputies’ varied views of th e  com m ittee’s role in  th e  estim ates consideration 
process such  as th e  ’exchange [of] view s’ (Col 345) or the  m aking  of ’useful 
com m ents on m atte rs  of particu lar in te re st’(Col 358). This sem i-relaxed approach 
to th e  task  w hich th e  th en  M inister for Defence considered ’an  excellent 
opportunity  to look in  som e dep th  at th e  role of th e  Defence Forces ... good value 
for the m oneys expended u nder the  ... Defence V otes’ (Col 328) drew  th e  rem ark
from the Fianna Fail spokesperson th a t ’it is a  sign of th e  tim es ... prim arily 
dealing w ith Estim ates, th e  M inister has decided to deal w ith  w ider issues. More 
th an  three-quarters of his speech dealt w ith m atte rs  outside th e  E stim ates’
(SCLS, Tuesday, 14 May 1996; L6, No. 6, Col 341).
T he consideration by  th e  com m ittee of th e  estim ates for th e  D epartm ent of 
Equality and  Law Reform am ounting  to  £11,768,000 took 2 hours to  com plete on 
28 May, 1996. This am ounted  to £98,067 per m inu te  and  w as u n d ertak en  by ju s t  
two Deputies Helen Keogh of Progressive D em ocrats (8 interventions) and  Michael 
Woods - Fianna Fail (5 interventions] both  p arty  spokespersons on th e  sub ject in 
addition to the  m in ister and  th e  chairm an. (SCLS, Tuesday, 28 May 1996; L6,
No. 7, Cols 399-432).
There w ere two m eetings devoted to  the  estim ates for the  D epartm ent of Ju stice  
as a supplem entary  estim ate  w as required  la ter in  th e  year. T he su m  in  respect of 
the  principal estim ate am ounted  to £614.318 m illion w as debated  on 13 Ju n e ,
1996 and a ttrac ted  seven deputies in  addition to  th e  m in ister and  chairm an.
Once again the  p arty  spokespersons contributed  - O’Donnell (11 interventions), 
Woods (10), O’Donoghue (9) and  they  w ere jo ined  by Gregory (4), F itzgerald L. (3) 
and  Browne (C/K) (12). It w as surprising  given th e  high profile afforded to crim e 
issues th a t the  debate  w as confined to practically  a  th ird  of the  com m ittee 
m em bership. The debate lasted  th ree  hours and  5 m inu tes - £3 .3206 m illion per 
m inute - and w as com pleted w ithout consideration of all th e  subheads (Col 496) 
and  four votes being tak en  ’as read ’. This w as in  p art due to o ther com m itm ents 
of th e  m inister and  even though  the  chairm an  floated the  idea of adjourning 
consideration of th e  estim ates until ano ther day, th is w as not considered
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necessary  (SCLS, T hursday, 13 Ju n e  1996; L6, No. 8, Cols 435-496).
A supplem entary  estim ate  am ounting  to ’approxim ately £33.7  m illion’ was 
considered on 3 Decem ber, 1996 for one and  a half hours (£374,444 per m inute). 
Five m em bers in  addition to th e  chair and  m in ister participated . A som ew hat 
hurried  debate w as evident w ith  the  m in ister once m ore anxious to  have ’the 
Estim ates agreed’ and  resisting a  proposal of the  opposition to adjourn the  m a tte r 
(albeit w ith an  elem ent of pique). It w as s trange to read, in  th e  light of the  
perceived im provem ent of parliam entary  business following reform s, of one 
deputy (Woods) rem arking  ’Estim ates and  supplem entary  E stim ates are not dealt 
w ith now adays w ith  the  sam e thoroughness as in th e  p a s t’ (Col 57) and  the 
w eariness of m em bers w as fu rther illustrated  by  the  jaund iced  reaction  of Tony 
Gregory to the  possibility of a fu rther m eeting to review th ese  estim ates: ’Can we 
not agree them ? There is no point in  com ing back. Could th e  M inister send us a 
note about the  various points m ad e?’ (SCLS, Tuesday, 3 D ecem ber 1996; L7, No. 
2, Col 59).
L egislation
The com m ittee concluded th e  com m ittee stage of a  num ber of Bills relating to 
issues w ith a high public profile including:
Refugee Bill, 1995 
Powers of A ttorney Bill, 1995
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Crim inal Ju stice  (Drug Trafficking) Bill, 1996 
Fam ily Law (Divorce] Bill, 1996
Organised Crime (Restraint and  Disposal of Illicit Assets) Bill, 1996
Crim inal Ju stice  (Miscellaneous Provisions) Bill, 1996
Sexual Offences (Jurisdiction] Bill, 1995
Crim inal Law Bill, 1996
Civil Liability (Amendment) Bill, 1996
G arda Siochana Bill, 1996.
Two of the  above bills, O rganised Crim e (Restraint and  Disposal of Illicit Assets)
Bill, 1996 and  Sexual Offences (Jurisdiction) Bill, 1995 originated as private
m em ber’s legislation having been  in troduced  into th e  Dail by  F ianna Fail. T he
governm ent took th e  rare  step  of accepting opposition legislation, a  m ove w hich
was welcom ed by Michael W oods of F ianna Fail:
It is particu larly  im portan t th a t th is  [Organised Crime] Bill has  com e 
th rough  th is com m ittee from th e  Opposition. In fu ture  I w ould like 
to  see a  m ore open approach to legislation w here Bills could be 
produced and  brought th rough  th e  O ireachtas, receive th e  support of 
th e  G overnm ent and  be th ra sh ed  out in  com m ittee. We are too 
bound  up  w ith a  single approach to G overnm ent. I w ould like to see 
th e  parliam ent m ore directly  involved as it has  been  in  th is  case.
(SCLS, Tuesday, 23 Ju ly  1996; L6, No. 13, Col 806).
In the  com m ittee’s deliberations during th e  year a  num ber of positive trends w ere 
discernible. Several com m ents m ade by  m in isters  and  m em bers w ere m ore 
com plim entary of th e  m em b ers’ inpu t th a n  usual courtesies heretofore. The 
M inister of S tate  a t the  D epartm ent of Ju s tic e  in  presen ting  th e  Refugee Bill 
indicated th a t ’an  opportunity  w as tak en  to  u se  th e  w ork on C om m ittee Stage of 
[the] earlier [1994] Bill’ w hen preparing  th e  1995 bill and  ’exam ined all the
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subm issions and  s ta tem en ts  w hich w ere m ade th en  ... w hen  draw ing up the
revised Bill’. Indeed the  com m ittee m em bers of all parties debated  th e  bill w ith
great vigour. Deputies, including governm ent supporters, u n h ap p y  w ith  an  '
elem ent of th e  m in iste r’s proposal, forced the  m in ister to revert to th e  A ttorney
General w ith  a  particu lar legal problem  prom pting th e  chairm an  to rem ark  ’there
is a  clear m essage from th e  com m ittee, representative of all parties in  the  House,
th a t we have a problem  ... [with the] w ording’. The chairm an  [who it should be
rem em bered  w as a  governm ent deputy] fu rther underlined  the  m essage of the
com m ittee w hen  he boldly asked  th e  m inister:
to convey to th e  A ttorney General and  indeed anybody else ... 
M inister for Ju s tic e  and  Cabinet M inisters, th e  very  strongly held 
views of th is com m ittee, representative of all parties, on  th is key 
aspect of the  legislation. We hope ... m a tte rs  can  be resolved in 
favour of the  w ishes of th e  m em bers of th is com m ittee
(SCLS, Tuesday, 30 Ja n u a ry  1996; L6, No. 1, Cols 33 & 42).
It transp ired  th a t th e  A ttorney G eneral and  th e  m in ister w ere subsequen tly  able 
to give the  m em bers a  satisfactory ’com prehensive’ reply. This assuaged  their 
earlier fears and  justified  the  ’very thorough exam ination of th e  issu e ’ by the  
com m ittee (SCLS, Tuesday, 6 F ebruary  1996; L6, No. 2, Cols 60 8s 63) as it 
forced a com plete review of and  detailed explanation for th e  particu lar section 
and  preven ted  th e  m atte r being forced th rough  on th e  nod or by  th e  inbuilt 
governm ent m ajority.
A sim ilar ’unan im ous view of the  com m ittee’ w hich w as con trary  to  the  position 
of the  governm ent em erged during  th e  debate  on th e  O rganised Crim e Bill, 1996. 
The chairm an  observed th a t m em bers w ould be presen ted  w ith  a  difficulty in 
supporting th e  governm ent if an  opposition am endm ent w as pressed  to a  vote
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and  asked the  m inister p resen t to  ’convey our strong  view s’ on th e  m atte r (SCLS, 
Tuesday, 23 Ju ly  1996; L6, No. 13, Col 784).
During th e  passage of th e  various pieces of legislation th e  sponsoring m in ister 
accepted m an y  opposition am endm en ts  often w ith  an  undertak ing  to correct 
som e m inor technical flaw a t a  la te r stage. On occasion th e  m in ister undertook to 
review a  specific m a tte r before Report Stage following concerns expressed  by 
opposition m em bers such  as occurred during th e  debate  on th e  G arda Siochana 
Bill on 17 Decem ber, 1996 (SCLS, Tuesday, 17 D ecem ber 1996; L7, No. 4, Col 
96). The governm ent had  m ajorities in  all eight divisions called in  1996 w ith  no 
deputy  "breaking ranks". T he stances referred to above poin t to  a  com m ittee keen  
to  undertake its legislative role and  could be said to  have confirm ed the  w ishes of 
legislators as articulated during  parliam entary  debates on reform  as to th e  value 
of their creation by the  Oireachtas.
T he com m ittee w as credited  w ith  m an y  positive qualities in  their deliberations 
including the  positive im parting  of knowledge (SCLS, W ednesday, 7 February  
1996; L6, No. 3, Col 172) and  th e  claim  by  Willie O’Dea th a t  ’Legislation is 
alm ost invariably im proved in  som e m easure  as a  resu lt of d iscussion on 
Com m ittee Stage, w hich is w hat th is com m ittee is ab o u t’ (SCLS, W ednesday, 13 
M arch 1996; L6, No. 4, Col 191).
Comments on th e  operations of th e  com m ittee.
There is evidence of m em bers briefing them selves on a  range of m atte rs  both  by 
receiving subm issions from  groups, hearing  testim ony from  m an y  bodies on th e
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likely im pact of proposed legislation and  attend ing  conferences on relevant 
subject m atters. Among th e  organisations w hich supplied  d a ta  and  m ateria l to  
m em bers w ere th e  Irish Refugee Council, A m nesty, UNHCR, th e  Law Society, 
representatives of the  Gardai, the  defence forces and  the  divorce action groups. 
All of these  contacts, w hich m u st have utilised a lot of m em b ers’ tim e, served to 
equip deputies w ith  b e tte r quality  inform ation w hen  considering new  legislation, 
a welcom e feature w hich the  earlier discussion on th is  m a tte r  highlighted.
Many of the  problem s identified w ith  th e  com m ittee are fam iliar by  now  and 
featured prom inently  during th e  debate on O ireachtas reform  in  October. There 
w ere incidences of com m ittee m eetings clashing w ith  Dail p lenary  sessions 
(SCLS, Tuesday, 6 February  1996; L6, No. 2, Col 49). O ther Dail business su ch  as 
divisions, parliam entary  question  tim e, different com m ittee m eetings or m em bers 
having to  leave th e  com m ittee m eeting  to m ove a  bill in  th e  Dail also contributed  
to delays or ad journm ents in  th is  com m ittee’s business. T he fact th a t all 
m em bers w ere very busy  w as fu rther illustrated  on a  n u m b er of occasions by  th e  
uncom m on need  for the chairm an  to absen t him self for p a rt or full sessions of th e  
com m ittee due to  o ther engagem ents. (SCLS, Tuesday, 23 Ju ly  1996; L6, No. 13, 
Col 792;Tuesday, 26 November, 1996, Col 9; Tuesday, 3 Decem ber, 1996, Col 
39). The lim itations on th e  opposition in  drafting technically  correct am endm ents 
and  the  short advance notice to s tu d y  proposed governm ent am endm ents 
together w ith  the  occasional sho rt tim e lim it im posed by  th e  Dail for 
consideration of bills con tribu ted  to th e  frustrations experienced by  deputies 
charged w ith th is legislative work.
It becam e apparen t on reading th e  reports of proceedings th a t th e  com m ittee
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failed to com m ence business on m any  occasions due to th e  failure of m em bers to 
provide a  quorum  for th e  com m encem ent of business. This w as th e  subject of a  
stinging political charge by  the  chairm an  on Liam  Fitzgerald (one of th e  best 
a ttenders according to th e  records] who a ttem p ted  to raise cu rren t contentious 
m atters  (the Ju d g e  Lynch letter). T he chair alleged th a t D eputy Fitzgerald ’w as 
not available to a ttend  a t the  com m ittee on a nu m b er of occasions on w hich we 
sought a  quorum  in  recen t tim es’ (SCLS, Tuesday, 26 N ovem ber 1996; L7, No. 1, 
Col 4). This was rejected by  th e  depu ty  who expressed  d isappoin tm ent a t being 
telephoned in his office and  asked ’to ru n  over here and  form  a q u o rum ’ 
especially since he w as in th e  process of a ttend ing  anyw ay. I highlight th is 
incident (for w hich the  chairm an  la ter apologised) because allied w ith the  poor 
a ttendance records, few speakers in debates and  apology by th e  chair to ’the 
M inister’s officials for a ttend ing  here diligently on a  n u m b er of occasions in 
recen t tim es w hen we did no t get out of th e  s tarting  b locks’ (SCLS, T uesday, 26 
Novem ber 1996; L7, No. 1, Col 36) confirm  th e  existence of a  problem  for the  
legislature w hich form ed a  m ajor p art of the  com plaints of deputies during the  
Dail debate.
Other a c tiv itie s  of th e  com m ittee during 1996
The annual report for 1996 indicates th a t the  com m ittee undertook a large 
volum e of business in  addition to th e  public sittings relating  to the  com m ittee 
stage of legislation and  exam ination  of estim ates. Closed, private or unreported  
sessions to consider the  following m atte rs  were held  as follows:
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Draft "Freedom  of inform ation" 
legislation
3 m eetings
Taking of evidence - Powers of 
A ttorney Bill
1 m eeting
Liquor Licence laws 8 m eetings
Defence forces representatives 2 m eetings
Law of defam ation - new spapers 1 m eeting
Other private m eetings 3 m eetings
Table: 9.4 - Purpose of closed, private or unrecorded m eetings of SCLS during 
1996.
Source: A nnual report
In addition the  sub-com m ittee on the  drugs problem  held  ten  m eetings receiving 
oral evidence from  a  range of in terested  bodies su ch  as th e  Revenue 
Com m issioners, D epartm ents of Education and  th e  Environm ent, th e  Irish 
Medical Organisation, th e  G arda com m issioner and  a  n u m b er of trea tm en t 
centres. The chairm an reports th a t  th e  sub-com m ittee will continue th is w ork in 
1997 ’w ith  a view to producing a  report w ith recom m endations for G overnm ent’ 
(Report of th e  Select Com m ittee on Legislation and  Security  for the  period 1 
Jan u ary , 1995 to 31 Decem ber, 1996, Volume 1, p .19).
The com m ittee reviewed th e  Official Secrets Act, 1963 in  accordance w ith  its 
revised m andate  in  th is area. T he th en  im pending Freedom  Of Inform ation Bill 
(since enacted) w as studied  by  th e  com m ittee and  evidence taken. T he com m ittee 
subsequently , a t a  m eeting  on 28 Jan u ary , 1997 adopted  a  report on its review  of 
th is  ac t and  p resen ted  it to th e  Dail for debate  (Select Com m ittee on Legislation 
and  Security - Report on Review of th e  Official Secrets Act, 1963).
T he com m ittee, following a  req u est from one of its  m em bers, devoted a  lot of
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tim e to th e  review of the  liquor licensing laws in  1996. A sub-com m ittee w as 
established to take th is w ork forward in 1997 w ith  a  desire to be in  a position to 
produce a  report w ith recom m endations for the  governm ent in 1997 (Report of 
the  Select Com m ittee on Legislation and Security  for the  period 1 Jan u ary , 1995 
to 31 Decem ber, 1996, Volum e 1, p .18).
Two reports from th e  advisory group on charities/fundraising legislation and  th e  
working group on a courts com m ission w ere referred to th e  com m ittee by  the 
Minister for Ju stice  in  late  1996 for consideration of necessary  legislation w hich 
was an  innovative move. This work to continue in  1997 (Report of th e  Select 
Com m ittee on Legislation and  Security for th e  period 1 Jan u a ry , 1995 to 31 
December, 1996, Volume 1, p .18).
Debate on Dail reform
A debate on m any  areas of Dail reform  w as held on 9 October, 1996 and  is 
com m ented upon in  the  chap ter on Dail reform.
In the  light of the  com m ents m ade during th a t debate  and  the  alleged im pact of 
com m ittee work on the  electoral fortunes of m em bers, I undertook a  cursory 
exam ination of the  fate of th e  m em bers of th is select com m ittee a t th e  general 
election of 1997.
The table on the following page gives som e indication on th e  m atter:
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NAME PARTY ELECTORAL
RESULT
COMMENT
BROWNE J . (C/K) FG Re-elected w ith  
som e reported  
difficulty
Regular 
a tten d er and  
contributor a t 
com m ittee 
m eetings
BROWNE J . (WEX) FF Re-elected Note com m ents 
above regarding 
constituency  
com petition
FITZGERALD L. FF Lost sea t to 
p a rty  colleague
R egular 
a tten d er and  
contributor a t 
com m ittee . 
m eetings
FLANAGAN C. FG Re-elected Outgoing
chairm an
GREGORY T. Ind Re-elected
com fortably
C ontributed 
well to specific 
m atte rs  only
HARTE P. FG Lost sea t to  Ind 
FF
KEMMY J . Lab Re-elected w ith 
som e difficulty
KENNEALLY B. FF 1 Re-elected
McDOWELL D. Lab Re-elected w ith 
difficulty
McGRATH P. FG Re-elected
MULVIHILL J . Lab Lost seat
O’DEA W. FF Re-elected
com fortably
O’DONNELL L. PD Re-elected w ith 
difficulty •
Reported to be 
suffering in 
constituency  
due to lack of 
presence
O’DONOGHUE J . FF Re-elected
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O’KEEFE J . FG Re-elected
SHATTER A. FG Re-elected
SMITH M. FF Re-elected
TIMMINS G. FG Retired
WALLACE D. FF Re-elected
WALSH E. Lab Lost sea t to 
FF/FG
Had been a 
good a tten d er 
and  contributor
WOODS M. FF Re-elected
com fortably
It is im possible to draw  any  conclusions from  these  facts and  com m ents alone 
b lit it is interesting to note Des O’Malley’s com m ents [see chap ter three] 
regarding th e  Progressive D em ocrats a tten tion  to com m ittee w ork (which w as 
very im pressive throughout the  term  of th is  select com m ittee] and  the  ill- 
inform ed perception by th e  public, based  on incom plete facts as indicated  in 
chap ter four, and  to consider w hether th a t m ight have been  one of th e  factors 
im pacting on their electoral fortunes given th a t dedicated  a ttendance a t 
com m ittee m eetings to  perform  duties as legislators was, by  adm ission of 
deputies, often a t th e  expense of in tense constituency  activity. Coupled w ith  the  
fate of som e of the  m em bers who had  been to  th e  fore of com m ittee partic ipation 
(Fitzgerald, Browne[C/K], W alsh, Keogh [as regu lar substitute]], it w ould be 
difficult to deny th e  proposition by  som e D eputies th a t diligent and  dedicated 
atten tion  to com m ittee task s  posed som e danger for backbenchers, especially of 
th e  sm aller parties, in  the  existing m ulti-seat constituencies.
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CHAPTER 10 - JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 1993
The original m otion to  estab lish  th is com m ittee w as m oved in  th e  Dail on 28 
April, 1993 and in  the  Seanad on 7 April, 1993. T he revised te rm s of reference 
agreed by  both  houses in  March, 1995 are contained in  A ppendix V.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ORDERS APPOINTING 9 th  March, 1995 (Dail) 
13th  M arch 1995 (Seanad)
MEMBERS APPOINTED Deputies - 10 M arch 1995 
Senators - 13 & 14 M arch 1995
MEMBERSHIP (1995) 21 Deputies and  10 Senators
QUORUM 8 M embers
CHAIRMAN Alan S hatter
CLERK TO COMMITTEE Paddy Ju d g e
SECOND CONTACT PERSON to  be decided
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DAIL MEMBERSHIP
Theresa A heam Alan Dukes Rory O’Hanlon
Declan Bree Michael Ferris J im  O’Keeffe
Ben Briscoe Pat Gallagher Desm ond O’ Malley
Raphael P. Burke Tony Gregory Willie Penrose
(appointed 07-12-95)
Ger Connolly Michael Kitt Alan S hatter
Jo h n  Connor Jam es  Me Daid Eam on W alsh
(appointed 06-04-95)
Brian Cowen P .J. Morley A ustin Deasy
Austin Deasy
FORMER DAIL MEMBERSHIP OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Deputy Jo h n  Mulvihill (discharged 06-04-95)
Deputy Brian Lenihan (died 01-11-95): D eputy Neil T. Blaney (died 08-11-95) 
Introduction
The estab lishm ent of th is com m ittee w as described by th e  th en  T anaiste  as ’a 
landm ark’ w hich w as a long tim e com ing to fruition as it had  first been proposed 
m any years previously (Parliam entary Debates, Dail E ireann, W ednesday, 28 
April 1993, Vol. 429, No. 7, Col 1645). Indicating an  opportunity  for the  new
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com m ittee to prom ote ’consensus-building on a  basis of shared  knowledge and  
m easured  consideration of options’, the  T anaiste  (who w as also the  M inister for 
Foreign Affairs a t th a t time) s ta ted  th a t the  com m ittee w ould ’have an  im portan t 
role in  providing a barom eter of concern on th e  m ultiplicity  of issues..[Ireland] 
confronts] ’ (Col 1648). This accords, in  the  m ain  w ith th e  aspirations articu la ted  
by  Donnelly and  o thers in th e  discussion of related  literature in  chap ter four. T he 
M inister acknow ledged th e  expertise in  foreign policy m atte rs  possessed by 
deputies and senators and  foresaw an  expanded role for com m ittee m em bers by  
the creation of a  netw ork of sub-com m ittees to absorb the  w ork of the  previous 
Jo in t Com m ittee on Secondary Legislation of the  E uropean C om m unities and 
o ther m atters  su ch  as N orthern Ireland affairs.
O ther deputies contributing  to th e  debate  w elcom ed th e  creation of th e  com m ittee
and w ere en thusiastic  about several aspects of th e  com m ittee’s potential
deliberations . T hese included th e  right of m em bers of the  European parliam ent
’elected from constituencies in  Ireland (including N orthern Ireland)’ to a tten d
m eetings and  partic ipate in  proceedings. A range of issues w ith  in ternational
connotations w ere identified as being w orthy  of consideration by th e  com m ittee.
Among those featuring in  the  debate  w ere th e  th en  im pending M aastricht Treaty,
the Council of Europe, E astern  E uropean developm ents, Irish neu trality , th e
United Nations, h u m an  rights, fam ine relief and  overseas aid  generally along w ith
other aspects of Irish foreign policy. Eoin Ryan, w elcom ing th e  ’setting  up  of the
Foreign Affairs C om m ittee’ saw  am ongst th e  advantages that:
Not alone will th e  m em bers of the  Dail and  Seanad be b e tte r inform ed, the 
country  as a  whole will benefit. Civil se rvan ts  and  m em bers of th e  
G overnm ent will benefit w hen  there  is a  m ore open fram ew ork w ithin  
w hich we can  discuss our s tand  on problem s around the  world and  we, as 
a  sm all country, w ith  a  unique h isto ry  in  in ternational affairs can  take  
initiatives and  discuss policies.
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(Parliam entary Debates, Dail E ireann, W ednesday, 28 April 1993, Vol. 429, No. 7, 
Col 1776).
Also welcom ing th e  estab lishm ent of th is  com m ittee Nora Owen argued th a t the  
absence until th is tim e of an  existing com m ittee of parliam ent considering foreign 
affairs w as often ’a  m a tte r of som e em barrassm en t and am u sem en t to m em bers 
of parliam ent from o ther European countries’. She added th a t :
T he lack of su ch  a  Foreign Affairs Com m ittee m ean t th a t w hoever visited 
th is country  w ith  inform ation to  im p art to  us, w ith  expertise to  share  w ith  
u s  and  knowledge about their own country  and  about troubled spots in  the 
world, had  no forum  a t w hich th ey  could address m em bers of Parliam ent 
here.
(Parliam entary D ebates, Dail Eireann, W ednesday, 28 April 1993,Vol. 429, No. 7, 
Col 1783).
M embers of th e  Dail, in  agreeing to th e  creation of th e  com m ittee, w ere fully 
aw are of the  m any  burdens th a t w ould be placed on the m em bers coping w ith  
the wide spec trum  of issues likely to be p resen ted  to m em bers for discussion, 
analysis and  w here appropriate, decision. In th is regard m an y  deputies pleaded 
for adequate  resources for th e  com m ittee to deal w ith  its w orkload as th is 
continued to be identified as a barrier to  the  effective w orking of O ireachtas 
com m ittees heretofore. In addition th e  hope of suitable m edia  coverage of 
com m ittee discussions and  briefings w as highlighted as a  m eans of d ispensing 
the  proceedings to th e  public a t large. T hese aspirations w ere typical of the  
w ishes of m any  m em bers of a wide range of com m ittees estab lished  during  th is 
Dail and  are noted  in  th e  review of O ireachtas debates on th is m a tte r  in  chap ter 
three. Indeed it seem ed th a t th ey  w ere destined  to continue to  occupy a 
p rom inent place in  deputies’ com plaints list even  a t the  end  of th e  2 7 th  Dail.
On the  following day th e  report of th e  com m ittee of Selection nom inating 
Deputies N. A hern, Bree, Briscoe, J .  Browne (Carlow/Kilkenny), Collins, Connor, 
Cox, Davem, De Rossa, D urkan, Ellis, Ferris, P. G allagher (Laois/Offaly), Hogan, 
Lawlor, Lenihan, Lowry, M. McDowell, Morley, O’Hanlon, Owen, Penrose, E. 
Ryan, S. Ryan and  S hatter to  the  new  Jo in t Com m ittee w as approved by the  Dail. 
(Dail Debates, T hursday, 29 April 1993, Vol. 429, No. 8, Col 1893).
Deputy J .  O’Keefe w as appointed to replace Jo h n  Browne (Carlow/Kilkenny) on 5 
May, 1993. (Dail Debates, W ednesday, 5 May 1993, Vol. 430, No. 3, Col 474).
W hilst the  form al m otion appointing th e  select com m ittee w as m oved in  the 
Seanad on 7 April 1993 (Seanad Debates, W ednesday, 7 April 1993, Vol. 135, No. 
13, Col 1472], th e  debate on th e  estab lishm ent of th e  com m ittee, w ith  slightly 
am ended te rm s of reference, took place on 13 May 1993. Senators h ad  been to 
the  ’forefront in  pointing to the  need  for a  foreign affairs com m ittee’ and  had  a 
’particu lar perspective...to  bear on foreign policy issu es’ acknow ledged the  
M inister of S tate  a t the  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs (Seanad D ebates, T hursday, 
13 May 1993, Vol. 136, No. 4, Col 331). He stressed  th e  positive role th a t the 
com m ittee could exert in the  consideration and form ulation of foreign policy.
O ther senators welcom ed the  creation of th is jo in t com m ittee b u t outlined specific 
concerns w hich included th e  poor level of senate  rep resen tation  and  th e  by now 
infam ous insufficient provision of resources to th e  com m ittee. W hilst a  num ber of 
senators voiced their suggestions for th e  proposed w ork of th e  com m ittee, those 
m em bers w ith an  academ ic background w ere perhaps slightly m ore revolutionary 
in  their ideas. Senator Lee counselled th e  com m ittee to  ’consider m obilising our 
intellectual resources in  th e  h igher education  system  m ore effectively to assist
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the  com m ittee in  its activ ities’ (Col 349). Senator M aurice M anning and  his 
colleague, Dick Roche, both  w ith  an  in terest in  th is sub jec t spoke a t length  w ith  
the benefit of academ ic and  practical experience of parliam entary  com m ittee 
operations in  Ireland and  I have referred to their com m ents earlier w hen 
discussing parliam entary  reform  in  general. T he hope w as th a t th e  practice as 
operated in  th e  O ireachtas to-date m ight change as ’an  appropriate  com m ittee 
system  w ould allow m ore com prom ise’ (Col 361) in  th e  form ulation of Irish public 
policy. Concluding the debate  the  M inister of S tate  assu red  th e  senators th a t the  
governm ent in tended  to take  th e  com m ittee seriously, listen  to its views 
conceding th a t ’we [the governm ent] do no t have all th e  answ ers’ (Col 377).
The Seanad la ter appointed B rendan Daly, Mick Lanigan, Sean  Maloney, David 
Norris and  Madeline Taylor-Quinn as m em bers of th e  jo in t com m ittee (Joint 
Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Report on th e  A gricultural A spects of th e  General 
A greem ent on Tariffs and  Trade, D ecem ber 1993).
O’Halpin (1996) highlighting the  calibre of som e of th e  m em bers appointed to th is 
com m ittee, Lenihan, Owen and  De Rossa and  associating th is  w ith  o ther factors 
such  as th e  choice of chair, observes ’that, in  s ta rk  con trast to  previous 
experim ents in  procedural reform , all th e  parliam entary  parties w ere genuinely 
com m itted  to securing  th e  success of th e  new  C om m ittee.’
A ttendance
The com m ittee sa t formally as a Jo in t Com m ittee on n ine occasions in  1993. In
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addition th e  m em bers of the  com m ittee from the  Dail m e t on two occasions as a 
Select Com m ittee to consider estim ates (which is solely a  responsibility  of the  
Dail) relevant to the D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs. As will be outlined later th e  
com m ittee established sub-com m ittees relating to European  legislation, United 
Nations affairs and  after a  period of tim e, N orthern Ireland. T hese sub-com m ittees 
m et frequently during the  year to conduct business relevant to their brief and  
m ention will be m ade of th em  later.
The table below illustrates th e  a ttendance record of m em bers as outlined in  th e  
records of proceedings:
NAME TOTAL 
NO. OF 
POSSIBLE 
MEETINGS
ATTENDED WAS
SUBSTITUTED
NO. OF
MEETINGS
SPOKE
AHERN N. 11 5 (45.45%) 1 (9.09%) 0
BREE 11 11 (100%) 0 8 (72.73%)
BRISCOE 11 6 (54.55%) 0 2 (18.18%)
O’KEEFE 11 8 (72.73%) 2 (18.18%) 6 (54.55%)
COLLINS 11 5 (45.45%) 1 (9.09%) 2 (18.18%)
CONNOR 11 9 (81.82%) 0 9 (81.82%)
COX 11 2 (18.18%) 0 0
DAVERN 11 2 (18.18%) 1 (9.09%) 1 (9.09%)
DE ROSSA 11 10 (90.91%) 0 7 (63.64%)
DURKAN 11 9 (81.82%) 0 8.(72.73%)
ELLIS 11 9 (81.82%) 0 2 (18.18%)
FERRIS 11 11 (100%) 0 5 (45.45%)
GALLAGHER 
P. (LAOIS/ 
OFFALY]
11 9 (81.82%) 1 (9.09%) 7 63.64%)
HOGAN 11 2 (18.18%) 3 (27.27%) 0
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LAWLOR 11 3 (27.27%) 0 0
LENIHAN 11 10 (90.91%) 0 CHAIR
LOWRY 11 5 (45.45% 1 (9.09%) 1 (9.09%)
MCDOWELL M. 11 4 (36.36%) 1 (9.09%) 4 (36.36%)
MORLEY 11 5 (45.45%) 2 (18.18%) 0
O’HANLON 11 6 (54.55%) 0 4 (36.36%)
OWEN 11 8 (72.73%) 2 (18.18%) 8 (72.73%)
PENROSE 11 7 (63.64%) 1 (9.09%) 0
RYAN E. 11 6 (54.55%) 0 4 (36.36%)
RYAN S. 11 3 (27.27%) 1 (9.09%) 0
SHATTER 11 0 1 (9.09%) 0
SENATORS
DALY 9 5 (55.56%) 0 3 (33.33%)
LANIGAN 9 7 (77.78%) 0 7 (77.78%)
MALONEY 9 8 (88.89%) 0 5 (55.56%)
NORRIS 9 4 (44.44%) 0 4 (44.44%)
TAYLOR-
QUINN
9 6 (66.67%) 1 (11.11%) 6 (66.67%)
Table: 10.1 - A ttendance at contributions a t JCFA during 1993 
(Source: Parliam entary  D ebates - official reports 1993)
In addition to the  provision for all m em bers of the  O ireachtas to a tten d  com m ittee 
m eetings, the  te rm s of reference also allow for m em bers of th e  E uropean 
Parliam ent (MEP) and  of th e  Council of Europe to  a tten d  and  partic ipate  w ithout 
th e  right to vote. Two MEPs, Mary B anotti and  Patrick Lalor, each  a ttended  one 
m eeting of th e  com m ittee as did one m em ber of th e  Irish delegation to the 
Council of Europe - A ustin Deasy. Ms. Banotti, the  only one of these  to  speak, 
m ade one contribution.
Deputies w ere p resen t on 155 occasions out of a  possible m ax im um  of 275 -
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56.36%  [arrived a t by  counting th e  num ber of m eetings a tten d ed  by each depu ty  
and  com paring it w ith  the  nu m b er of deputies (25) and  th e  to tal num ber of 
m eetings (11)].
Senators a ttended  a gross to ta l of 32 m eetings out of a  possible 45 [5 senators x  9 
m eetings] w hich equates to 71.11% .
Com paring the  a ttendance (including substitution) ra te  of governm ent supporters 
and  opposition m em bers th e  following details em erge:
GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION
DEPUTIES----64.24% DEPUTIES----60.91%
SENATORS-—74.07% SENATORS— 61.11%
during 1993.
Source: Official records
The a ttendance can be fu rther sum m arised  as follows:
PERCENTAGE OF MEETINGS AT 
WHICH MEMBERS WERE PRESENT 
OR SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER OF MEMBERS
100% 2
> 90-< 100% 5
>80-90% 4
> 70-80% 3
> 60-70% 1
50-60% 7
< 50% 8
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Source: Official records 
Interventions
The tab le a t APPENDIX X illustrates the  nu m b er of in terventions of m em bers a t 
reported  m eetings of th e  jo in t com m ittee. Excluding th e  chair, m inisters, 
substitu tes  and  visitors, a  to ta l of 404  in terventions are recorded a t full m eetings 
of th e  com m ittee and are p resen ted  in  the  following tab u la r form.
Table: 10.3 - Sum m ary of attendance at JCFA during 1993.
G overnm ent Opposition
Total percentage of 
interventions
36.39% 63.61%
Percentage of 
in terventions m ade by 
Deputies
23.02% 57.18%
Percentage of 
in terventions m ade by 
senators* *
13.37% 6.43%
N um ber of m em bers 
who m ade no 
interventions during 
1993
6 2
Table: 10.4 - Analysis of in terventions m ade a t JCFA  during  1993
Source: Official records
* * As indicated above, senators w ere eligible to a tten d  only n ine m eetings 
w hereas TDs could a ttend  a  m axim um  of 11.
E stim ates
The Select Com m ittee (m em bers of the Dail only] m et on tw o occasions in 1993 
to  consider estim ates proper to  th e  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs. On 18 Ju n e
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1993 the  com m ittee considered the ’Vote for Foreign Affairs’ (Parliam entary 
Debates, Dail E ireann, Select Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs [SCFA], Friday, 18 
J u n e  1993; FA1, No. 1, Col 3) am ounting  to £40.417 m illion (Col 34] and  the  
’Vote for International Co-operation’ totalling £38.8  m illion (Col 62). On 16 
D ecem ber, 1993 th e  select com m ittee w as fu rther p resen ted  w ith a 
supplem entary  estim ate  ’of £1,904,000 arising on th e  In ternational Co-operation 
Vote’
(SCFA, Thursday, 16 D ecem ber 1993; FA2, No. 5, Col 168).
In addition to th e  chairm an  (the late Brian Lenihan) and two m inisters, the 
debate on 18 J u n e  1993 a ttrac ted  a  total of fifteen speakers and  lasted  for four 
hours and  tw enty  five m inutes. This am ounted  to a  sum  of £298,932 per m inu te  
of debate or £5.28 million per speaker. The business relating to the 
supplem entary  estim ate w as concluded in one hour w ith five speakers excluding 
the  chair and  m inister. This equated  to £31,733 per m inu te  and  £380,800 per 
speaker. As indicated in  m y  consideration of th e  SCLS, th ese  figures are for 
illustrative purposes only, as a  scorecard-type approach  w ould serve little purpose 
in  th is study.
W hilst the  full range of in ternational m atters  cu rren t a t th a t tim e tended  to be
draw n into the  debate, m em bers used  the  occasion to ’consider the  effectiveness
of Irish foreign policy over th e  ...[previous] 12 m o n th s’ (Col 21). In addition Nora
Owen welcom ed in particu lar the  large nu m b er of officials from  the  D epartm ent
of Foreign Affairs p resen t as she  hoped
their involvem ent in  th is debate will be as useful to  th em  as it will be to 
us. It is very im portan t th a t th e  staff of th e  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs 
get an  opportunity  to in terac t w ith parliam entarians, an  in teraction  w hich 
w as not available prior to the  setting  up  of th is com m ittee.
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(SCFA, Friday, 18 J u n e  1993; FA1, No. 1, Cols 13 & 14), w hich underp ins the  
socialisation-enhancing potential of com m ittees as claim ed by  com m entators in 
chap ter four.
T hanking the  com m ittee a t the  conclusion of the  debate  on th e  m ain  estim ates, 
the  Tanaiste referred to ’inpu t from  th e  com m ittee in  relation to decisions m ade 
by Irish M inisters and  representatives a t foreign in ternational bodies and  fora’. He 
confirm ed th a t he w elcom ed such  inpu t by  th e  com m ittee ’in  the  context of the  
ongoing developm ent of foreign policy’ (Col 104). This constructive and  positive 
attitude w as still evident six  m onths later during  consideration of the  
supplem entary  estim ate w hen  th e  T anaiste  s ta ted  th a t  he  valued ’the 
contribution to be m ade in  discussions w ith  the com m ittee in  relation to  all our 
[overseas aid] p rogram m es’ (SCFA, T hursday, 16 D ecem ber 1993; FA2, No. 5, Col 
188).
L egislation
The only piece of legislation b rought before th e  jo in t com m ittee in  1993 w as the  
com m ittee stage of the  Diplomatic and  Consular Officers (Provision of Services) 
Bill, 1993. The records indicate th a t 19 deputies (76% of possible Dail 
representation) and  two senators (40% of possible Seanad representation) w ere 
listed as present. Seven TDs (37% of those show n as present) and  two senators 
(100% of those present) contributed  to th e  debate.
T hree am endm ents w ere proposed and  all w ere w ithdraw n as the  proposer w as 
happy  w ith th e  m in iste r’s  response w hich  w as to reconsider th e  m a tte r before
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Report Stage in two instances and  to refer the  rem ain ing  issue to th e  M inister for 
Ju stice  for early action (SCFA, Thursday, 11 N ovem ber 1993; FA2, No. 1, Cols 
8,9 & 28). This la tte r item  w hich related  to  the  g rea t delay in  gran ting  Irish 
citizenship to  eligible applicants who had  paid the  appropriate fees for th is service 
in  em bassies and  m issions abroad a ttrac ted  cross-party  support. One depu ty  
(Enda Kenny), supporting  a n  am endm ent com m ented  th a t ’one of th e  values of 
the  com m ittee system  ... is highlighted by an  issue su ch  as this. T he ex ten t and 
detail of discussion on th is  am endm ent would no t have been  possible during  a 
Com m ittee Stage debate  in  p lenary  session’ (Col 18). It transp ired  th a t the  m atte r 
w as really the  responsibility of another m in ister and  no t relevant to th e  particu lar 
piece of legislation under consideration. However th e  com m ittee m andated  the  
Minister of S tate a t th e  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs w ho w as "piloting" th is  Bill 
th rough the  O ireachtas to ’w rite to the M inister [for Justice] w ith  th e  full w eight 
of th is com m ittee behind ... [the] suggestion th a t th is  m a tte r  be dealt w ith  very 
quickly’ (Col 22).
Other a ctiv ities  o f th e  com m ittee
A part from consideration of the  estim ates and  the  single piece of legislation 
referred to it a t C om m ittee Stage, the  jo in t com m ittee engaged in  a nu m b er of 
m eetings of both  th e  full com m ittee and  several m eetings of sub-com m ittees 
relating to the United Nations and  the  European Com m unity.
A feature of all these  m eetings was the  a ttendance of m any  non-parliam entarians 
w ith  expertise of a  num ber of areas who appeared  before th e  com m ittee (and su b ­
com m ittees) to  brief the  m em bers on a  large range of issues.
In 1993 the  com m ittee debated  developm ents in  Liberia, Bosnia and  E ast T im or 
[14 Ju ly  1993]; th e  Opsahl Report relating to  N orthern Ireland and  "Third World 
Debt" [22 S eptem ber 19931; Som alia and  nuclear w eapons [20 October 1993]; 
Angola and  S udan [5 Novem ber 1993]; GATT negotiations, South Africa and  the  
Middle E ast [24 Novem ber 1993]; Cam bodia and  V ietnam  [8 D ecem ber 1993]. In 
addition the United Nations sub-com m ittee d iscussed  the  role of th e  UN in  m any 
parts  of the globe and  in  particu lar Ireland’s partic ipation in UN projects.
A sub-com m ittee dealing w ith  EC affairs w as created  during th is year w hich 
studied  EC legislation and  received subm issions from m any  sources particularly  
agricultural and  trade  related  (including th e  form er Irish EU Com m issioner Ray 
MacSharry] as th e  GATT negotiations w ere of critical im portance to Ireland a t 
th a t tim e. O’Halpin (1996] records th a t th is la tte r  sub-com m ittee ’w as confronted 
w ith  the fam iliar problem  of an  im m ense backlog of docum ents to consider - 
217 .’ He adds th a t th e  m em bers resolved to adopt a  proactive approach  and  
com m ence business w ith  pending legislation w here the  m em bers w ould ’have a 
m eaningful in p u t’ (JCFA, 14 Ju ly , 1993, Cols 151-64].
M embers of the  com m ittee form ed part of delegations to Brussels, Copenhagen, 
Israel, Palestine, New York in pu rsu it of th e ir duties and  also heard  first-hand 
reports from w itnesses fam iliar w ith  Angola, South  E ast Asia, Som alia and  m any  
other places.
Comment
It m ight be easy to criticise m em bers of th e  com m ittee undertak ing  som e of the
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foreign trips indicated above. However th is  aspect of their w ork m u s t be coupled 
w ith th e  m any  hours devoted to com m ittees and  the  th en  two sub-com m ittees by 
a relatively sm all pool of nom inated parliam entarians. Most of th e  m em bers 
would have had  o ther parliam entary  du ties to perform  in  addition to the  
constituency dem ands placed upon  them . It w ould be reasonable to assum e th a t 
there would be little local kudos to  be gained from  investing huge am ounts of 
energy and  in terest in  som e of the  issues pu rsued  by the  com m ittee and  credit 
m u st therefore be  bestow ed upon th em  for so doing.
In addition to th e  work outlined above the  com m ittee produced a  report en titled  
"Report on th e  A gricultural A spects of the  G eneral A greem ent on Tariffs and  
Trade" in  D ecem ber 1993. This report w as the  culm ination of a  y ea r’s w ork 
involving consultation w ith  all th e  relevant in terested  parties. The jo in t 
com m ittee proposed a  series of eleven proposals for consideration by  the 
governm ent in  relation to  th is  m atter.
From  a s tudy  of th e  reports of proceedings during  the  year, it is clear th a t the 
com m ittee faced th e  usual handicaps associated w ith O ireachtas com m ittees. 
These include lack of resources including staffing, clashes of parliam entary  
business and poor m edia attention. W hilst th is com m ittee operated  in  th e  m ain  in 
a less adversarial fashion th an  other com m ittees I have exam ined, th e  instinctive 
political prejudices surfaced on occasion and  the te rm s of reference, perhaps 
wisely stifled m em b ers’ a ttem p ts  to transfer elem ents of trad itional political 
in teraction to th is com m ittee w hich by and  large acted  as an  inform ation 
gathering body in  1993, its first year of existence.
CHAPTER 11 - JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 1994
The com m ittee continued th e  w ork began in  1993 in the  area  of foreign affairs. 
The m em bers afforded m uch  tim e to the  full com m ittee, th e  four sub-com m ittees, 
the bureau, various informal (and unrecorded) m eetings, foreign travel in  addition 
to the  s tudy  of docum entation, subm issions and  briefing no tes supplied  relating 
to th e  issues under discussion. T he form al consideration by th e  Select Com m ittee 
(m em bers of the  Dail only) of th e  estim ates for th e  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs 
and  the  processing of the  com m ittee stage of one piece of legislation w as also 
undertaken . Given th a t th is w as no t prim arily  a  legislative com m ittee, m uch  
atten tion  was devoted to a  range of in ternational issues and  Irish foreign policy.
A ttendance
Official records are available for m any  of th e  m eetings of th e  com m ittee and sub ­
com m ittees. It is clear however from a s tudy  of th e  records th a t m any  o ther 
informal m eetings took place in addition to several instances w here the 
com m ittee decided to consider certain  sensitive m atte rs  in  private session. 
Exam ples of th is included consideration of security  m atte rs  in  N orthern Ireland 
and  som e discussions w ith am bassadors of a  num ber of countries.
My exam ination of th e  attendance records of th e  individual m em bers a t m eetings 
of the  com m ittee indicate th a t there  w ere tw enty  one m eetings of th e  full
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com m ittee in  1994. Of these  senators w ere eligible to  a tten d  and  partic ipate  in  
tw enty  m eetings as th e  Dail m em bers had  suprem acy  in  financial/estim ates 
m atters. A ttendances w ere recorded as follows
NAME TOTAL OF
POSSIBLE
MEETINGS
NUMBER 
RECORDED 
AS PRESENT
NUMBER
SUBSTITUTED
NUMBER
AT
WHICH
MEMBER
SPOKE
AHERN N. 21 18 (85.71%) 0 1 (4.76%)
BARRETT S. 21 11 (52.38%) 2 (9.52%) 5 (23.81%)
BREE D. 21 17 (80.95%) 0 9 (42.86%)
BRISCOE B. 21 17 (80.95%) 0 11
(52.38%)
COLLINS G. 21 1 (4.76%) 1 (4.76%) 0
CONNOR J . 21 17 (80.95%) 0 17
(80.95%)
COX P. 21 see note 2 (9.52%) 0 2 (9.52%)
DAVERN N. 21 0 1 (4.76%) 0
DE ROSSA P. 21 11 (52.38%) 1 (4.76%) 10
(47.62%)
DURKAN B. 21 16 (76.19%) 1 (4.76%) 12
(57.14%)
ELLIS J . 21 14 (66.67%) 1 (4.76%) 1 (4.76%)
FERRIS M. 21 10 (47.62%) 1 (4.76%) 6 (28.57%)
GALLAGHER 
P. (L/O)
21 13 (61.90%) 1 (4.76%) 10
(47.62%)
HOGAN P. 21 5 (23.81%) 2 (9.52%) 1 (4.76%)
LAWLOR L. 21 3 (14.29%) 2 (9.52%) 1 (4.76%)
LENIHAN B. 21 13 (61.90%) 1 (4.76%) CHAIR
LOWRY M. 21 7 (33.33%) 1 (4.76%) 0
McDOWELL
M.
21 6 (28.57%) 2 (9.52%) 5 (23.81%)
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MORLEY P. 
J .
21 13 (61.90%) 1 (4.76%) 0
0 ’HANLON 
R.
21 15 (71.43%) 1 (4.76%) 9 (42.86%)
O’KEEFE J . 21 14 (66.67%) 3 (14.29%) 10
(47.62%)
OWEN N. 21 17 (80.95%) 2 (9.52%) 17
(80.95%)
PENROSE W. 21 10 (47.62%) 0 0
RYAN E. 21 10 (47.62%) 0 1 (4.76%)
RYAN S. 21 8 (38.10%) 0 0
SENATORS 
DALY B.
20 15 (75%) 0 4 (20%)
LANIGAN M. 20 16 (80%) 0 12 (60%)
MALONEY S. 20 13 (65%) 1 (5%) 3 (15%)
NORRIS D. 20 13 (65%) 1 (5%) 10 (50%)
TAYLOR- 
QUINN M.
20 15 (75%) 0 10 (50%)
Table: 11.1 - A ttendance and  contributions by  m em bers a t JCFA during 1994
Source: Parliam entary  debates - official records.
Note -in the  course of the  year D eputy P at Cox resigned as a  m em ber of Dail 
E ireann following his election to th e  E uropean parliam ent. He w as replaced m id­
year by Des O’Malley.
The a ttendance ra te  can  be sum m arised  as follows:
Percentage of m eetings 
a t w hich m em bers 
a ttended  or were 
substitu ted
N um ber of m em bers Com parison w ith 1993
100% - -2
> 90  < 100% 1 -4
>80 -90% 6 + 2
> 70  -80% 5 + 2
> 60  -70% 6 + 5
50 -60% 2 -5
<50% 10 + 2
Table: 11.2 - Sum m ary of a ttendance  a t reported m eetings of JCFA during 1994 
Source: Official records
The tab le show s a  decrease in  the  higher level of a ttendance  in  th is second year 
com pared to year one.
M embers of th e  Dail recorded a  51.05%  a ttendance ra te  [arrived a t by  m ultiplying 
the  num ber of deputies (25) by  th e  nu m b er of possible m eetings (21) and  
com paring th e  resu lt to th e  actual to tal of a ttendances by  m em bers], w hilst 
senators m anaged  a  72% rate.
G overnm ent supporters (Fianna Fail and  Labour) reg istered  a 54.93%  attendance 
ra te  as com pared to opposition m em bers w ith  a 53.6%  record.
It should be stressed  th a t these  figures above refer only to th e  m eetings of th e  full 
com m ittee during  the  year and  a ttendance a t o ther sub-com m ittee m eetings, 
private sessions and  bureau  m eetings are no t included.
An exam ination of the  list of those  w ho a ttended  com m ittee m eetings during the  
year indicates th a t a  num ber of th e  Irish m em bers of bo th  th e  E uropean 
parliam ent (MEPs) and  th e  parliam entary  assem bly of th e  Council of Europe
availed of their right to a ttend  and  partic ipate (without voting rights] a t m eetings 
of the  com m ittee. The following MEPs attended  a t least once during 1994 - 
Cooney, Lalor, Hume, McKenna, Killilea and A hem  (Nuala]. O ther MEPs - 
Andrews, Fitzsim ons and  Pat the  Cope Gallagher a ttended  som e of the  sub ­
com m ittee m eetings relating to EC legislation th roughou t th e  year 
notw ithstanding  the  reference m ade to the  difficulties im posed on MEPs in 
attend ing  Irish parliam entary  m eetings during the  w eek w hen  the  European 
parliam ent w as in  session (Parliam entary Debates, Jo in t Com m ittee on Foreign 
Affairs [JCFA], W ednesday, 2 Novem ber 1994; Vol. FA4, No.8; Col 209). M embers 
of the  Irish delegation to the  parliam entary  assem bly of th e  Council of Europe 
who attended  m eetings included Mattie Brennan, Michael Kitt and  A ustin Deasy.
Participation
The table at APPENDIX XI illustrates the  nu m b er of in terven tions by individual 
m em bers a t full m eetings of th e  com m ittee.
Excluding th e  interventions of substitu tes, visitors and  th e  chair (Linehan, Owen 
and O’Hanlon) there  were a to tal of 488 contributions to  the  full m eetings of the 
com m ittee during the year. T he governm ent parties - F ianna Fail and  Labour - 
can  be credited  w ith  144 in terventions (29.5%) and  the  com bined opposition w ith 
344 (70.5%).
The above da ta  can  be sum m arised  as follows
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GOVERNMENT OPPOSITION
MEMBERSHIP 60% 40%
ATTENDANCE 54.93% 53.6%
PARTICIPATION 29.5% 70.5%
MEMBERS WITH NO 
CONTRIBUTIONS RECORDED IN 1994
5 0
PARTICIPATION BY SENATORS ONLY 8.8% 8.8%
Table: 11.3 - Sum m ary of participation at reported m eetings of the JCFA, 1994. 
Source: Official records
E stim ates
The Select com m ittee exam ined th e  estim ates for the  D epartm ent of Foreign 
Affairs on 12 May, 1994. A m ounts of £41,018,000 for th e  office of th e  M inister for 
Foreign Affairs and  £57,797,000 for in ternational co-operation were requ ired  for 
the  year ending 31 Decem ber, 1994 (1994 revised estim ates for Public Services, 
pp. 184-188). T hus th e  g rand  to tal for the  estim ate relating to  th is departm en t 
and  w hich w as considered by th e  Select com m ittee w as £98,815,000. T he debate 
w hich lasted  for four hours and  tw enty  five m inu tes a ttrac ted  a to tal of seven 
speakers (three governm ent and  four opposition) excluding th e  chair and  
attending  m inisters. A to tal of seventy  in terventions w ere recorded during  the  
debate of w hich the  governm ent m em bers m ade seven (10%) and  the opposition 
63 (90%). This study  of th e  estim ates by the  com m ittee indicates th a t a  su m  of 
£372,887 per m inu te of debate  and  £14,116,428 per speaker w as approved.
The T anaiste (who w as also M inister for Foreign Affairs) in  h is  s ta tem en t to the  
com m ittee referred to the  key  role of th e  com m ittee w hich h ad  ’helped to  ensure
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th a t im portan t foreign policy issues receive[d] th e  a tten tion  and  inform ed debate
they  deserve[d] (SCFA, Thursday , 12 May 1994, Vol. FA3, No. 17, Col 592]. T he
debate ranged over the  expected  variety of in ternational m atte rs  and  w ere in 'th e
m ain  non-controversial. Speaking for th e  Progressive D em ocrats, Michael
McDowell was com plim entary  of the  com m ittee and  th e  m an n er of its chairing
This com m ittee is th e  one w hich is least divided on party  lines, the  m ost 
constructive in  its procedures and  th e  m ost open to  participation by all of 
its m em bers. The m an n er in  w hich th e  com m ittee functions is a  m odel for 
o ther com m ittees of th e  O ireachtas ... [we] w elcom e the  openness and 
success w ith  w hich its  activities have been  m et in th e  various fields it has 
investigated
(SCFA, T hursday, 12 May 1994, Vol. FA3, No. 17, Col 604).
This speaker how ever w ent on to deplore th e  fact th a t a t th a t tim e there  w as no 
exam ination of any  delegated European legislation as envisaged would be the 
case w hen the  com m ittee w as initially established. [This defect w as rectified later 
in the  year w hen a sub-com m ittee com m enced w ork in  th is  area.]
L egislation
As indicated above the  com m ittee considered and  com pleted th e  com m ittee stage 
of ju s t  one piece of legislation during  1994. T he E uropean Com m unities 
(Amendment] Bill, 1994 related  to  m atte rs  pertain ing  to  th e  th en  en largem ent of 
th e  EU through  the  accession of Austria, Finland, Sw eden and  (as th en  
anticipated) Norway.
Sub-com m ittees
Much of the  detailed w ork fell to the  sub-com m ittees c reated  to  consider areas of
concern to the com m ittee. There w ere four su ch  sub-com m ittees - N orthern 
Ireland chaired by J im  O’Keefe, Developm ent Co-operation chaired  by  Pat 
Gallagher [Laois/Offaly], E uropean legislation chaired by Rory O’H anlon and  
United Nations chaired by Nora Owen. Those records th a t are available indicate 
th a t these  sub-com m ittees m e t on five, ten, two and  two occasions respectively. A 
feature of these sub-com m ittees w hich s truck  m e on perusal of th e  official records 
was the  dedication of the  sm all band  of legislators, particu larly  the  chairpersons 
to th e  allotted tasks and  sub jec t areas. T he in terest and  com m itm ent of m em bers 
evident from th e  debates w ould appear to be far superio r to th a t observed in  
either o ther com m ittees or p lenary sessions of e ither house. This, I conclude 
m u st s tem  from th e  non-adversarial n a tu re  of th e  business of the sub-com m ittees 
coupled w ith the  apparen t in terest of m em bers in  their deliberations.
T he sub-com m ittees scored a num ber of "firsts" during  1994. The British 
am bassador’s appearance before the  N orthern Ireland sub-com m ittee was 
described as ’h istoric’ by m an y  m em bers as it w as ’th e  first tim e a  British 
A m bassador has spoken to  th e  O ireachtas or a com m ittee th e reo f (JCFA, 
W ednesday, 13 April 1994, Vol. FA3, No. 13, Cols 431,463,472). This sam e su b ­
com m ittee afforded Jo h n  H um e ’th e  first form al opportunity  ... to ta lk  to a  
com m ittee of ... [a] H ouse’ (JCFA, Friday, 1 Ju ly  1994, Vol. FA3, No. 21, Col 
849).
The sub-com m ittees d iscussed  a num ber of issues and  received m an y  visitors 
from overseas and  Ireland to  discuss m atte rs  of in terest. These included 
D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs personnel who briefed m em bers extensively, in 
private on m any  occasions, on the  cu rren t issues u nder consideration. Many
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activists working in  th e  area  of th ird  world developm ent appeared  before bo th  the 
Developm ent and  UN sub-com m ittees w hilst the  N orthern  Ireland sub-com m ittee 
m et w ith a  range of political leaders from a  n u m b er of parties in  N orthern Ireland 
to discuss m atters  of m u tual interest.
A ctiv ities o f the fu ll com m ittee
T he com m ittee considered a num ber of m atte rs  and  received m an y  w itnesses 
from a wide range of organisations. In m any  case deliberations by th e  com m ittee 
resu lted  in resolutions being forw arded to th e  D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs and  
the cabinet. Reports w ere also published by  the  com m ittee relating to th ird  world 
deb t (April) and  th e  en largem ent of the  E uropean Union (September), bo th  of 
w hich contained several succinct recom m endations. T hese reports w ere the 
culm ination of work u n d ertak en  by  the  com m ittee, w ith  th e  support of a 
consu ltan t in  th e  la tte r case, and  followed th e  receip t of contributions from  a 
range of in terested  and  qualified contributors in  th e  fields u nder exam ination. 
Other subjects considered by th e  com m ittee w ere the  Opsahl report (relating to 
N orthern Ireland), events in H ungary, E uropean security  developm ents, E uropean 
ethnic conflicts, political developm ents in  N orthern Ireland, Form er Yugoslavia, 
Cuba, A ustrian accession to th e  EU, EU affairs, US foreign policy, Rwanda, 
Burundi, developm ents in  Poland, Pakistan, M ozambique, East Tim or,
Portuguese m atters , A m erican/Cuba relations, bom bings in  Tel Aviv and th e  
w hite paper on foreign policy. I list these  sub jects in  order to illustrate th e  great 
b read th  of expertise requ ired  to be possessed by m em bers in order to m anage the 
consideration of each of th e  above m atte rs  in a professional and  productive
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manner.
As indicated above, the  com m ittee regularly forw arded resolutions to m in isters 
concerning item s considered. In addition th e  com m ittee m ade subm issions to the  
M inister for Foreign Affairs during the receipt of subm issions relating to th e  th en  
forthcom ing w hite paper on foreign policy (D epartm ent of Foreign Affairs, 1996, 
p .342).
A clash  w ith the  governm ent was observed over the  m a tte r  of th e  C uban 
em bargo. The com m ittee had  devoted som e considerable tim e to hearing  
evidence from both  the  A m erican authorities, w hen officials from  th e  US em bassy  
a ttended  to explain and  defend US policy ’for w hich th ere  ... little support on th is 
com m ittee’ (JCFA, W ednesday, 12 October 1994, Vol. FA4, No. 6, Col 174) and  
the  Cuban am bassador to th e  UK (JCFA, W ednesday, 19 October 1994, Vol. FA4, 
No. 7, Col 180). T he com m ittee had  ’recom m ended th a t Ireland vote in favour of 
the m otion to w ithdraw  th e  em bargo’ w hen a  m otion relating  to Cuba w as being 
considered a t th e  UN in  November, 1994 (JCFA, W ednesday, 23 Novem ber 1994, 
Vol. FA4, No. 10, Col 300). M embers had  given careful consideration to the  issues 
involved, heard  both  sides and  engaged in long and  detailed discussion of the 
pros and  cons of the  m a tte r  before issuing th e ir unan im ous recom m endation 
outlined above (Cols 300, 301 8s 302).
It transpired  th a t Ireland abstained  on th e  m otion a t the  UN and th is  drew  the  
anger of the com m ittee. One deputy, J im  O’Keefe of Fine Gael, recorded his 
’d isappointm ent th a t th e  recom m endation, the  first of its k ind since th e  form ation 
of the com m ittee, w as not acted  on by th e  G overnm ent’ (Col 301). O ther
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m em bers also expressed th e ir anger a t the  s ituation  and  the  potential dam age
th is could cause to  th e  relevance of O ireachtas com m ittees. This w as s ta ted  by
the  acting chair - Nora Owen w hen she  stated:
My biggest d isappoin tm ent on th is m a tte r  is in  respect of th ese  com m ittees 
and  their efficacy, and  in respect of th e  im portance of all of us w orking 
together as m ulti-party  com m ittees w here w e reach  th is k ind of unan im ous 
decision ... we hope th a t w hoever is M inister for Foreign Affairs ... will be 
prepared as far as possible to listen  to a  properly elected com m ittee of th e  
two Houses of the  O ireachtas
(JCFA, W ednesday, 23 Novem ber 1994, Vol. FA4, No.10, Col 304).
The unsatisfactory  situation  as far as the  com m ittee w as concerned drew  th e
> r
following caustic com m ents from Declan Bree of th e  Labour p arty  (which a t th a t
stage had  ju s t pulled out of governm ent w ith  F ianna Fail):
the  views of th e  Jo in t Com m ittee have been  trea ted  w ith con tem pt by th e  
outgoing Cabinet. In the  light of th is débàcle, we m u st ask  What is the  
future role of the  Jo in t Com m ittee.
(Col 305]
T he com m ittee resolved to  w rite to th e  M inister for Foreign Affairs to  convey their 
d isappointm ent in  the  m atter.
This episode would appear to  illustrate the  fact th a t regardless of the  s ta ted  views 
(in th is case unanim ous) of a  com m ittee of th e  legislature, th e  h arsh  reality  
rem ained th a t a  final decision in  the  m atter, tak en  by  th e  executive, w as in  
contrast to the  w ishes of th e  com m ittee. This tends to confirm  th a t th e  real power 
in these  instances lies w ith  th e  executive and  no t the  legislators.
The disappointm ent felt by  th e  com m ittee m em bers a t th e  action of the  
governm ent in  ignoring their views in  relation  to Cuba w as perhaps
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understandable given their som ew hat inflated sense  of th e ir role. T hroughout th e  
debates during 1994 references w ere m ade to  th e  perceived relationship  w ith  th e  
governm ent. It m ay  be th a t the  com m ittee "overstepped th e  m ark" in  assum ing  
th a t their will w ould prevail. There w ere occasions w here m em bers h ad  
m isgivings concerning certa in  aspects of governm ent perform ance and  w ished to 
voice their concerns as instanced  by  a  w ish to  d iscuss ’recen t speeches of th e  
T anaiste and  the  Taoiseach on the  security  aspects  of E uropean  Union and  policy 
in respect of th a t’ (JCFA, T hursday, 20 Ja n u a ry  1994, Vol. FA3, No.2, Col 91). 
A lthough m inisters w ho appeared  before th e  com m ittee undertook  to  consider 
m em bers’ views, th e  com m itm ent, in  th e  m ain, w as to  convey views expressed  
by th e  com m ittee to  th e  relevant m in isters (JCFA, W ednesday, 27 Ju ly  1994,
Vol. FA3, No.24, Col 1007). Certainly th e  com m ittee appeared  to  accep t on m any  
occasions th a t th e  correct avenue for it w as ’to  report form ally ... to  th e  Houses of 
th e  O ireachtas and  th e  M inisters for ... ’ (JCFA, T hursday , 1 F ebruary  1994, Vol. 
FA3, No.3, Col 103) w hen seeking u rg en t action on th ird  world d eb t and  later 
w hen discussing th e  R w andan crisis and  appreciating th e  urgency  of th e  m atter, 
it agreed to pass its resolution ’to the  T an a iste ’ presum ably  for action (JCFA, 
W ednesday, 25 May 1994, Vol. FA3, No. 18, Col 703). T he com m ittee w as of th e  
belief th a t it had  som e influence w ith  the  governm ent and  exam ples of how  it 
proposed to exercise it w ere evident during  a  sub-com m ittee debate on 1 
February, 1994 w hen  D eputy Ferris seem ed to  advance th e  notion of an  ’opinion 
of the  O ireachtas as opposed to  th e  G overnm ent’s opinion’ (Col 119) and  im plied 
th a t th is could th e n  be used  to p ressure  m in isters  into a  course of action favoured 
by  the  com m ittee. In  a  sim ilar vein Nora Owen asserted  (whilst chairing a 
m eeting of the  sub-com m ittee on th e  U nited Nations) th a t p ressu re  ’from  th is 
com m ittee would en su re ’ th a t a  convention on land  m ines ’would be ratified in
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the n ex t Dail session’ (JCFA, W ednesday, 6 Ju ly  1994, Vol. FA3, No.22, Col 910).
This apparen t flexing of th e  legislature’s m uscles w as vividly illustrated  by th e  
sam e deputy  a t ano ther m eeting  w hen, in troducing  the  P residen t of the  E uropean 
Affairs com m ittee of th e  Portuguese parliam ent, she  alluded to  a  recen tly  enacted  
Portuguese ’law w hich will require m inisters to  com e to th e  parliam ent before 
decisions are m ade a t [European] council m eetings. T ha t does no t happen  here, 
b u t m em bers have suggested i t ... Did your com m ittee ... s tress  th e  need  for th a t 
legislation’ (JCFA, Friday, 7 October 1994, Vol. FA4, No.5, Col 118).
O bservations on com m ittee a c tiv itie s  during 1994
A feature of th e  w ork of th is com m ittee w as the  extensive am oun t of foreign 
travel undertaken  by its m em bers. Reference w as m ade in  th e  official records of 
1994 to travel to  Lebanon, Somalia, South Africa, A thens, New York, Cyprus, 
Cairo, Brussels, China, Bonn, W ashington, Paris, Lisbon an d  also to  m eetings of 
th e  W estern E uropean Union. From  a s tu d y  of th e  com m ittee proceedings, it is 
clear th a t th is  travel together w ith  a  w ide range of "good briefing" supplied by 
officials and  w itnesses (Cols 108,684) con tribu ted  to  a  professional understand ing  
of th e  issues by th e  m em bers and  w as clearly of benefit to  those m em bers 
anxious to increase the ir expertise in  selected foreign affairs m atters . In addition 
there would appear to be an  elem ent of feedback from  th ese  visits to  D epartm ent 
of Foreign Affairs officials - an  exam ple of w hich  w as a  req u est by  th a t 
departm ent to ’arrange a debriefing of th e  people who w ere in  South Africa for 
the  elections’ (JCFA, W ednesday, 11 May 1994, Vol. FA3, No.16, Col 568). On a 
m ore m undane y e t practical level th e  nom ination of Senator B rendan Daly to
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attend  a pan-European transport conference drew  laughter a t a m eeting  of th e
com m ittee on 2 February, 1994 causing the  acting chairm an  to com m ent by w ay
of explanation to  a  visiting H ungarian delegation:
I do no t know  w hether you understood the  slight air of laugh ter there, b u t 
Senator Daly has been  recom m ended to a ttend  a conference abroad and 
his colleague from a different party  in  his constituency  w as very  willing to 
let h im  go and  leave her free to w ork th e  constituency. I am  su re  th a t as 
politicians you will understand  the  dynam ics of th a t.
(JCFA, W ednesday, 2 February  1994, Vol. FA3, No.4, Col 132)
This served as a  rem inder th a t in  the  m idst of w orthy debates on in ternational 
topics, the  "bread and  butter" politics is never far below th e  surface.
The com m ittee continued to be dogged by  th e  ongoing handicap  of inferior 
resources (Cols 3, 622), pressure of o ther parliam entary  business leading to tim e 
restrictions (Col 106) and  difficulties on occasion w ith  th e  form ation of a quorum  
to conduct business and  th e  usual p lethora of housekeeping problem s. A classic 
exam ple of th e  above w as highlighted by  P at Gallagher of Laois/Offaly w hen 
pressing th e  need  for an  early decision in  order to  influence a particu lar m atte r 
referred to a sub-com m ittee w hich h ad  finalised a report on GATT too late as ’the 
decisions [in relation to  GATT] h ad  [already] been  tak en ’ (JCFA, T uesday, 1 
February 1994, Vol. FA3, No.3, Col 119).
On a m ore positive note the  com m ittee engaged in  m uch  dialogue w hich can  only 
have proved educational for its m em bers, w itnesses and  a ttend ing  officials. The 
non-adversarial, som ew hat consensual approach  adopted by  m em bers [which 
m irrors the expectations highlighted in  the  d iscussion in chap ter four] w as rarely 
shaken except for h in ts  of d isagreem ents over issues su ch  as neutrality , an  
exam ple of w hich can  be found in  th e  exchanges betw een D eputy Nora Owen and
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Senator Michael Lanigan during  a debate  on E uropean security  developm ents 
(JCFA, 9 February  1994, FA3, No.6, Cols 225/6). T he a ttendance  of a  range of 
contributors w ith  contrasting  views on m atte rs  su ch  as N orthern Ireland, Cuba 
and th e  EU continued  to be a useful forum  for legislators to hear and  advance 
ideas thereby  helping m em bers get ano ther perspective on issues o ther th an  the 
officially advanced position and  aided th e  m atu ring  and  independently  form ing 
process of Irish foreign policy consideration by th e  legislature albeit w ith  th e  
occasional painful rem inder of th e  sea t of real power. T hus th e  y ea r’s work 
should be viewed as a segm ent of th e  evolving role of th e  O ireachtas in Irish 
public affairs.
CHAPTER 12 -JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1995 AND 1996
1995 w itnessed th e  fallout following th e  change of governm ent as a  resu lt of the  
collapse of th e  Reynolds adm in istra tion  in  late 1994. W ith th e  consequent 
changes in  O ireachtas operations th e  com m ittee had  b u t one form al m eeting  w ith 
its original com position, te rm s of reference and  chairm an  before changes in 
personnel w ere organised by th e  new  regim e in  Leinster House.
New term s of reference w ere approved by  the  Dail (Dail D ebates, T hursday  9 
M arch 1995, Vol. 450, No. 4, Cols 772-792) and  by th e  Seanad (Seanad Debates, 
Monday 13 M arch 1995, Vol. 142, No. 7, Cols 789-794). T his h ad  th e  effect of 
altering th e  m em bership  com position of th e  jo in t com m ittee to  tw en ty  one 
deputies (previously tw enty  five) and  ten  senators (previously five). These 
changes can  be seen  as a  consequence to  th e  oft repeated  com plaints th a t 
deputies w ere overstretched in  a ttem pting  to service so m an y  com m ittees and  a  
view th a t senators had  been  u n d er rep resen ted  on jo in t com m ittees in  the  past.
The com m ittees of selection of bo th  Houses nom inated  th e  various m em bers to 
the  com m ittee on 10 March 1995 (Dail Debates, Friday 10 M arch 1995, Vol. 450, 
No. 5, Col 1077), 13 M arch 1995 (Seanad Debates, M onday 13 M arch 1995, Vol. 
142, No. 7, Col 956) and  14 M arch 1995. A m endm ents to  the  m em bersh ip  
occurred la ter in  th e  year following th e  dea ths of D eputies Lenihan and  Blaney.
The newly constitu ted  com m ittee m et for the  first tim e on 15 M arch 1995 and
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elected a governm ent backbencher, Alan Dukes as chairm an  and  an  opposition 
deputy, Ray Burke as vice-chairm an (JCFA, W ednesday 15 M arch 1995, FA5, No. 
2, Cols 67 & 68).
A ttendance
Following a decision by the adm inistration in Leinster House, w ith  the  
concurrence of the  com m ittee, to  cease publication of th e  official records of 
com m ittee m eetings (apart from the  processing of legislation and  consideration of 
estim ates) on th e  grounds th a t th is practice was no t "cost effective"1 , it has 
proven im possible to establish  a  realistic record of a tten d an ce  by the  m em bers. A 
total of n ine records w ere published  in 1995 (one of w hich re la ted  to the  outgoing 
com m ittee and  one solely devoted to an  address by the  P residen t of the  Republic 
of Hungary) and  three in 1996. However, no tw ithstanding  th e  lack of adequate 
inform ation coupled w ith the  failure of the  com m ittee to publish  annual reports2 
containing these  details, I propose to  outline such  a ttendance  records as are 
available for 1995 and  1996 purely  for the  sake of consistency in  m y 
m ethodology.
In 1995 one final m eeting of the  "first" JCFA w as held on 19 Ja n u a ry  w ith  the  
following a ttendance and contributions outlined in the  tab le  on the  following 
page:
1 Discussion w ith com m ittee secretaria t - Leinster House
2 as 1 above
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Name P resent S ubstitu ted N um ber of 
in terventions
A hem  N. P
B arrett S. S
Bree D. S
Briscoe B. P 3
Collins G.
Connor J . P 7
Cox P.
D avem  N.
De Rossa P. S
D urkan B. S
Ellis J . P 8
Ferris M.
Gallagher P. (L/O) P 4
Hogan P.
Lawlor L.
Lenihan B. P Chair
Lowry M.
McDowell M.
Morley P .J.
O’Hanlon R. P 1
O’Keefe J . P
Owen N. S
Penrose W. P
Ryan E.
Ryan S.
Senators 
Daly B.
P 1
Lanigan M. P 12
Maloney S. P 4
Norris D. P 5
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Taylor-Quinn M. P 11
Costello J. 1
L yn ch  K. 3
Table: 12.1 - Record of a ttendance and  in terventions a t final m eeting of th e  first 
JCFA, 19 Ja n u a ry  1995.
Note - (i) th e  m any sub stitu tes  above arose in the  m ain  from  the  appo in tm ent of 
m em bers as m inisters and  m in isters of s ta te  following th e  change of governm ent 
and  to w hich I referred earlier during  th e  discussion on th e  role of parliam ent as 
an  educator of m em bers and  (ii) th e  nam es in  italics con tribu ted  to the m eeting  
as substitu tes.
T he rem aining records of th e  proceedings of six  jo in t and  one select com m ittee 
m eetings in 1995 and the  th ree  reported  m eetings of th e  select com m ittee in 
1996 reveal the following a ttendances and  contributions:
Name M axim um Present S ubstitu ted N um ber a t
w hich
contributed
A heam  T. 10 6 (60%) 1 (10%) 1 (10%)
Blaney N.3 10 4 (40%) 0 3 (30%)
Bree D. 10 9 (90%) 0 4 (40%)
Briscoe B. 10 9 (90%) 1 (10%) 7 (70%)
Burke R. 10 9 (90%) 0 8 (80%)
Connolly G. 10 7 (70%) 0 2 (20%)
Connor J . 10 6 (60%) 0 5 (50%)
Deasy A. 10 7 (70%) 0 4 (40%)
Dukes A. 104 9 (90%) 1 (10%) Chair
Ferris M. 10 8 (80%) 1 (10%) 6 (60%)
Gallagher P. (L/O) 10 9 (90%) 1 (10%) 7 (70%)
Kitt M. 10 7 (70%) 0 4 (40%)
3 Deceased in  Novem ber 1995 and replaced by  T. Gregory
4 Resigned D ecem ber 1996
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Lenihan B.5 10 5 (50%] 1 (10%) 3 (30%)
McDaid J . 10 4 (40%] 2 (20%) 0
Morley P. J . 10 7 (70%) 0 0
Mulvihill J .6 10 8 (80%) 0 2 (20%)
O’Hanlon R. 10 6 (60%) 0 3 (30%)
O’Keefe J . 10 8 (80%) 0 6 (60%)
O’Malley D. 10 7 (70%) 0 2 (20%)
Penrose W. 10 8 (80%) 0 3 (30%)
S hatter A. 10 6 (60%) 0 3 (30%)
Senators 
Daly B.
6 5 (83.33%) 0 2 (33.33%)
E nright T. 6 4 (66.67%) 0 2 (33.33%)
Gallagher A. 6 2 (33.33%) 1 (16.67%) 1 (16.67%)
Howard M. 6 4 (66.67%) 0 3 (50%)
Lanigan M. 6 4 (66.67%) 2 (33.33%) 4 (66.67%)
Maloney S. 6 4 (66.67%) 0 2 (33.33%)
Mooney P. 6 4 (66.67%) 1 (16.67%) 2 (33.33%)
Norris D. 6 4 (66.67%) 0 4 (66.67%)
O’Kennedy M. 6 6 (100%) 0 5 (83.33%)
Taylor-Quinn M. 6 6 (100%) 0 5 (83.33%)
Table: 12.2 - A ttendance and  contributions of reported  m eetings of new  SCFA and  
JCFA 1995 and  1996.
The above attendance (including substitution) can  be sum m arised  as follows:
5 Deceased in Novem ber 1995 and  replaced by  B. Cowen (not on record]
6 Discharged and  replaced by  E. W alsh on 6/4/95
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Percentage of m eetings a t w hich 
m em bers a ttended  or w ere 
substitu ted
N um ber of m em bers
100% 6
> 90  -< 100% -
> 80 -90% 5
> 70 -80% 3
> 60 -70% 10
50 -60% 6
< 50% 1
Table: 12.3 - Sum m ary of a ttendance a t reported  m eetings of SCFA and  JCFA 
during 1995 and  1996.
Source: Official records
Insofar as these rep resen t a snapshot of the a ttendance p a tte rn  of m em bers 
a t m eetings of the JCFA during  1995 and 1996 and  assum ing  th a t th ey  w ere 
reciprocated a t o ther unreported  m eetings during  th a t period, they  p resen t a 
favourable attendance rate. T he figures indicate a  75.56 p er cen t a ttendance  rate  
overall including a 74.76 p er cen t a ttendance by  TDs and  78.33 per cen t 
a ttendance from senators. T he governm ent supporters recorded a 77.86 per cent 
a ttendance w hilst th e  opposition m em bers are credited  w ith  a  73.08 per cen t 
overall a ttendance. During th is  period one MEP (Patricia McKenna) a ttended  
twice and one delegate to th e  Council of Europe (Mattie Brennan) paid one visit to 
the  com m ittee. It should be rem em bered  th a t o thers m ay  have attended  m eetings 
of sub-com m ittees or o ther unreported  m eetings during  th is  period.
Interventions
The table a t A ppendix XII indicates the num ber of in terventions by all speakers 
excluding th e  chairs and  m in isters  for those published records of m eetings.
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E stim ates
Given th a t the au thorities w ere obliged to  publish  the  proceedings considering 
departm ental estim ates, it is possible to com m ent on the  com m ittee’s 
consideration of sam e in  bo th  1995 and 1996.
T he 1995 estim ates w ere exam ined by th e  select com m ittee  (deputies only] on  7 
Ju n e , 1995. The tw o votes relating to th is com m ittee. Foreign Affairs and  
International Co-operation am ounted  to £121,238 m illion (1996 Revised 
E stim ates for th e  Public Service, p.ix). T he debate  lasted  for a period of four 
hours and  th irty  m inu tes and  a ttrac ted  a to ta l of ten  speakers apart from  the 
chairm an  and attend ing  m in isters and  tw en ty  th ree  interventions. This pans ou t 
a t £449,030 per m inute, £12,123,800 per speaker and  £5,271,217 per 
intervention.
T he 1996 estim ates w ere considered on 15 and  16 May 1996 w ith  a 
supplem entary  estim ate exam ined on 4 D ecem ber, 1996. T he to tal am oun t of 
both  votes considered by the  com m ittee w as £143,765 ,000  (1996 Revised 
E stim ates for th e  Public Service, pp. 189 8s 193) and  (SCFA, W ednesday 4 
D ecem ber 1996, FA7, No. 1, Col 3). Excluding th e  chair and  relevant m in isters 
th e  debate on the  principal estim ates drew  eight speakers and  eighteen 
in terventions w hich equals £17,845,625 p er speaker, £7 ,931,389 per in tervention  
and  £634,511 per m inu te  of debate  as th e  to tal tim e allocated to th is  ta sk  w as 
th ree  hours and  forty five m inu tes (SCFA, W ednesday 15 May 1996, FA6, No. 1) 
and  (SCFA, T hursday  16 May 1996, FA6, No. 2).
M embers’ Role
The T anaiste in his contribution to one of the  reported  sessions of th e  com m ittee 
continued to praise the w ork of the  m em bers and  the ir inpu t into the  
exam ination of Irish foreign policy. He described th e ir w ork as ’a  welcom e 
contribution’ to the  inform ed and inclusive debate on issues and  saw  th e  
com m ittee w ith ’a  vital ro le’ in the  harnessing  of public confidence and  support 
for fu ture Irish policy (JCFA, 7 Ju n e  1995, FA5, No. 9, Cols 313 & 317) [which it 
could be argued is one of th e  functions of parliam ent- referred to  by  Bagehot in 
the  literature as its ’teaching  function’]. This, if b rought to its logical conclusion, 
w ould correspond, to a  certa in  ex tent, w ith  the  policy-influencing function of 
parliam ent outlined in  chap ter one.
It is clear from the  lim ited published record of proceedings th a t th e  com m ittee 
saw  as part of its role the  acquisition of know ledge and  inform ation concerning 
m atte rs  falling w ithin its  brief prior to the  subm ission  of reports and  
recom m endations to the  O ireachtas and  governm ent. Quite a  lot of tim e w as 
devoted by th e  com m ittee to  hearing w itnesses and  being inform ed abou t a  range 
of m atters. One deputy  (John Connor) w as of the  view th a t th is com m ittee was 
well served by the  appearance of ’eye w itnesses to certa in  events in  th e  w orld’ 
(JCFA, W ednesday 15 M arch 1995, FA5, No. 2, Col 72). Being ’inform ed abou t ... 
s ituations’ was deem ed to  be ’a vital part of our w ork as m em bers of th e  
O ireachtas’ according to th e  chairm an  (JCFA, W ednesday 3 May 1995, FA5, No. 
8, Col 300). This sam e speaker described its  w ork as ’a  Jo in t Com m ittee on 
Foreign Affairs w hich w ishes to inform itself as closely as possible on all of the 
relevant factors on ... issue[s]’ (JCFA, T uesday 28 M arch 1995, FA5, No. 4, Col
1 9 8
164) before coming to conclusions.
One w ay of increasing know ledge about issues in different regions in  th e  world 
w as to travel to th e  areas concerned. The records indicate th a t som e m em bers 
visited Paris, Russia, Taiw an, Tanzania, U ganda and  Rw anda w ith  a  visit to 
Nigeria banned by  the  authorities there. It is likely th a t o ther foreign journeys 
w ere undertaken  by  m em bers in 1995 and 1996. These journeys w ere defended 
by the com m ittee, one m em ber of w hich (Ben Briscoe) s ta ted  ’we are no t going on 
junkets: we are going ou t to inform  ourselves and  to  be inform ed so th a t we can  
m ake w orthw hile con tribu tions’ (JCFA, W ednesday 7 J u n e  1995, FA5, No. 9, Col 
352).
In addition to  travelling to key  regions of th e  world and  interview ing w itnesses, or 
receiving subm issions, the  p rim ary  source of inform ation for m em bers w as to be 
found in the  briefing docum entation  supplied in  th e  m ain  by the  D epartm ent of 
Foreign Affairs. This briefing was usually  gratefully received by th e  m em bers 
being described quite often as "very good", "up to  date" and  "excellent". One 
deputy, Alan Shatter, linked his cross-exam ination of officials supplying briefing 
w ith  the declaration of his view  of the  com m ittee’s role as ’try ing to m ake a  
constructive contribution to th e  developm ent of foreign policy, w hich is 
som ething the Dail and  Seanad w as never able to  do until ... [the creation of] a 
com m ittee of th is n a tu re ’ (JCFA, W ednesday 7 J u n e  1995, FA5, No. 9, Col 346). 
[It will be recalled from ch ap ter one th a t th is is also one of th e  s ta ted  purposes of 
a  parliam ent - developm ent/form ation/enunciation of public policy]
O bservations
If th e  executive w ished to show  proof of its declared support for parliam entary
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com m ittees, one tangible m ethod of so doing w ould be the  provision of sufficient 
resources to com m ittees to  function effectively. Once again in 1995 and  1996 the  
fam iliar spectacle of com m ittees com plaining abou t the  provision of inadequate  
resources by th e  au thorities w as repeated. Given th e  in ternational con tex t of 
m uch  of th is com m ittee’s w ork and th e  claim  b y  th e  chairm an  (which w as 
challenged) th a t th is com m ittee ’is the p rim ary  com m ittee in  th ese  areas and 
should be catered  for properly, a t th e  expense of o ther com m ittees if necessary ’ 
(JCFA, W ednesday 5 April 1995, FA5, No. 5, Col 167), th e  persis ten t problem  of 
providing sufficient staff, facilities and  budget continued to  be raised  a t m eetings.
The clash of o ther aspects of parliam entary  business w ith  sittings of th is 
com m ittee continued to be an  obstacle to  th e  full partic ipation by all m em bers in  
the  operations and  deliberations of th e  com m ittee. T he som ew hat farcical 
situation of the com m ittee adjourning in  order th a t o ther com m ittees could use 
the  sam e room  m ight have appeared am using  to  som e visitors b u t w as hardly  
appropriate to professional legislators in  1995. (JCFA, T uesday 28 M arch 1995, 
FA5, No. 4, Cols 149 & 159). T he productive partic ipation by  m em bers of the 
European parliam ent continued to be thw arted  by unsu itab le  tim es of com m ittee 
m eetings (from th e  MEPs’ point of view) (Cols 83 & 293). Instances of m em bers 
leaving for parliam entary  questions (Col 131), a  b an  by the  chief whip on any  
com m ittee m eetings during  th e  plenary sessions of th e  Dail considering th e  
Finance Bill (Col 293) and  a  plethora of parliam en tary  engagem ents w ere am ong 
the difficulties encountered  by m em bers. It frequently  proved im possible for 
representatives of sm all parties and  th e  independents to  a tten d  m eetings and 
their colleagues w ere no t slow to  com m ent on this. This problem  seem ed 
magnified after th e  change of governm ent w hen a su b stitu te  from any of the
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irrespective of the party of the absent member. The dilemma faced by
parliamentarians was highlighted by Ray Burke on the occasion of the
appointment of sub-committees when he stated:
I am dubious about having too many subcommittees. We now have 17 or 
18 committees and these, with parliamentary duties and party and front 
bench meetings, mean that the demands on 166 members will be 
intolerable.
(JCFA, Wednesday 15 March 1995, FA5, No. 2, Col 72)
Senators
The role of senators in the committee was very positive. All of the senator 
members contributed to the debates and senators formed part of delegations 
travelling abroad. Their attendance record, insofar as it can be established, was 
praiseworthy. Senators on occasion were subjected to some bizarre comment and 
treatment such as an observation by a chair on one occasion that two senators 
share speaking time when all deputies had not been so restricted, or a somewhat 
patronising remark that a senator’s contribution to a debate showed that there 
was no shortage of knowledge on a particular subject amongst senate nominees 
to the committee.
Senator David Norris had on a number of occasions requested permission to 
attend meetings of the select committee (Dail members only). Whilst there were 
constitutional reasons why senators could not participate in such meetings, the 
response from the chair that the senator ’would probably be more comfortable 
observing on the monitor’(JCFA, Wednesday 15 March 1995, FA5, No. 2, Col 74) 
bordered on the insulting.
For some strange reason the proceedings of select committees were televised in 
Leinster House ’but not joint committees which comprise Members of both
government parties could attend in place of another government backbencher
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Houses’ (Col 76). This could be deemed to be discourteous to senators and their 
parliamentary role.
The conduct of th e  chair
The occupier of the chair of this and similar non-legislation dominated 
committees was considered free to participate in debates, ask questions and 
generally play an active, full role in proceedings. The previous chair - Brian 
Lenihan - with substitution by Nora Owen and Rory O’Hanlon frequently aired 
views and sought information from witnesses. However their tenure did not 
appear to generate antagonism between the chair and members as did that of 
Alan Dukes. The reports of 1995 contain instances of the chair clashing with 
members, many of which from a perusal of the records arose from Deputy Dukes 
occasional abrasive style and tendency to utter caustic comments which offended 
some members. Dotted throughout the debates can be found charges against the 
chair of being ’condescending’, of wishing ’to score points’, of making comments 
that were ’totally unnecessary and invalid ... deviant’. The frustration of one 
senator member with the chair led him to ask ’Do you know anything about 
chairing meetings? Presumably, you do not.’ (JCFA, Tuesday 28 March 1995, 
FA5, No. 4, Col 149). It may well be that some of this unpleasantness arose from 
purely standard political interaction and was a byproduct of the change in 
administration in Leinster House and the subsequent loss of positions by Fianna 
Fail.
In late 1996 Alan Dukes resigned as chairman consequent upon his appointment 
to the cabinet following the resignation of Michael Lowry. His successor was Alan
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Shatter (JCFA, Wednesday 4 December 1996, FA7, No. 1, Col 3).
Conclusion
1995 and 1996 continued the work began by the previous committee in many 
areas of foreign affairs. As mentioned above it is difficult to comment 
comprehensively on the activities of the committee due to the absence of 
published records. It is clear from reports that were published, such as the Report 
on European Union Security and Defence (pp.2 8s 3) that much discussion of 
issues took place, often of necessity in private. Other reports published in 1995 
related to the situation in Rwanda and Tibet together with a revised report on 
third world debt.
Clearly most of the general population would be unfamiliar with this aspect of 
Irish parliamentarians’ work. The acknowledgement by the then minister of 
state, Joan Burton, during consideration of the estimates for international 
development, of the ’personal commitment’ of members to the question of 
overseas development (JCFA, Thursday 16 May 1996, FA6, No. 2, Col 63) is 
perhaps all the recognition they will receive. [Indeed some of the most active 
members in this field were later to suffer at the polls in 1997 - Pat Gallagher of 
Laois/Offaly and John Connor - two of the most committed members to the plight 
of the third world were to lose their seats together with Declan Bree and Eamonn 
Walsh. Clearly their involvement in this committee cannot be solely blamed for 
their defeat but membership of a more media friendly, Irish focused committee 
might have aided their political fortunes.)
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CHAPTER 13 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
As both the overview of committees presented in chapter five and the case 
studies relating to the SCLS and the JCFA clearly indicate, the employment by 
Ireland of parliamentary committees is consistent with similar-type procedures 
found in other legislatures throughout the world as the comments of Laundy
(1989) in chapter four clearly illustrate and furthermore, an examination of their 
track record can be said, in the main, to suggest a performance that complies 
with his assertion regarding the positive contribution that such committees make 
to parliaments globally. Given the historical background to their use by the 
Oireachtas in the past and mindful of the comments of Arkins (1990) and others 
of earlier experiments in this field, it was to be expected that Oireachtas 
committees would not yet have reached the same degree of maturity as found in 
many other parliaments. There is evidence, however, that exposure to similar 
type arrangements in inter-parliamentary contacts and the European parliament 
has contributed to the actual as distinct from cosmetic development of their use 
in Ireland. The tight party political grip on committee operations, however, serves 
to stifle the potential that such committees possess when compared to some of 
their counterparts abroad.
In this chapter I intend to comment upon the operations of the two committees 
that I studied in chapters six to twelve, identifying links and comparisons with 
the secondary literature reviewed in the earlier chapters, highlighting trends over 
the four years including the change over time, where possible, in the views of the
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Oireachtas members.
In addition I will comment on how the committees impacted on the ability of the 
Oireachtas to carry out the many tasks associated with parliaments which were 
discussed in detail in chapter one and the effects the creation of these committees 
had on Oireachtas members and their role within parliament.
General conclusions
These committees came into being in a spirit of some enthusiasm from members 
coupled with some generous concessions from government which hitherto had 
been reluctant to permit parliament such freedom. Review of the Oireachtas 
debates on the formation of the committees shows that members were, in the 
main, positive in their approach to their formation although there was also 
evidence of scepticism from some speakers. There is some evidence of the 
intention of both the government and political parties to treat the committees 
seriously, manifested both by the calibre of members nominated to the JCFA 
(O’Halpin, 1996) and the declaration by the Minister of State at the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (Seanad debates, 13 May 1993, Col 377) that the government 
intended to listen to the views of the (JCFA) committee and take it seriously.
Increase in  power of parliam ent
The fact that, for the first time, a coalition government involving both Fianna Fail 
and Labour together was formed with the latter Party’s apparent greater 
eagerness for reform a factor in negotiations on the government formation [which
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is clear from the debates referred to in earlier chapters and comments such as 
those of O’Halpin (1996) on the new JCFA] was instrumental in their creation. 
The often repeated calls by members of the Oireachtas for effective legislative 
committees to enhance their role as legislators (harking back at least to the 
Desmond paper on the subject referred to in chapter three] and in particular for 
the Joint/Select Committee on Foreign Affairs ("a long time coming") bore fruit on 
the formation of the coalition government and gives some credence to and 
corresponds with Mezey’s (1979) and others assertion, discussed in chapter one, 
that coalition arrangements are more likely to lead to a modest increase in power 
for legislatures than is the case in a strong single party government such as 
witnessed by allegedly anti-committee Fianna Fail governments (Arkins, 1990) of 
the recent past. The subsequent enhancing amendments sponsored by the three 
party rainbow coalition in 1995, which culminated (as seen in the review of 
parliamentary debates on the matter and in particular the consideration of the 
SCLS following the change of government and detailed in chapter eight) in 
revised terms of reference for committees, gives further evidence of this feature.
Related to this point is the assertion by many authors such as Shaw (1979), Arter
(1990), Olson and Norton (1996), referred to earlier, writing about parliamentary 
affairs that the earlier in the legislative process that a committee is empowered to 
act on a given project or proposal, the greater the opportunity for that committee 
to exert real influence on the matter. As was seen in the consideration of related 
literature, in many parliaments bills are referred to committees before the second 
reading in plenary, a practice unknown in Ireland until the Refugees Bill was 
referred to the SCLS prior to second reading in the Dail (SCLS, 27 September 
1994; L3, No.l) and this small step for meaningful parliamentary input into
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legislation was commented upon further in chapter seven. Furthermore the 
second draft of the bill (which had been withdrawn upon the change of 
government] considered by the committee in 1996 (SCLS, 30 January 1996; L6, 
No. 1] reflected some of the concerns of members as expressed during the earlier 
aborted committee stage. This was a solid move as it gave impetus to the 
committee to continue detailed work on the subject and signalled to it that its 
consideration of legislation was taken into account. Further positive 
strengthening moves included the acceptance by the government of a selection of 
opposition amendments, examples of which can be found in chapters six to nine, 
the acknowledgement by the Fianna Fail Minister for Justice that she was 
incorporating provisions previously presented in a Progressive Democrats 
opposition bill, which was a mature development in Irish parliamentary 
proceedings and as detailed in chapter six, corresponds, albeit to a limited degree, 
with a documented Italian approach to private members legislation. The 
acceptance by both governments in office during the 27th Dail/Oireachtas that 
they were accepting a few opposition bills before the committee also contributed 
to this improvement.
These actions served to reinforce the committees’ role as legislators and were 
given greater impetus later in the 27th Dail when revised term of reference made 
provision for ministers to discuss matters of policy and proposals for future 
legislation with members before drafting along with the referral to the committee 
by the Minister for Justice of two reports relating to charities/fundraising and 
court operations for consideration and resulting recommendations as detailed in 
chapter nine above. As was seen in many legislatures, particularly those 
considered advanced such as Sweden and interestingly a practice which Olson
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and Norton (1996) claim is being adopted by the reformed parliaments of Central 
and Eastern Europe, this facility is considered central to the goal of meaningful 
roles not only for parliamentary committees but for parliament itself and its 
members. Another welcome development introduced during this Oireachtas was 
the access afforded to interest groups to members of committees through briefing 
or direct evidence, which is considered the norm in Scandinavian parliaments 
(Miles, 1997; Heidar, 1997). Thus Ireland can be seen to have adopted 
progressive procedures in this area in line with current global parliamentary 
"best practices". The operations of Oireachtas committees, together with inter­
parliamentary communication by members can be credited with this 
advancement.
P ositive  developm ents
Many positive developments emerge from the use of committees during the last 
Oireachtas. There were numerous instances where members exercised their right 
to amend legislation, often with opposition and government supporters uniting to 
put pressure on the government to take a particular course of action. Examples 
include the amendments to the Solicitors Bill (discussed in detail in chapter 
eight), described as the defining moment in the history of Oireachtas committees 
where the Minister for Justice was forced to make concessions by the united 
action of the TDs of all parties; sections of both the Refugees Bill and the 
Organised Crime Bill were reexamined following determined action by the 
committee (as outlined in chapter nine) and in the JCFA, that committee 
impressed its collective view on the government with an insistence of action on a 
particular issue and may also have been a factor in the government eventually
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altering its traditional stance on Cuba, as the extracts from the proceedings of the 
JCFA highlighted in chapter eleven suggest. Several other amendments were 
noted during the consideration of the Committee Stage of many bills as the case 
studies in chapters six to nine illustrate, and whilst some would have been 
accepted in any event and the acceptance of others tend to confirm the 
incidences of some pressure "behind the scenes", it is clear that the more 
reflective consideration of issues by legislative committees aided this process 
greatly, even though some members were not convinced of this. In the main the 
comments from members (and on occasion from ministers] indicate that the 
committee stage in legislative committees was useful and beneficial, particularly 
in the SCLS as that case study reveals at Chapters six to nine, as it permitted a 
more thorough examination of issues than would have been possible in plenary 
sessions although it has to be conceded that the government’s will triumphed in 
most cases. The fact that whilst many members, including government 
supporters, on occasions voiced views contrary to the administration [illustrated 
by such sabre-rattling comments as the difficulties posed to government deputies 
in supporting the government line ’if opposition amendment pressed to a vote’ 
(SCLS, 23 July 1996, Col 784)], the government’s wish still triumphed at each 
division called in both sample committees is proof positive of the assertion by 
Shaw (1979) that tight party political control of committee operations (which is a 
feature of Irish parliamentary affairs generally] dilutes the effective power of 
committees as, regardless of any personal views of members, the whip was 
obeyed in all cases.
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A ttendance
Insofar as attendances can be monitored, given the lack of complete records, the 
attendance at the principal legislative committee in this study (SCLS) suffered 
over time, particularly in the second year of both SCLS committees of this 
Oireachtas, falling on average from a high of 80% in 1993, to 53.8% in 1996.
This reflects both the reduction in interest by backbenchers in the work of the 
committee and a reliance on spokespersons to make contributions (as the case 
studies confirm), a fear which had been highlighted during the discussions on the 
committees’ creation and evidenced by the review of the committees in chapter 
three and is a potential flaw in the current committee system insofar as it could 
permit a small group of members take decisions with national implications, a 
danger that had been signalled in the case study and in the discussion in chapter 
four. The erratic attendance rates at the SCLS (reference the meeting of 13 March 
1996 when at one point the record suggests that only one deputy was present 
along with the minister and chair) may have limited the fostering of the type of 
specialisation among members which it is said flows from consistency of 
membership as is the norm in Germany, Denmark and Norway (Saalfeld, 
Damgaard, Heidar, 1997). Evidence of the development of such expertise was 
clearly evident from the deliberations of the JCFA where a core of members, by 
consistent involvement and study of third world issues mastered their brief 
admirably. The fact that the SCLS interacted with three departments, all with 
different party political spokespersons necessitated the smaller parties alternating 
attendance at meetings and this added to the problems of the SCLS in this 
regard. It is quite clear also that the sheer number of committees, often involving 
dual (or greater) membership, coupled with the pressure of other parliamentary
and party business such as plenary sittings, meetings, question time, party 
political business placed a tremendous strain on members, particularly if they 
wanted to study/debate issues in depth. The feature of Irish parliamentarians 
being members of more than one committee is at variance with that found in 
such countries as Norway (Heidar, 1997 - see chapter four above). In addition, the 
perceived acknowledgement by many of the ongoing relentless workload involved 
in constituency business, visits, telephone calls, correspondence, local authority 
membership, which pose particular additional burdens for rural members has 
had an impact on members’ ability to effectively operate as full time legislators. 
This concentration on either constituency work or local authority membership 
and eventual re-election, which I have shown is by no means peculiar to Ireland 
(Frears, 1990; Gallagher, 1996 in chapter one and Saalfeld, 1997; Patzelt, 1997 
and De Winter, 1997; Sowell, 1996; Strom, 1997 in chapter four], was often 
evident from the poor attendances at meetings such as the Estimates 
consideration of the Department of Equality and Law Reform, an example of 
which can be found at chapter seven. This is further exacerbated by the 
demanding electoral arrangements in Ireland which, it could be claimed, 
promoted constituency activities by members with at least one saving grace in 
that it endorsed the claim made by Wheare (1968) on the feature of constituency 
work in the UK facilitates members of parliament in learning of both the 
electorate’s and supporters’ thinking on issues. It continues, however, to attract 
criticism from commentators such as the recent Constitutional Review Group 
regarding the excessive degree of constituency loyalty/following pursued by TDs, 
including ministers.
Comments of m em bers
Tracing the views of members over the four years, it is clear that the initial 
enthusiasm, which was reflected in comments at various meetings regarding 
perceived "flexibility" and "constructive discussions" and fully outlined in the 
case studies above, gave way over time to a weariness with the procedure. Falling 
attendances, apparent membership fatigue, fewer contributions and difficulties 
with forming a quorum all provided evidence of a strain on the system and are 
illustrated in the case studies above.
Members were afforded many opportunities over the period to discuss committees 
and reform in general; 1993 on their formation; 1995 on their revamping 
following a change in government and 1996 when many Deputies spoke of their 
disappointment with the then current system. The main concerns which came to 
light over the period of my study and which are extensively logged in each of the 
years of the committees’ proceedings in chapters six to twelve included; the lack 
of suitable resources including technical assistance and research facilities to 
committees and their members, unhappiness at the degree of media coverage 
given to committees and the large number of committees to be serviced by a 
relatively small pool of parliamentarians. The fact that Fiarrna Fail, the largest 
political party in the Oireachtas were put to the ’pin of [their] ... collar’ (R.Burke, 
Parliamentary Debates, 9 October 1996, Cols 175/6] illustrates how grave a 
problem this was and the exhausting impact it must have had on smaller parties. 
The principal complaint incorporates also the effect on parliamentarians’ other 
duties and the strongest complaint, voiced at great length during the Dail debate 
of 9 October, 1996 and with which I agree, is that there were simply too many
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committees, often meeting at the same time, with the consequent strain on all 
the players in parliament, members, officials, media and other services.
Faults
If, as is claimed, the committee system fell into some disuse following the 24th 
Dâil [see references to work of both O’Halpin (1986) and Arkins (1990) noted in 
the earlier discussion of previous Oireachtas committees] due in part to the over 
abundance of poorly focused committees, then it must be asked why the 
proponents of the new legislative committees had not made a greater effort to 
apply all the lessons learned from the mistakes of the past and devised a leaner, 
better system. Whilst the committees were more focused, faults such as poor 
resources, unsatisfactory reporting and dual membership had been exposed in 
the past and appear to have been overlooked on the formation of these new 
committees. The failure to provide an adequate secretariat with a capacity to 
service parliamentary committees adequately through the acquisition and 
accumulation of expertisé, experience and knowledge which could be imparted to 
new members to any significant degree was a striking weakness in the new 
system. As the details in Appendix I illustrate, the secretarial backup provided to 
the committees was at a minimal level and this defect is further highlighted by 
the comments of Deputies Wallace and Flanagan (SCLS, 30 March 1995; L4,
No. 11) regretting the inability of the SCLS to create a particular sub-committee as 
there were ’no officials to staff it’, a comment echoed in the JCFA especially in 
relation to perceived administrative difficulties. This would not seem to compare 
favourably with such bodies as the US Congress with its vast numbers of staff 
allocated to both members and committees although both sets of
parliamentarians would be equally expected to transact business in a professional 
and well briefed manner at international fora.
It has been claimed that adequate media reporting of committee proceedings was 
itself hampered by the plethora of meetings and the inability of the media to 
service them also and it has been asserted that this alleged defect is one of the 
reasons for slack attendances and performances by any members who abandoned 
committee proceedings in favour of constituency chores, particularly in the run­
up to the 1997 election. As I have suggested elsewhere in both the consideration 
of this topic in the earlier discussion and in comments on committee proceedings, 
there is a valid argument that consistent, committed committee activity by 
members, which subsequently reduced the time available for the type of intensive 
constituency activities considered the norm in Ireland, in the absence of 
associated appropriate and satisfactory media recognition which parliamentarians 
and public both deserve, was one factor in the electoral fate of many Deputies at 
the last election. The comments of both John Browne (W exfordJ on his low level 
of activity in the SCLS [chapter two and chapter three] and Des O’Malley 
regarding the public’s misconception of committee activities [chapter three], 
underscored by the comments of FitzGerald [1997] regarding the duty of 
journalists to report the full parliamentary picture, give further credence to this 
observation. This dissatisfaction with media parliamentary coverage, which, as 
the discussion in chapter three disclosed, has been documented since the efforts 
of John Kelly to develop effective parliamentary committees in 1973, is mirrored 
to some degree by the experiences of parliaments of the UK (Norton, 1997) and 
Spain (Panigua Soto, 1997) but is not reflected in the experiences noted of 
Sweden (Miles, 1997] with its emphasis on freedom of information.
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Com m ittees im pact on functions of parliam ent/O ireachtas
Referring to the catalogue of tasks associated with parliaments outlined in 
chapter one and considering the inability/failure, as asserted by many 
commentators, of legislatures to undertake these functions in practice, my study 
of these two committees suggest the following.
The law-making function of the Irish parliament was enhanced to a certain extent 
by the operations of these committees, as Laundy (1989) claimed was the 
position globally and is in line with their employment in Scandinavia, U.S.A., 
South America, China and Central Europe, a point developed in chapter four.
This was demonstrated through the volume of amendments accepted and in 
particular the number conceded by the government following pressure from all 
sides and outlined particularly in the various chapters of the case study on the 
SCLS. It is unlikely that the government would have experienced such resistance 
from its own supporters on occasions if the proceedings had been in the 
parliamentary chamber as they would not have felt free to criticise to such a 
degree as occurred lest it be misconstrued as a confidence/discipline issue. There 
was some evidence of the committees impacting on the quality of legislation in 
particular aided by the absence, in most cases, of the time limits experienced in 
the chambers of the Oireachtas (with the range of other matters considered there) 
and further improved by the quality of the reflection in committees. The 
comments of Enda Kenny at the JCFA (11 November 1993, FA2, No. 1) 
commenting favourably on the extent and detail of discussion afforded by 
committee procedures as noted in chapter ten, give weight to this argument.
Ministers appeared to either be more acceptable to amendments than hitherto or 
at least review matters following requests from a range of members, not just 
supporters. There were comments noted elsewhere of members acknowledging 
this fact (Parliamentary Debates, 19 October, 1993; Vol 434, No. 8, Col 1685/6 is 
an example) which should be read in conjunction with the remark of the Minister 
for Justice that she did not mind which side of the house worthwhile and 
progressive amendments came from. Whilst it is impossible to identify a definite 
trend in this matter, I detected at least a realisation by ministers that a case had 
to be made when opposing backbench/opposition proposals apart from the 
traditional stark rejection of same as often evidenced in the past. These 
developments still leave the Oireachtas committees in an inferior position to that 
of Spain, Japan and Italy (Panigua Soto, 1997) and the U.S.A. (Laundy, 1989] as 
regards legislative impact.
It is fair to say that committees commenced, marginally, to reverse the hitherto 
absence of a genuine input in the public policy arena and can be credited with 
influencing the climate of policy making in several ways. The number of reports 
by both committees that I studied reveal quite an in-depth review of issues, often 
without the party ideological factors being overplayed. The reports of the SCLS 
and JCFA relating to the Official Secrets Act, third world issues, European Union 
matters when combined with the deliberations of the JCFA often involving other 
parliamentarians, including sitting Irish members of the European parliament 
and delegates to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe or experts 
in various fields and the close relationship that committee enjoyed with officials 
of the Department of Foreign Affairs brought sustained yet considered pressure 
on governments on a number of complementary fronts. The comments reported
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at the early sittings of the JCFA in 1993 regarding potential advantages flowing 
from such interaction appear to have been validated. In addition, the relationship 
between the two committees and the plethora of interest groups in 
communication with them was beneficial to both sides, as acknowledged on 
many occasions such as in the examination of the JCFA in chapter twelve, and 
contributed to the increase in knowledge by TDs and senators in a fashion that 
would not have proved possible in the absence of committees, thus confirming 
one of the expected benefits of a parliamentary committee system as outlined in 
the earlier discussion. This modest development is at least a movement by the 
Irish parliamentarians towards the participative role attributed in chapter one to 
their colleagues in Sweden and the U.S.A.
Administrative oversight and financial control were exercised by committees 
through the estimates process. This feature of the committees’ work had mixed 
results, fading in significance and intensity as the Oireachtas headed towards a 
general election and drew a variety of responses from members, including 
satisfaction, disappointment (Michael Woods - 3 December 1996] and an element 
of despair/fatigue with the system was evident from comments made by Tony 
Gregory (3 December 1996 - Col 59) at the possibility of the committee being 
reconvened to further consider estimates. The figures quoted in the chapters 
relating to the case studies indicate that the amount of time allocated to this work 
tended primarily to decrease over time even though the monetary amounts 
increased. By and large those members interested enough had the facility to 
attend estimates meetings and contribute to debate or ask questions. There were 
plenty of examples where this happened and ministers were obliged (with help 
from their officials] to provide answers and justification for certain actions
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following criticisms from members, often including their own backbenchers. The 
sections of chapters six to twelve relating to "estimates" indicate that many 
members used this branch of parliamentary activity, with all its unsatisfactory 
limitations, to exercise this function of parliament, the importance and resulting 
benefits of which had been claimed in the UK by Morris (1984).
The representational function of parliament was found in the 
points raised during estimates debates or when topical amendments were being 
pressed especially during the passage of the many crime bills and in the 
questioning of witnesses at committee meetings. Members frequently cited the 
alleged views of their constituents when debating measures/proposals/reports. 
Furthermore, when undertaking the tasks above, members, elected by the 
citizens, represented the people in their various endeavours, a practice which 
helped to copperfasten the traditional symbolic role of parliament. The above 
features tend to direct the mandate of deputies towards that promoted by-Rose 
(1986) earlier of members of parliament numbering among their tasks that of 
being "constituency representatives".
Similarly the functions of parliament outlined earlier which included talking and 
debating about current issues were undertaken by committees to a certain extent 
although their ability to raise topical and current issues was thwarted on 
occasion as certain attempts to discuss politically sensitive issues of the day 
(such as the passports for sale and letter from Judge Lynch referred to earlier) 
were ruled out of order. The marked absence of adversarialism in most instances, 
which was a feature in the committees was encouraged by these restrictions and 
mirrors the position found in other parliaments as suggested in the related
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literature whereby different roles are adopted by members in committee as 
distinct from plenary sittings (Heidar, 1997). Where committees excelled was in 
the opportunities they afforded backbenchers to involve themselves in issues, 
which is often absent in the main chamber due to the over concentration there on 
the utterances of spokespersons stating official party positions.
I have given examples earlier of the educational, recruitment and socialisation 
functions of parliament being assisted to a large extent through membership of 
committees (Brian lenihan, JCFA, 19 January 1995, FA5, No. 1, Col 3 and 
Heidar, 1997). In the last Oireachtas there was the unique situation of almost all 
members being a government supporter at some stage during the lifetime of that 
parliament and in fact many members enjoyed, as outlined earlier, an 
opportunity to serve in government. Whilst continuity of service is often cited as 
being essential for strong committees, the above scenario unleashed many talents 
on both government and committees at various stages as it exposed most 
members to both an executive approach and alternatively a legislative view and 
introduced members into more direct contact with civil servants to explore their 
role in public affairs. The education of members was further enhanced by the 
non-legislative work of the committees, when members heard/questioned 
witnesses, received representations, made visits abroad and obtained a variety of 
briefings from both officials and others on a range of subjects including such 
sensitive issues as criminal law, freedom of information, Northern Ireland, EU 
affairs and overseas aid.
The teaching function of a parliament was found in much of the above also. What 
was disappointing to some extent, was the inability of parliament to mould public
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opinion which, as I indicated in an early chapter, some commentators see as a 
role of parliament. Whilst the Oireachtas undertook some of these tasks when 
considering reports and preparing proposals which afforded them with an 
opportunity to promote ’consensus-building’ according to the Tanaiste (Dail 
Debates, 28 April 1993) the lack of publicity of these matters may have sullied 
their efforts in this regard.
Conclusion
When I commenced my study of the reformed Oireachtas committees, I expected 
to find "worthy" and "aspirational" labels to apply to their usage rather than 
practical and actual performances. What I encountered was a system with great 
potential for deputies and senators to comment upon and engage in public policy 
development together with a useful and valuable vehicle for governments to avail 
of the expertise of "working" politicians, with their "ears close to the ground" and 
a vast number of interested, committed and knowledgeable organisations content 
to provide material, research and analysis on a range of issues at little or no cost 
to the exchequer, provided all the participating parties were resolved to 
productively engage in the process. Unfortunately, for reasons which are 
highlighted throughout this dissertation, golden opportunities have been lost for a 
myriad of reasons. It is to hoped that the potential benefits, which should flow 
from the apparent incremental improvement in the expertise of committees and 
members will be reaped in the future following the expected upgrading and 
refinement of the system. Members, political parties and the government will all 
have to play their part through personal commitment, effort and genuine 
partnership if the process is to operate successfully
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The advent of these legislative committees were certainly a positive stage in the 
development of the power of ordinary members of parliament although it would 
be incorrect to describe them as a revolution. The change of government afforded 
members of all parties an exceptional opportunity to push for changes in 
procedure which, by and large, governments were willing to advance. The faults 
and problems discovered during their existence and outlined by members in the 
various debates, when addressed, contribute to the development of the 
parliamentary committee system in Ireland which will need frequent honing and 
refining to improve it. There is evidence from the creation of the most recent 
committees in this 28th Dail, which assembled following the general election of 
1997, that a number of the problems will be remedied, such as the decision to 
amend standing orders to ensure that ’not more than two Select Committees 
shall meet to consider a Bill on any given day’ (Dail Debates, 13 November 1997, 
Col 1358] unless some critical circumstances exist. This should reduce the 
pressure on members to service too many committees at one time. Similarly, the 
recommendations of the new Standing Committee on Dail Reform on 
Establishment of Committees in the 28th Dail relating to refined joint and 
standing committees, will improve matters considerably by reducing the 
numbers of both committees and their membership when taken together with the 
revision of related standing orders. The fact that the Irish parliamentary 
committee system is to continue, of necessity in a reformed mode, is to be 
welcomed especially when compared to the previous experiment with a range of 
Oireachtas committees which were largely abandoned by both the government 
and parliament. There is clear evidence that ‘the lot' of the individual member of 
parliament has been greatly enhanced by the ongoing developments in the 
committee system following upon the experiences of the last Oireachtas. In
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addition there is plenty of seope for deputies and senators to participate in both 
legislative and policy deliberations through such mechanisms as the review of 
strategy statements for each department which now must be referred to the 
appropriate "marking" joint committee. Many of the benefits to the country, 
Oireachtas, parliamentarians and diverse interest groups which are highlighted in 
this study should continue, albeit to a modest degree, although it will be 
necessary to revisit the issues of media attention and constituency arrangements 
if the benefits of the revised arrangements are to be maximised.
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APPENDIX I - OIREACHTAS COMMITTEES - 1 9 9 6
C om m ittees of S election
Nominates members to serve on select or special committees, with power to 
discharge such members from time to time for non-attendance or at their own 
request, and in the case of the Dail Committee, at the request of their Party 
Leader, and to appoint other to replace those discharged. There is a Committee of 
Selection for each House.
Com m ittee of S election  (Dail Eireann)
Deputy Jim Higgins (Minister of State at the Department of the Taoiseach) 
(Chairman), Deputies Dermot Ahem, Michael Bell, Andrew Boylan, Eric Byrne, 
Ivor Callelly, Michael Creed, Brian Fitzgerald, Tony Gregory, Seamus Hughes,
P.J. Morley, Liz O’Donnell and Roisin Shortall.
Dail Committee Clerk: Marie Kennedy
Com m ittee of S election  (Seanad Eireann)
An Leas-Chathaoirleach, (Chairman), Senators Michael Calnan, Bill Cashin, Liam 
T. Cosgrave, Michael Finneran, Rory Kiely, Maurice Manning, Brian Mullooly,
Ann Ormonde, Joe O’Toole and G.V. Wright.
Seanad Committee Clerk: Jody Blake
Com m ittees on Procedure and P rivileges
Consider matters of procedure, recommend any additions or amendments to the 
Standing Orders and consider and report as and when requested to do so on 
Members’ privileges. There is a Committee on Procedure and Privileges for each 
House.
Dail Committee: Deputy Sean Treacy, Ceann Comhairle (Chairman), Deputies 
Dermot Ahem, Jim Higgins (Minister of State at the Department of the 
Taoiseach), Peter Barry, Michael Bell, Eric Byrne, Ivor Callely, Ger Connolly, Noel 
Dempsey, Alan Dukes, Michael Ferris, Brian Fitzgerald, Mary Flaherty, Charles 
Flanagan, Tony Killeen, Tom Moffat, Liz O’Donnell and Brendan Smith.
Dail Committee Clerk: Elaine Gunn
Seanad Com m ittee
Senator Liam Cosgrave, Cathaoirleach (Chairman), Senators Donie Cassidy, Tom 
Fitzgerald, John Dardis, Mick Lanigan, Pat Magner, Maurice Manning, Brian 
Mullooly, Jan O’Sullivan, Joe O’Toole and G.V. Wright.
Seanad Committee Clerk: Deirdre Lane
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Deputies Andrew Boylan, Michael Ferris and M.J. Nolan; Senators Dan Kiely, 
Jarlath Me Donagh and Jim Townsend 
Committee Clerk: Jody Blake
Standing Jo in t Com m ittee on Consolidation B ills
Senator Dick Roche (Chairman), Deputies Andrew Boylan, John O’Donoghue and 
Sean Ryan; Senators Bill Cashin and Tom Enright
Com m ittee of Public A ccounts
Examine and report to the Dail upon the accounts, showing the appropriation of 
the sums granted by the Dail to meet public expenditure with the report of 
Comptroller and Auditor General, and suggest alterations and improvements in 
the form of the Estimates submitted to the Dail.
Committee: Deputy Denis Foley (Chairman), Deputies Tommy Broughan, Eric 
Byrne, Sean Doherty, John Ellis, Michael Finucane, Phil Hogan, John Connor, 
Batt O’Keeffe, Ned O’Keeffe, Desmond J. O’Malley and Pat Upton 
Contact in Secretariat: Cliona O’Rourke
Join t Com m ittee on Commercial State-Sponsored Bodies
Examine the reports, accounts and overall operational results of specified state-. 
sponsored bodies engaged in trading or commercial activities and report thereon 
to both Houses of the Oireachtas.
Committee: Deputy Liam Kavanagh (Chairman), Deputies Seamus Brennan, 
Martin Cullen, Frances Fitzgerald, Seamus Kirk, Jim O’Keeffe and Sean Ryan; 
Senators Dick Roche, Michael Finneran, Feargal Quinn and Shane Ross.
Contact: Conan McKenna
Select Com m ittee on Social Affairs
Examine legislation and estimates for Public Services relating to Social Welfare, 
Health, Education, Labour Law, the Gaeltacht and Equality.
Committee: Deputies Seamus Pattison (Chairman), Frank Crowley, Paul Bradford, 
Matt Brennan, Joe Costello, Frances Fitzgerald, Mary Flaherty, Chris Flood, Tom 
Foxe, Maire Geoghegan - Quinn, Phil Hogan, Seamus Hughes, Jim Kemmy, Sean 
Kenny, Helen Keogh, Kathleen Lynch, Dinny Me Ginley, Michael Martin, Tom 
Moffat, Joe Walsh and Michael Woods.
Contact: Jane Mathews
Join t Com m ittee on Standing Order (Private B usiness)
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S elect Com m ittee on Finance and General A ffairs
Examine legislation and estimates for Public services relating to arts, culture and 
broadcasting and the Departments of the Taoiseach, Finance and the 
Environment.
Committee: Deputy Jim Mitchell (Chairman), Deputies Michael Ahem, Noel 
Ahem, Tommy Broughan, Paul Connaughton, John Connor, Michael Creed, 
Martin Cullen, Sean Kenny, Liam Lawlor, Padraic Me Cormack, Charlie Me 
Creevy, Derek Me Dowell, Michael Me Dowell, Ted Nealon, Rory O’Hanlon, John 
O’ Leary, Willie Penrose, John Ryan, Trevor Sargent and Dan Wallace.
Contact in Secretariat: Tom Malone
Select Com m ittee on Enterprise and Economic S trategy
Examine legislation and estimates for Public Services relating to agriculture, 
food, forestry, enterprise, employment, marine, transport, communications, 
energy, tourism and trade.
Committee: Deputy Michael Bell (Chairman), Deputies Andrew Boylan, Tommy 
Broughan, Eric Byrne, Hugh Byrne, Joe Costello, Seymour Crawford, Mildred 
Fox, Michael Finucane, Brian Fitzgerald, Tom Kitt, Jimmy Leonard, Robert 
Molloy, M.J. Nolan, Eamon O’Cuiv, Ned O’Keeffe, Mary O’Rourke, Sean Power, 
Michael Ring and P.J. Sheehan 
Contact in Secretariat: Una Nic Giolla Choille
Select Com m ittee on L egislation  and Security
Examine legislation and estimates for Public Services relating to justice, law 
reform and defence.
Committee: Deputy Charles Flanagan (Chairman) Deputies John Browne (Carlow- 
Kilkenny), John Browne (Wexford), Liam Fitzgerald, Tony Gregory, Paddy Harte, 
Jim Kemmy, Brendan Kenneally, Derek Me Dowell, Paul Me Grath, John 
Mulvihill, Willie O’Dea, Liz O’Donnell, John O’Donoghue, Jim O’Keeffe, Alan 
Shatter, Michael Smith, Godfrey Timmins, Dan Wallace, Eamon Walsh, Michael 
Woods.
Contact in Secretariat: John Roycroft 
Joint Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs
Examine legislation and estimates for Public Services relating to Foreign Affairs 
and International Co-operation.
Dail Committee: Deputy Alan Shatter (Chairman), Deputies Theresa Ahem, Tony 
Gregory, Declan Bree, Ben Briscoe, Raphael P. Burke, Ger Connolly, John 
Connor, Austin Deasy, Michael Ferris, Pat Gallagher, Michael P. Kitt, Brian 
Cowan, James Me Daid, P.J. Morley, Rory O’Hanlon, Jim O’Keeffe, Desmond J. 
O’Malley, Willie Penrose, Eamon Walsh; Senators Brendan Daly, Thomas W. 
Enright, Ann Gallagher, Michael Howard, Mick Lanigan, Sean Maloney, Paschal 
Mooney, David Norris, Michael O’ Kennedy and Madeleine Taylor-Quinn.
Contact in Secretariat: Patrick Judge
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Processes primary legislation, scrutinize secondary legislation and examines 
policy relative to European Affairs.
Committee: Deputy Michael Ferris (Chairman), Deputies David Andrews, Andrew 
Boylan, John Browne (Carlow/Kilkenny), Raphael P. Burke, Noel Davem, Michael 
Ferris, Mary Flaherty, Sean Haughey, Derek Me Dowell, Desmond J. O’Malley,
Pat Upton; Senators Michael Calnan, Michael D’Arcy, Dan Kiely, Joe O’Toole, 
Ann Ormonde and Gerry Reynolds.
Contact in Secretariat; Liam Conniffe
Com hchoiste don G haeilge (Joint Committee on the Irish Language)
Examine matters concerning the Irish Language both within the Houses of the 
Oireachtas and in the country in general.
Committee: Deputy Dinny Me Ginley (Chairman), Deputies Tommy Broughan, 
John Browne (Carlow/Kilkenny), Joe Costello, Mary Coughlan, Michael Martin, 
Padraic Me Cormack, Robert Molloy, Donal Moynihan, Eamon O’Cuiv and Pat 
Upton; Senators Paddy Burke, Willie Farrell, Tom Fitzgerald, Mary Kelly, Jarlath 
Me Donagh and Joe O’Toole.
Contact in Secretariat: Padraig O’hAilin
Joint Services Com m ittee
Senator Pat Magner, (Chairman), Deputies Ben Briscoe, Liam Burke, Colm 
Hilliard, Padraic Me Cormack, P.J. Morley, Breeda Moynihan-Cronin, John 
Mulvihill, John O’Leary and Michael Ring; Senators Louis Belton, Eddie Bohan, 
Rory Kiely, Denis (Dino) Cregan, John V. Farrelly, Don Lydon, Pat Magner, 
Francis O’Brien and Jim Townsend.
Contact in Secretariat: David Brennan and Jim Mulkerrins 
Joint Com m ittee on W omen’s R ights
Deputy Mary Wallace (Chairwoman), Deputies Theresa Aheam, Michael Ring, 
Mary Coughlan, Sile De Valera, Charles Flanagan, Helen Keogh, Kathleen Lynch, 
Breeda Moynihan-Cronin, Eoin Ryan and Roisin Shortall; Senators Ann 
Gallagher, Mary Henry, Billy Kelleher, Marian Me Gennis, Dan Neville and Ann 
Ormonde.
Contact in Secretariat: Patrick Timmins and Paddy Judge 
Joint Com m ittee on th e  Fam ily
Committee: Deputy Paul Me Grath (Chairman), Deputies Liam Aylward, Paul 
Connaughton, Mary Coughlan, Frances Fitzgerald, Chris Flood, Seamus Hughes, 
Breeda Moynihan-Cronin, Liz O’Donnell, Alan Shatter, Roisin Shortall, Brendan 
Smith, Godfrey Timmins, Mary Wallace, Eamon Walsh; Senators Paddy Burke, 
Sean Byrne, Mary Kelly, Marian Me Gennis 
Contact in Secretariat: Patrick Timmins
Joint Com m ittee on European Affairs
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Joint Com m ittee on Sm all B usiness and Services
Committee: Deputy Michael Creed (Chairman), Deputies Declan Breen, Seamus 
Brennan, Ivor Callely, Seymour Crawford, Theresa Ahem, Michael Creed, Mary 
Harney, Colm Hilliard, Seamus Hughes, Liam Kavanagh, Sean Kenny, Dinny Me 
Ginley, M.J.Nolan and Mary O’Rourke; Senators Bill Cotter, Edward Haughey, 
Dick Roche and Jack Wall.
Contact in Secretariat: Una Connolly
Joint Com m ittee on Sustainable D evelopm ent
Committee: Deputy Batt O’Keeffe (Chairman), Deputies Noel Ahem, Michael Bell, 
Eric Byrne, Joe Costello, Noel Dempsey, John Ellis, Mary Flaherty, Brendan Me 
Gahon, Liam Burke, Mairin Quill, Eoin Ryan, Sean Ryan, P.J. Sheehan and Noel 
Treacy; Senators Bill Cashin, Donie Cassidy, Michael Mulcahy and Joe Sherlock 
Contact in Secretariat: Conan Me Kenna
Liaison Com m ittee
Senator Pat Magner (Chairman)
Membership: Chairpersons of Select, Special and Joint Committees of both 
Houses.
Contact: Jim Mulkerrins
Sources: Houses of the Oireachtas - Public Relations Office, Committee 
Secretariat and State Directory 1995 - 6
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(1) That a Select Committee, which shall be called the Select Committee on 
Legislation and Security, be appointed consisting of 30 members of Dail 
Eireann, in addition to the ex  officio members of the Committee referred to 
in paragraph (3), to consider the following matters relating to justice, law 
reform and defence, namely -
(i) the Estimates for Public Services relevant to the above-mentioned 
subjects;
(ii) the impact on equality of policy and legislation relevant to the 
above-mentioned subjects;
(iii) the Committee Stages of such Bills initiated in relation to those
subjects as may be referred to the Select Committee under Standing 
Order 70 of the Standing Orders relative to Public Business;
(iv) such reports relevant to those subjects as Dail Eireann may refer to 
the Select Committee for discussion, observations and 
recommendations
and shall report thereon to Dail Eireann.
(2) That the Select Committee shall have power to appoint sub-Committees 
and to delegate any matter comprehended by paragraph (1) to a sub­
committee.
(3) That the member of the Government in charge of the Department the 
statute law in respect of which is dealt with in a Bill which is referred to 
the Select Committee or a sub-Committee thereof or the Estimates for 
Public Services for which are considered by the Select Committee or a sub­
committee thereof shall be an ex  officio member of such Committee or 
sub-Committee but such member of the Government may nominate a 
Minister or Minister of State to be such ex  officio member in his stead.
(4) That the report of the Select Committee upon every Bill referred to it shall 
be set down for Report Stage in Dail Eireann.
(5) That the Select Committee shall make an annual report to Dail Eireann 
which shall detail
(i) the work carried out by the committee;
(ii) the work in progress by the committee;
(iii) the attendance and voting records at meeting of the Committee;
(iv) its future work programme, and
APPENDIX II - SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY -
TERMS OF REFERENCE (Order of 7 April 1993)
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(6) That, subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance, the Select 
Committee shall have the power to engage the services of persons with 
specialist or technical knowledge to assist it or any of its sub-Committees 
in their consideration of any matters comprehended by paragraph (1).
(7) That the Select Committee may invite submissions in writing, if 
considered necessary by the Committee, from interested persons or bodies 
on any matter comprehended by paragraph(l).
(8) That, previous to the consideration of the Committee Stage of a Bill by the 
Select Committee, a briefing session or sessions shall be held between the 
officials of the relevant Department and members of the Select Committee 
(or sub-Committee as the case may be) and that such briefing session shall 
be held in private.
(9) That, in the absence from a particular meeting of the Select Committee (or 
of a sub-Committee) of a member, another member of Dail Eireann, 
nominated by the Party or group within the meaning of Standing Order 89 
to which the absent member belongs, may take part in the proceedings 
and vote in his stead.
(10) That the Select Committee and each sub-Committee, previous to the 
commencement of business, shall elect one of its members to be 
Chairman, who shall have only one vote.
(11) That all questions in the Select Committee and in each sub-Committee 
shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members present and 
voting and in the event of these being an equality of votes, the question 
shall be decided in the negative.
(12) That every report which the Select Committee proposes to make shall, on 
adoption by the Select Committee, be laid before Dail Eireann forthwith, 
together with any document relating thereto which the Select Committee 
proposed to publish, whereupon the Select Committee shall be empowered 
to print and publish such report and the said document, or documents, as 
the case may be.
(13) That notwithstanding paragraph (12), where the Select Committee has 
completed Committee Stage of a Bill, it shall be empowered to print and 
publish the said Bill as amended, where appropriate.
(14) That the quorum of the Select Committee shall be 11, and the quorum of 
each sub-Committee shall be a number to be decided by the sub­
committee when such sub-Committee is appointed.
(15) That no document received by the Clerk to the Select Committee or a sub­
committee thereof shall be withheld, withdrawn or altered without the 
knowledge and approval of the Committee or sub-Committee, as may be 
appropriate."
(v) such other matters as the Committee deem s appropriate.
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That notwithstanding paragraphs (1) of the Orders of Reference of the Select 
Committees on Legislation arid Security, Finance and General Affairs, Social 
Affairs and Enterprise and Economic Strategy, the Estimates for the Public 
Services for the following Departments be referred to the Select Committees for 
consideration in accordance with the following table, and that where the estimate 
for a Department is referred to a Select Committee, all other estimates relevant to 
that Department shall also be referred to that Committee:
TABLE
Select Com m ittee on L egislation  and Security
Defence
Equality and Law Reform 
Justice
Select Com m ittee on Finance and General A ffairs
Taoiseach
Tanaiste
Environment
Finance
S elect Com m ittee on Social Affairs
*
Arts, Culture and the Gaeltacht
Health
Education
Social Welfare
Select Com m ittee on E nterprise and Economic S trategy
Agriculture, Food and Forestry 
Enterprise and Employment 
Transport, Energy and Communications 
Tourism and Trade 
Marine
Order of 11 May 1993
Order of 29  June 1993
That the Orders of Reference of the Select Committees on Legislation and 
Security, Enterprise and Economic Strategy, Finance and General Affairs, and 
Social Affairs be amended by the addition of the following paragraph after 
paragraph (15) in all cases
(16) That Members of Dail Eireann, not being members of the Select
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Committee, may attend meetings and take part in the proceedings of the 
Select Committee and of its sub-committees without having a right to vote.
Order of 22  February 1994
That notwithstanding paragraphs (14) of the Orders of Reference of the Select 
Committees on Legislation and Security, Finance and General Affairs, Social 
Affairs, and Enterprise and Economic Strategy, the quorum of each Select 
Committee shall be eight".
Order of Dail o f 2 4 th  January, 1995
"That notwithstanding anything in the Standing Orders of Dail Eireann:
(1) All members serving on Select Committees of the 27th Dail, including 
Joint Committees and the Committee of Selection, be discharged from 
membership of those committees with the exception of the members of the 
sub-Committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security 
appointed to consider the matters referred to that Committee by order of 
Dail Eireann on 6th December 1994, who shall continue as members of 
that sub-Committee until the sub-Committee has discharged the functions 
assigned to it by orders of Dail Eireann.
(2) Any matter in the course of consideration by a Committee referred to in 
paragraph (1) above, including the committee stage of a Bill, shall be 
deemed to be unaffected by the discharge of the members of the 
Committee and
(3) The following members be appointed to serve on the Committee of 
Selection:
Dermot Ahem, Seari Barrett (Minister of State at the Department of the 
Taoiseach), Michael Bell, Andrew Boylan, Eric Byrne, Ivor Callely, Michael 
Creed, Michael Ferris, Tony Gregory, Seamus Hughes, P.J. Morley, Liz 
O’Donnell and Roisin Shortall".
Order of th e  Dail of 1 March 1995
(1) That the Order of Reference of the Select Committees on Finance and 
General Affairs, Social Affairs, Enterprise and Economic Strategy, and 
Legislation and Security be amended as follows:
(i) in paragraph (1) in all cases, by the deletion of "30" and the
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(i) in paragraph (1) in all cases, by the deletion of "30" and the 
substitution therefor of "21".
(il) in paragraph (9) in all cases, by the addition of the following:
Provided that in the case of a substitute nominated by a Party which 
is a Government Party, such substitute may be a member of another 
Government Party", and
(iii] by the addition of the following paragraphs after paragraph [16) in 
all cases:
(17) That the Select Committee shall have the power to discuss 
and draft proposals for legislative changes and new legislation 
for recommendation to Ministers which are relevant to the 
matters comprehended by paragraph (1).
(18) That the Select Committee shall have the power to receive 
submissions and hear evidence from interested persons and 
organisations.
(19) That the Select Committee shall have power to print and 
publish from time to time minutes of evidence taken before it 
together with such related documents as it thinks fit.
(20) That Ministers and Ministers of State shall discuss with the
Select Committee, where practicable, general proposals for 
legislation relevant to the matters comprehended by 
paragraph (1) prior to such legislation being approved and 
published by Government.
(21) That all appointees to high office in the State shall attend 
meetings of the Select Committee, as appropriate, and subject 
to the legal constraints of their office, to discuss issues which 
are relevant to the matters comprehended by paragraph (1).
(22) That Ministers and Ministers of State shall appear before the
Select Committee to discuss current policies relevant to the 
matters comprehended by paragraph (1) and the 
implementation of such policies in their Departments. A 
Minister or Minister of State may request the Select 
Committee to convene to enable him or her to explain current 
or proposed policy or to initiate a debate thereon".
That notwithstanding paragraphs (14) of the Orders of Reference of the
Select Committees specified in paragraph (1), the quorum of each Select
Committee shall be five; and
That the Orders of Reference of the Select Committee on Legislation and
Legislation and Security be amended as follows:
Security be further amended by the addition of the following paragraph 
after paragraph (1):
[1 A) That the Select Committee shall review, on a regular basis, the
Official Secrets Acts and all other statutory provisions which restrict 
access to information and shall report thereon to Dail Eireann with 
recommendations to bring them into line with the best international 
standards of public information provision".
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APPENDIX III - ORDER OF DAIL EIREANN OF 1 5 /1 2 /9 4  SETTING UP
SUB COMMITTEE OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
AND SECURITY
(1) That a sub-Committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security 
consisting of the Chairman and 11 other members of that Committee be 
appointed to consider the matters referred to that Committee by order of 
Dail Eireann on 6th December, 1994 and to report thereon directly to Dail 
Eireann not later than 24th January, 1994.
(2) That the membership of the sub-Committee shall consist of 5 
representatives of the Fianna Fail Party, 3 representatives of the Fine Gael 
Party, 2 representatives of the Labour Party, 1 representative of the 
Progressive Democrat Party and 1 representative of the Democratic Left 
Party.
(3) The Chairperson of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security shall 
be the Chairperson of the sub-Committee.
(4) That each party referred in paragraph [2] shall, before the commencement 
of the consideration by the Committee at any meeting of the matter 
referred to it, furnish the Chairperson of the sub-Committee with the name 
of the member of the sub-Committee nominated by that party to question 
witnesses attending before the sub-Committee.
(5) That all questions of procedure in the sub-Committee shall, subject to 
consultation with the Legal Adviser, be determined by a majority of votes 
of the members present and voting and in the event of there being an 
equality of votes, the question shall be decided in the negative.
(6) That the quorum of the sub-Committee shall be 6.
(7) That, in the absence from a particular meeting of the sub-Committee of a 
member, another member of Dail Eireann, nominated by the Party or 
group within the meaning of Standing Order 89 to which the absent 
member belongs, may take part in the proceedings. Any member of Dail 
Eireann so substituted may be nominated by his Party for the purposes set 
out in paragraph (4).
(8) That the sub-Committee shall have power to send for persons, papers and 
records and, subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance, to engage 
the services of persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist it in 
its consideration of the matters referred to it.
(9) That the sub-Committee shall appoint a Legal Adviser nominated by the 
Clerk of the Dail to advise on all legal matters and procedures for the sub­
committee and to ensure that all Constitutional rights are protected.
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(10) That the sub-Committee shall have power to take evidence in public and to 
publish this evidence in its report.
(11) Witnesses attending before the sub-Committee shall have the right to 
cross-examine other witnesses in person or through a legal representative, 
to the extent that the sub-Committee is of the opinion that such cross- 
examination is necessary to defend and vindicate the Constitutional rights 
of such witness.
ORDER OF DAIL EIREANN OF 15 /12 /94  AMENDING ORDERS OF 
REFERENCE OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND 
SECURITY
"That the order of the Dail of this day in relation to the appointment of a sub- 
Committee of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security be amended as 
follows;
(1) In paragraph (1), by the deletion of ‘11’ and the substitution therefor of 
‘ 12 ’ .
(2) In paragraph (2), by the addition of ‘and 1 representative of the 
independent members’.
(3) In paragraph (4), by the addition of the following:
‘An independent member of the Committee shall be entitled to question 
witnesses attending before the sub-Committee’; and
(4) In paragraph (7), by the addition of the following:
‘An independent member of the sub-Committee may nominate another 
independent member of Dail Eireann to take part in the proceedings in his 
absence, and such substitute may be nominated by him for the purposes 
set out in paragraph (4)’".
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APPENDIX IV
Sub-committee on the drugs problem - orders of reference
(1) That a sub-committee, which shall be called the Drugs sub-Committee of 
the Select Committee on Legislation and Security, be appointed consisting 
of 13 members of Dail Eireann, in addition to the ex  officio members of the 
Committee referred to in paragraph (2), to consider all matters 
comprehended by Paragraph 1 (i) of the Orders of Reference of the Select 
Committee on Legislation and Security in relation to the drugs problem 
and shall report thereon to the Select Committee from time to time.
(2) That a member of the Government in charge of (the) Department 
concerned with the drugs’ problem shall be an ex-officio  member of such 
sub-Committee but such member of the Government may nominate a 
Minister or Minister of State to be such ex-officio member in his stead.
(3) That, subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance and the Select 
Committee on Legislation and Security, the sub-Committee shall have the 
power to engage the services of persons with specialist or technical 
knowledge to assist it in its consideration of any matters comprehended by 
paragraph (1).
(4) That the sub-Committee may invite submissions in writing, if considered 
necessary by the sub-Committee, from interested persons or bodies on any 
matter comprehended by paragraph (1).
(5) That, in the absence from a particular meeting of the sub-Committee of a 
member, another member of Dail Eireann, nominated by the party or 
Group within the meaning of Standing Order 90 to which the absent 
member belongs, may take part in the proceedings and vote in his stead, 
provided that in the case of a substitute nominated by a party which is a 
Government Party, such substitute may be a member of another 
Government Party.
(6) That the sub-Committee, previous to the commencement of business, shall 
elect one of its members to be Chairman, who shall have only one vote.
(7) That all questions in the sub-Committee shall be determined by a majority 
of votes of the members present and voting and in the event of there being 
an equality of votes, the question shall be decided in the negative.
(8) That every report which the sub-Committee proposes to make shall, on 
adoption by the Select Committee, be laid before Dail Eireann forthwith, 
together with any document relating thereto which the Select Committee 
proposes to publish, whereupon the Select Committee shall be empowered 
to print and publish such report and the said document, or documents as 
the case may be.
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(9) That the quorum of the sub-Committee shall be four.
(10) That no document received by the clerk to the sub-Committee shall be 
with-held, withdrawn or altered without the knowledge and approval of the 
sub-Committee.
(11) That Members of Dail Eireann, not being members of the sub-Committee, 
may attend meetings and take part in proceedings of the sub-Committee 
without having a right to vote.
(12) That the sub-Committee shall have the power to discuss and draft 
proposals for legislative changes and new legislation for recommendation 
to Ministers which are relevant to the matters comprehended by paragraph 
(1).
(13) That the sub-Committee shall have the power to receive submissions and 
hear evidence from interested persons and organisations.
(14) That Ministers and Ministers of State shall discuss with the sub­
committee, where practicable, general proposals for legislation relevant to 
the matters comprehended by paragraph (1) prior to such legislation being 
approved and published by Government.
(15) That all appointees to high office in the State shall attend meetings of the
sub-Committee, as appropriate, and subject to the legal constraints of their
office, to discuss issues which are relevant to the matters comprehended 
by paragraph (1).
(16) That Ministers and Ministers of State shall appear before the sub­
committee to discuss current policies relevant to the matters 
comprehended by paragraph (1) and the implementation of such policies in 
their Departments. A Minister or Minister of State may request the sub­
committee to convene to enable him or her to explain current or proposed 
policy or to initiate a debate thereon.
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Members of the Sub-Committee on the Drugs Problem
O’Donoghue, John [Chairman]
Browne, John (Carlow-Kilkenny)
Flanagan, Charles
Gregory, Tony
Kenneally, Brendan
McDowell, Derek
McGrath, Paul
Mulvihill, John
O’Donnell, Liz
O’Keefe, Jim
Wallace, Dan
Walsh, Eamon
Woods, Michael J.
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APPENDIX V - TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN AFFAIRS - 1995
Orders of reference 1 March 1995
(1) That the Orders of Reference of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs are 
hereby rescinded and that a Select Committee of Dail Eireann consisting of 
21 members of Dail Eireann, excluding the ex  officio members of the 
Committee referred to in paragraph (7), be appointed to be joined with a 
Select Committee of Seanad Eireann to form the Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs.
(2) That the Joint Committee shall have power to appoint sub-Committees 
and to delegate any matter comprehended by paragraphs (4), (8), (9) and
(11) to a sub-Committee.
(3) That the Select Committee of Dail Eireann shall consider the Estimates for 
Public Services submitted to Dail Eireann in respect of Foreign Affairs and 
International Cooperation and report thereon to Dail Eireann and the Select 
Committee shall have power to appoint a sub-Committee for this purpose.
(4) That a Bill initiated by the Minister for Foreign Affairs or a Minister of 
State at the Department of Foreign Affairs having passed its Second Stage 
may on motion made in Dail Eireann by a member of the Government' or a 
Minister of State be referred, with the concurrence of Seanad Eireann, to 
the Joint Committee.
(5) That in the case of a Bill originating in Seanad Eireann, the motion of 
referral in Dail Eireann shall constitute a Second Reading of the Bill and 
the debate thereon shall be confined to the general principle of the Bill and 
where the Third Stage has been dealt with in the Joint Committee, the Bill 
shall on its receipt in Dail Eireann after being passed by Seanad Eireann be 
set down for Report Stage, the First, Second and Third Stages being 
waived.
(6) That the report of the Joint Committee upon every Bill originating in Dail 
Eireann which is referred to it shall be set down for Report Stage in Dail 
Eireann.
(7) That the Minister for Foreign Affairs shall be an ex  officio member of a 
Committee or sub-Committee which is considering-
(i) a Bill referred to it, or
(ii) Estimates for Public Services
and may nominate a Minister or Minister of State to be such ex  officio  
member in his or her stead.
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(8) That the Joint Committee shall consider the impact on equality of policy 
and legislation in respect of the Department of Foreign Affairs and report 
thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.
(9) That the Joint Committee shall consider such aspects of Ireland’s 
international relations as the Joint Committee may select and report 
thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.
(10) That any consideration by the Select Committee, the Joint Committee or a 
sub-Committee of security issues relating to Northern Ireland shall be in 
private session.
(11) That Dail Eireann may refer reports relevant to the Department of Foreign 
Affairs to the Joint Committee for discussion, observations and 
recommendations and the Joint Committee shall report thereon to both 
Houses of the Oireachtas.
(12) That the Joint Committee shall make an annual report to both Houses of 
the Oireachtas which shall detail
(i) the work carried out by the Committee,
(ii) the work in progress by the Committee,
(iii) the attendance and voting records at meetings of the Committee,
(iv) its future work programme, and
(v) such other matters as the Committee deems appropriate.
(13) That the Select Committee, the Joint Committee and each sub-Committee 
shall have power to send for persons, but information need not be provided 
to a Committee or a sub-Committee if a member of the Government 
certifies in writing that such information is confidential or that is 
disclosure would be prejudicial to the State’s international relations.
(14) That the Select Committee and the Joint Committee shall have power, 
subject to the consent of the Minister for Finance, to engage the services of 
persons with specialist or technical knowledge to assist them or a sub­
committee for the purpose of particular enquiries.
(15) That in the absence from a particular meeting of the Select Committee, of 
the Joint Committee or of a sub-Committee of a member who is a member 
of Dail Eireann, another member of Dail Eireann nominated by the Party or 
group within the meaning of Standing Order 90 to which the absent 
member belongs may take part in the proceedings and vote in his or her 
stead. Provided that in the case of a substitute nominated by a Party which 
is a Government Party, such substitute may be a member of another 
Government Party and that members of Dail Eireann, not being members 
of the Joint Committee, may attend meetings and take part in the 
proceeding of the Select Committee, the Joint Committee and each sub-
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(16) That Members of the European Parliament elected from constituencies in 
Ireland (including Northern Ireland) and Members of the Irish delegation to 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe may attend meetings 
of the Joint Committee and of its sub-Committees; and that other Members 
of the European Parliament may, at the invitation of the Joint Committee 
or of a sub-Committee attend particular meetings. Members of the 
European Parliament and Members of the Irish delegation to the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe attending on such 
occasions may take part in proceedings without having a right to vote or to 
table amendments to Bills referred to the Committee under paragraph (4).
(17) That the Select Committee, the Joint Committee and each sub-Committee
previous to the commencement of business, shall elect one of its members 
to be Chairperson, who shall have only one vote.
(18) That all questions in the Select Committee, the Joint Committee and each
sub-Committee shall be determined by a majority of votes of the members 
present and voting and in the event of there being an equality of votes, the 
question shall be decided in the negative.
(19) That every report which the Select Committee or the Joint Committee 
proposes to make shall, on adoption by the Committee be laid before Dail 
Eireann or in the case of a report by the Joint Committee both Houses of 
the Oireachtas forthwith together with any document relating thereto 
which the Committee proposes to publish whereupon the Committee shall 
be empowered to print and publish such report and the said document, or 
documents, as the case may be.
(20) That notwithstanding paragraph (19), where the Joint Committee has 
completed Committee Stage of a Bill, it shall be empowered to print and 
publish the said Bill as amended, where appropriate.
(21) That the Joint Committee shall have the power to discuss and draft 
proposals for legislative changes and new legislation for recommendation 
to Ministers which are relevant to the matters comprehended by paragraph
(9).
(22) That the Joint Committee shall have the power to receive submissions and 
hear evidence from interested persons and organisations.
(23) That the Joint Committee shall have power to print and publish from time 
to time minutes of evidence taken before it together with such related 
documents as it thinks fit.
(24) That Ministers and Ministers of Stage shall discuss with the Joint 
Committee, where practicable, general proposals for legislation relevant to 
the matters comprehended by paragraph (9) prior to such legislation being 
approved and published by Government.
Committee without having a right to vote.
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(25) That Ministers and Ministers of State shall appear before the Joint 
Committee to discuss current policies relevant to paragraph (9) and the 
implementation of such policies in their Departments. A Minister or 
Minister of State may request the Joint Committee to convene to enable 
him or her to explain current or proposed policy or to initiate a debate 
thereon.
(26) That the quorum of the Joint Committee shall be 8, the quorum of the 
Select Committee shall be 5 and the quorum of each sub-Committee shall 
be a number to be decided by the sub-Committee when such sub­
committee is appointed.
(27) That no document received by the Clerk to the Select Committee, the Joint 
Committee or a sub-Committee shall be withheld, withdrawn or altered 
without the knowledge and approval of such Committee.
(28) That the Joint Committee shall have power to liaise and consult, as its 
deems necessary, with the Joint Committee on European Affairs to ensure 
co-ordination and co-operation between both Committees in relation to 
areas of common activities as provided in the respective Orders of 
reference.
(29) That the Joint Committee shall have power to request, as it deems 
appropriate, of the Joint Committee on European Affairs, that a joint 
meeting of both Committees be held to consider a specific matter or 
matters of common activity.
(30) That in the case of any joint meeting held with the Joint Committee on 
European Affairs the following shall apply:
(i) the Chairperson of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs shall also 
act as the Chairperson of any such joint meeting and in the event of 
his or her unavoidable absence from a joint meeting, a temporary 
Chairperson shall be elected from among the members present and 
voting;
(ii) the quorum for the joint meeting shall be 9, of whom at least 2 shall 
be members of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and at least 2 
shall be members of the Joint Committee on European Affairs; and
(iii) the Orders of Reference, as set out herein, shall otherwise continue 
to apply
(31) That all appointees to high office in the State shall attend meetings of the 
Joint Committee, as appropriate, and subject to the legal constraints of 
their office, to discuss issues which are relevant to the matters 
comprehended by paragraph (9).
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APPENDIX VI
TABLE INDICATING NUMBER OF INTERVENTIONS BY 
MEMBERS/SUBSTITUTES AT 1993  MEETINGS OF SELECT COMMITTEE
ON LEGISLATION AND SECURITY
Date 7 14 21 13 22 14 15 20 22 9 10 25 10
Month 5 5 5 7 7 9 9 9 9 11 11 11 12
Ahem D 5 2 2 2 5 3
Barrett S 8 1 5 5 2 1 3 18 1
Briscoe B 4 4 3 2 4 1 13 3
Browne J (C/K) 9 4 7 7 5 9 14 22 9 3 5 2 2
Callely I 4 1 8 7 6 3 4 3 1
Carey D 1 1 1 1
Clohessy P 8 1
Collins G 3 3 6
de Valera S
Fitzgerald L 5 5 2 2 18 5 11 4 3 1
Foley D 1 3 1 1 5
Gilmore E 7 8 10 4 5 1 7
Gregory T
Harte P 3 3 3 2 16
Kemmy J 7 1 2 4 4 1 2 1
Lenihan B 3 4 2 2
McDowell D 1 5 4 3 8 2 1 1
Mitchell G 7 13 55 26 15 27 5 30 11
Mulvihill J 1
O’Donnell L. 3 3 29 1
O’Donoghue J 3 3 4 1 6
Date 7 14 21 13 22 14 15 20 22 9 10 25 10
O’Keefe J 2 1 1 3 13 1 1 1
Power S 6 4 2 1
24 3
Ryan E 5 2 3 4 11
Ryan J 3 3
Shatter A 2 20 1 11 2 3 5
Shorthall R
Timmins G
Wallace D C H A I R M A N
Walsh E 2 1 4 1 2 4 2 2 4 1 1 2 1
d e  R o ssa  P. 8
H a rn ey  M. 11 7 13 1 0 9 11 2 0 7
M cM anus L. 12 1
C oste llo  J. 3 3 2 6 4 1 3
A h ern  N. 1 1
M cD ow ell M. 2 0 8 1
O ’K eefe  E. 1
M itchell J. 4 1
A h e rn  M. 2
F la h er ty  M. 1
F in u can e M. 2
K eo g h  H. I
F itzg e ra ld  B. 1
R a b b it te  P. 1
Source: O fficial reco rd s
Vhose m e m b e rs  lis te d  in  ita lic s  o p e r a te d  a s  s u b s t i tu te s  a t  so m e  o f  th e  1 9 9 3  m e e tin g s .
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\PPENDIX VII
nterventions made at sittings of the Select Committee on Legislation and Security - 1994
Date 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2/ 1 2 2 5
1/ 2/ 8/ 9/ 5/ 4/ 7/ 0/ 1/ 7/ 8/ 6 5/ 1/ 7/ /
1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 5 5 5 6 7 9 1
0
Ahem 5 1 1 3 1
Barrett 2 2
Briscoe 3 1 3 1 1
Browne 4 4 1 3 6 1 1 7 2 1 1 1 1
2 0 0 4 5 9
Callely 1 3 1 3 3 5 1
4
Carey 4 1 3 2 7
Clohessy 1
Collins
de Valera 1
Fitzgerald 2 3 5 4 1 1 1 6 1 1 3
8 9
Foley C C 1
Gilmore 3 1 1 3 2 9 1
1 2 1
Gregory 2 1
Harte 4 1 2
7
Kemmy 1 1 5 1
0
Lenihan 1 3 1
McDowell D. 1 1 3 2 3 1 2
0
Mitchell G. 1 3 6 2 6 3 1 2
2 6 3 5 0 6 2 6
Mulvihill 1 2
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O’Donnell 6 6 8 6 1
9
4 2
8
6
0
3
2
2 1
0
O’Donoghue 3 3 1 1 1 2
O’Keefe 2 8 4 4 1
0
6
Power 2 4 1 2 1
Ryan E. 7 6 2 5 7 3
Ryan J.
Shatter 3
0
1
7
4 1
3
5 1
1
1
2
4
Shorthall
Timmins
Wallace c c c c c c c c c c c c c c
Walsh
B ra d fo rd
1 2 1
1
4
C urrie 6 2
6
1
9
D e a sy 2
d e  R o ssa 2
D o yle 2
D u rk a n 2
F itzg e ra ld  F. 1
H illiard 1
K eogh 1 2
4
1 8
L a w lo r 9
M cD ow ell M. 2
6
3
8
6 1
8
M cM anus 1 1
9
7
R a b b it te 4 2
0
The members listed in italics attended as substitutes at various meetings throughout the year. Their
246
ittendance arose out of their positions such as spokespersons (Keogh and McManus as Equality and 
.aw Reform) or to maintain their party strength in the absence of regular attenders or simply 
Decause the particular Deputy wished to make a specific point relating to the debate in question.
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APPENDIX VIII
Interventions by members - Select Committee on Legislation and Security - 1995
Name 23/
3
30/
3
4/4 5/4 16/
5
1/6 7/6 9/6 16/
6
20/
6
12/7 5/1
0
6/1
0
1/11 7/1
1
5/1
2
6/1
2
7/1
2
Browne J. (C/K) 3 3 8 6 5 2 4 3 4 5 3 7 1 C C
Browne J. (Wex)
Fitzgerald L. 3 8 4 4 2 1 2 11 4 4
Flanagan C. C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
Gregory T. 1 3 1 1
Harte P. 6 7 1
Kenneally B. 4 2 3 9 3 10 1 3
McDowell D. 2 3 3 6 1 1 1 10 1
McGrath P. 1 9 2 3
Mulvihill J. 1 1 11
O’Dea W. 1 18 13 5 30 3 8 2 9 21 13
O’Donnell L. 4 5 21 15 14 30 16
Kemmy J. 1 1 * 1 1 1
O’Donoghue J. 1 19 9 13 12 8 26 23
O’Keefe J. 1 1 2 5 1 13
2 4 8
Shatter A. 6 1 1 5 14 21
Smith M. 1 34 1 2
Timmins G.
Wallace D. 2 1 5 4 15
Walsh E. 1 1 2 2 1 2 3
Woods M. 3 5 38 22 12 49 20 9 9 82 9 5 19 23 2 3
A h e m  N. 3 3
B ell M. 3
C lo h essy  P. 3
C on n a u g h to n 9
C oste llo  J. 9 3
C raw ford  S. 1
C reed  M. 1
D e a sy  A. 5 2
D o h erty  S. 7
F itzg e ra ld  F. 2
F erris M. 2
K eo g h  H. 16 7 17 28 21 36 15 15
M cD ow ell M. 4 11
O ’M alley  D. 9
249
P o w e r  S. 12
Names in italics indicate substitutes or Deputies who exercised the rights of non-members to attend and participate without a vote. During the 
year two Deputies, Michael McDowell and Des O’Malley are recorded as having so attended. Other Dail Deputies with an interest in or a portfolio 
to "shadow" which was the subject of committee business frequently substituted for members of their own parties.
Source: SCLS - Dâil Debates 1995
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APPENDIX IX -
Interventions by m em bers of Select Com m ittee on L egislation  and Security  - 1996
NAME 3 6/ 7/ 1 2/ 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2/ 8/ 2 3/ 1 1
0/ 2 2 3/ 5 4/ 8/ 3/ 8/ 0/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 3/ 1 1 6/ 1 0/ 7
1 3 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 0 0 1 2 1 /
1 2 1
2
BROWNE J.(C/K] 4 1 1 3 4 1 6 8 6 8 4 7 1 2 8
3 2 6
BROWNE J. (WEX)
FITZGERALD L. 5 1 5 2 7 3 3 1 1 3 2 2 2 5 1 1 1
0
FLANAGAN C. C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H H
GREGORY T. 1 4 5 2 3
5
HARTE P. 2 3
KEMMY J. 3 1 2 5
KENNEALLY B. 1 1 1
McDOWELL D. 7 1
5
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McGRATH P. * 3 2
MULVIHILL J. 1
O’DEA W. 1 8 6
9
O’DONNELL L. 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 1 3 1 4 3
1 8 4 3 1 5 8 3 4 6
0 ’DONOGHUE J. 6 2 1 9 5 1 8 1 1 1 2 9 2
2 8 3 8 6 5 2
O’KEEFE J. 1 2 2
SHATTER A. 5 4
SMITH M. 3 1
0
TIMMINS G.
WALLACE D. 6 2 1
WALSH E. 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 3
WOODS M. 4 2 4 5 1 5 1 2 2 4 3 9 1 2
8 0 3 1 9 3
BYRNE E. 1
KEOGH  H. 8 5
LYNCH K. 2
M O LLO YR . 9 2
2
2 52
O ’CUIV E. 1
8
POW ER S. 1
3
R Y A N  E. 5
(Source: Official parliamentary debates)
Names in italics operated as substitutes at certain committee meetings.
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APPENDIX X
Interventions - Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs - 1993
NAME/DATE 18/6 14/7 22/9 6/10 20/10 5/11 11/11 24/11 8/12 16/12a 16/12b
AHERN N. *
BREE D. 1 5 5 2 4 3 1 2
BRISCOE B. 4 2
COLLINS G. 1 3
CONNOR J. 13 8 5 5 12 2 3 2 1
COX P. *
DAVERN N. 2
DE ROSSA P. 13 27 5 3 3 2 3
DURKAN B. 6 3 6 3 2 5 2 2
ELLIS J. 4 1
FERRIS M. 6 4 3 4 2
GALLAGHER 
P. (L/O)
4 2 2 1 2 1 1
HOGAN P.
LAWLOR L.
LENIHAN B. CH CH CH CH CH CH CH CH CH CH
LOWRY M. 3
2 5 4
McDOWELL
M.
3 7 5 1
MORLEY P.J.
O’HANLON R. 3 3 1 4
( + CH)
O’KEEFE J. 5 3 1 2 17 1
OWEN N. 24 5 10 2 11 12 5 7
PENROSE W.
RYAN E. 1 1 7 1
RYAN S.
SHATTER
A.1
SENATORS 
DALY B.
SEL 6 1 2 SEL
LANIGAN M. SEL 7 6 8 2 6 7 SEL 1
MALONEY S. SEL 1 2 2 2 SEL 1
NORRIS D. SEL 10 4 1 SEL 1
TAYLOR- 
QUINN M.
SEL 3 1 1 2 2 SEL 1
1 Probably replaced by S. Barrett -no record found and therefore not included in calculations
2 55
BA N O TTIM . 1
BA R R E T T S.2 1 5 2 4 8 1
D E A SY  A. 4 5
FLAH ERTY M. 5 2
KEN N Y E. 1 6
KEOGH H. 4
MITCHELL G. 1
MITCHELL J. 2
O ’KEEFE E. 1
UPTON P. 2
Source: Official records [Note CH denotes chair and SEL denotes a meeting of the Select committee (TDs only]]
2 See footnote on previous page
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APPENDIX XI
Interventions - Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs - 1994
NAME /DATE 2
0/
1
2/
2
9/
2
2
3/
2
9/
3
2
3/
3
1
2/
4
3/
5
1
1/
5
1
2/
5
2
5/
5
2
9/
6
1/7 27/
7
14/
9
28/
9
7/
10
12/
10
19/
10
3/
11
23
/I
1
AHERN N. 3
BARRETT S. 2 3 5 3 1
BREE D. 2 2 3 2 1 7 2 1 4
BRISCOE B. 2 4 9 2 5 1 1 3 2 1 1
COLLINS G.
CONNOR J. 3 2 2 1 3 2 2 1
8
2 2 1 15 3 2 3 1 4
COX P. 3 2
DAVERN N.
DE ROSSA P. 5 1 2 7 1 9 2 3 2 2
DURKAN B. 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 3
ELLIS J. 1
FERRIS M. 1 1 4 1 3 3
GALLAGHER P. 
(L/O)
1 2 4 2 1 1 1 1 4
2 5 7
HOGAN P. 1
LAWLOR L. 1
LENIHAN B. C C C C C C C C C C C C C
LOWRY M.
MCDOWELL M. 2 2
7
1
1
3 4
MORLEY P.J.
O’HANLON R. c 1 1 2 1 1 1 c 3
; O’KEEFE J. 1 2 4 3 2 2 4 3 1 1
OWEN N. C 7 4 6 1
5
1
1
C 2
5
6 1 2 9 5 C C C C
PENROSE W.
RYAN E. 1
RYAN S.
SENATORS 
DALY B.
5 2 1 1
LANIGAN M. 7 1 4 1 3 3 1 1 2 3 1 4
MALONEY S. 1 1 1
NORRIS D. 2 2 1 7 4 2 1 1 2 4
TAYLOR-QUINN
M.
1 1 3 1 2 2 1 1 1 4
2 5 8
ALLEN B. 1
BLAN EY N. 1
BO YLAN  A. 1
BYRNE E. 1
COONEY P. 2
D E A SY  A. 1 1 2
LALOR P. 1
MCKENNA P. 2
MITCHELL G. 1
O ’M ALLEY D. 5
Source: Parliamentary debates - official records.
Note - those listed in italics attended as substitutes, MEPs, Council of Europe delegates or availed of the opportunity of all 
Oireachtas members to attend committee meetings.
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APPENDIX XII
Interventions at reported meetings of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs - 1995 and 1996
Name/ Date 15/3/
95
22/
3
95
28/
3
95
5/4
95
12/
4
95
3/5
95
7/6
95
15/
5
96
16/
5
96
4/
12
96
Aheam T. 1
Blaney N. 3 1 4
Bree D. 1 2 2 1
Briscoe B. 3 3 1 2 . 1 2 2
Burke R. 3 6 4 243 4 1 5 2
Connolly G. 1 1
Connor J. 1 3 1 2 1
Deasy A. 1 10 8 7
Dukes A. Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch Ch
Ferris M. 1 6 1 2 84 1
Gallagher P. (L/O) 1 1 4 1 2 3 1
3 A c t i n g  a s  c h a i r  -  f i g u r e s  d i s c o u n t e d  
4 As 9 above
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